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Despite the considerable emphasis on improving maintenance reliability in the 
petroleum industry by adopting an engineering approach (International Standards 
Organization, 2006b), production losses, ineffective maintenance, and major 
disasters continue to occur (Urbina, 2010; Pidgeon, 2000).  Analyses of these events 
have indicated that a failure to consider the human factors in the design (Taylor, 
2007), operation (Øien, 2001a), or maintenance (Bea, 1998) of hazardous process 
technologies is often an important contributor.  Based on research to evaluate the 
influence of these human factors on organisational performance, various models 
(Rasmussen, 1982; Dekker 2005) and taxonomies (Reason, 1998) for analysing 
organisational processes at the individual-, group- and organisational-level have been 
developed.   
 
By using these models, the current research was designed to determine the influence 
of human factors on maintenance reliability in petroleum operations.  Three studies 
were conducted in petroleum operations with the objective in the first two studies of 
identifying the most-frequent contributors to maintenance-related failures, and in the 
third study, determining if group differences between higher and lower reliability 
work areas could be differentiated on the basis of these human factors. 
 
In Study 1, the First Priority incident database of the target organisation was used to 
determine the most frequently reported human factors in maintenance-related, lost-
production failures.  The most-frequent factors in the incidents (N=194) were found 
to be Violations, Design & Maintenance, Detection, and Decision-making.  These 
results accorded with earlier studies in the field of human factors (Hobbs & 
Williamson, 2003; Lawton 1998), which frequently identified human error and 
violations as the causes of failures.  Study 2 provided a more rigorous investigation 
of the organisational contributors to failures through structured interviews with 
maintenance personnel.  The results of these interviews (N=38) using the Human 
Factors Investigation Tool (HFIT) (Gordon, 2005) demonstrated that Assumption, 
Design & Maintenance, and Communication were the most frequent contributors to 
maintenance-related failures. 
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Based on the predominant factors identified in Study 2, a survey of the perceptions of 
maintenance personnel (N=178) was conducted for Study 3.  Scales measuring 
Problem-solving (Morgeson & Humphrey, 2006) and Vigilance (Mann, Burnett, 
Radford, & Ford, 1997) were used to measure the processes that provoke 
assumptions.  Design & Maintenance items from HFIT (Gordon, 2001), and scales 
from Wiio’s (1978 a&b) Organisational Communication Development questionnaire 
(OCD/2) were used to test the factors identified in Study 2.  Exploratory Factor 
Analysis indicated that the responses to the Design & Maintenance items loaded onto 
a single variable, while the Communication items loaded onto two variables, which 
were named Job-related feedback and Information about change.   
 
The perceptions of personnel in lower and higher reliability work areas across the 
target organisation were compared using these scales, with reliability level ranked 
according to the monthly Mean Time Between Deferments of petroleum production.  
Significant between-group differences were found between work areas on Design & 
Maintenance and Problem-solving.  These results suggest that better maintainability 
in the design of plant is predictive of higher reliability level.  In addition, greater 
requirements for Problem-solving were associated with lower reliability level.  There 
were no significant effects of reliability on Vigilance or either communication 
measure. 
 
The quantitative data was triangulated with comments in response to an open-ended 
question asking about factors that help or hinder maintenance activities.  
Respondent’s comments indicated that Communication was not significantly 
associated with reliability at the group-level.  The reason appeared to be that 
Communication was an organisation-level property of the employing company.  
Many comments indicated that access to information was difficult, explaining the 
high occurrence of assumptions reported in Study 2.  In addition, although 
maintenance personnel generally agreed in the survey that they were vigilant in 
decision-making, personnel in lower reliability facilities provided a higher proportion 
of comments indicating that the decision-making of supervisors and management had 
a negative impact on their work. 
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The results of the three studies support past research demonstrating that problem-
solving skills (Tucker, 2002) and the design of socio-technical facilities (Reiman, 
Oedewald & Rollenhagen, 2005) have an important influence on organisational 
performance.  The findings further extend research in the field of human factors by 
demonstrating a significant relationship between these two factors and group-level 
performance.  The findings also demonstrated the importance of organisational 
communication, but as an organisational-level dimension that might not influence 
group-level measures.  This research has implications for organisations that operate 
complex, hazardous technologies and that are attempting to improve organisational 
processes by utilising a human factors approach.  
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1.0 Thesis Introduction and Overview 
1.1 Introduction 
Theory and practice in the fields of industrial maintenance, and engineering 
reliability have undergone significant development over the past decades.  This has 
mainly concerned the effectiveness and efficiency of the organisations that manage 
hazardous technologies.  In parallel with this have been the advances in research into 
human factors and organisational behaviour, which have improved the understanding 
of the role of humans in supporting the function of these organisations. 
 
The knowledge gained from studying hazardous technologies has been in two 
principal domains: 1) knowledge about the processes that occur when machines fail, 
and 2) knowledge about the factors that create high reliability.  For example, Reason 
(1997) estimated that approximately 50-70% of industrial failures involve a human 
element, including the Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, Bhopal and even the Barings 
Bank failures.  While the characteristics of organisations regarded as High Reliability 
Organisations have been well-studied, less information is available concerning how 
humans maintain on-going reliability in other technology-intensive industrial 
workplaces.  More needs to be understood about how successful functioning of 
equipment on a ‘day-to-day’ basis is achieved in those industries in which work is 
not as heavily regulated and proceduralised as it is in aircraft and nuclear power plant 
maintenance operations.   
 
Aviation and nuclear power generation pose a safety risk to large numbers of people 
and to whole communities, and for this reason have been intensively studied.  In 
other hazardous industries, such as petroleum production, there have been far fewer 
studies of the factors influencing safety and reliability.  However, the financial 
criticality of petroleum production, the potential to injure workers, and the potential 
for environmental damage are still high, as recent events demonstrated in the disaster 
involving British Petroleum’s Deepwater Horizon platform (Urbina, 2010).  The 
value of production for one company can be in the hundreds of thousands of dollars 
per hour, maintenance costs can be in the hundreds of millions of dollars per year, 
capital costs are often in the billions of dollars, and millions of consumers may be 
dependent on the continuity of supply.  On this basis alone, the factors that influence 
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maintenance reliability in the petroleum industry, including the human factors, would 
warrant attention.   
 
Petroleum production, as with most modern industrial processes, relies on 
management by humans of complex control systems to maintain production at 
dependable levels and avoid dangerous operational states.  Traditionally, the field of 
industrial reliability has concerned itself with technical solutions to inadequate 
maintenance performance and failures (Dhillon, 2002).  However, even in 
engineering-oriented environments, recognition has emerged of the human factors 
underlying historical and potential failures (Pidgeon & O'Leary, 2000; Pate-Cornell, 
1993).  The growing body of research on the role of human factors in failures has 
demonstrated the importance of continuing to develop an understanding of the 
connection between the fields of organisational psychology on one hand, and 
engineering design and maintenance on the other.  
 
The overall aim of the current thesis has been to address the need for a greater 
understanding of the influence of human factors on maintenance-related reliability in 
the unique environment of the petroleum industry.  In order to more fully understand 
the origins of failures and the sources of reliability, an integrative approach was 
chosen in which a group-level measure for plant reliability was derived along with 
empirical measures of the human factors known to influence workgroup 
performance.  Current theoretical frameworks for understanding human behaviour 
assisted in developing an understanding of these potential influences.  The aim of the 
current thesis was to characterise the relationship between specific human factors and 
measurable maintenance outcomes in a petroleum industry context, in order to 
develop a more comprehensive understanding of the origins of reliable industrial 
performance. 
 
1.2 Thesis Overview  
 Following this introduction, Chapter 2 is a review of theoretical and empirical 
research concerning reliability in a maintenance context, and the human factors that 
influence organisational performance.  The literature is surveyed in order to provide 
an understanding of the relevant developments in the fields of engineering, 
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organisational psychology, management, human factors, and industrial safety.  In 
addition, developments specific to the petroleum industry are reviewed to provide 
background on the organisational context for the three studies in this thesis, which 
were all conducted within a single petroleum organisation.  
 
Chapter 3 offers a rationale for conducting research aimed at identifying the human 
factors that promote failure or success in maintenance work.  In addition to justifying 
the need for further research, the benefits in terms of developing the theory 
surrounding human factors in the workplace, and an appropriate methodology are 
discussed. 
 
Chapter 4 describes Study 1, in which company incident reports were examined to 
identify the most-frequent human factors in maintenance failures.  An evaluation of 
the methodology is provided, and the limitations of obtaining data from internal 
investigation reports are discussed. 
 
Chapter 5 describes Study 2, which used a validated structured interview method to 
obtain detailed human factors information concerning past failures.  The results from 
interviews conducted with maintenance personnel, and specifically, descriptions of 
the most frequently recurring contributing factors, are presented.  Comparisons with 
the results from Study 1 are used to demonstrate the value of investigating the 
underlying organisational factors contributing to the occurrence of failures.  
 
Chapter 6 discusses different ways in which the reliability of production facilities 
could be measured.  This includes the standards by which engineering practitioners 
quantify reliability.  The results of examining different reliability measures are 
presented, and one measure selected as the means of ranking the reliability level of 
different work areas within the target company, as needed for Study 3. 
 
Chapter 7 describes the methodology and results, and provides a discussion of the 
findings obtained from Study 3.  This study was designed to compare perceptions of 
maintenance personnel across nine production areas representing low, middle and 
high reliability facilities in each of three facility types.  The survey measured 
perceptions of those human factors identified from Study 2 as being most frequently 
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occurring in maintenance failures.  The results are discussed, including the 
implications for addressing the positive and negative influences of human factors on 
the performance of maintenance workgroups. 
 
Comments were also requested from the maintenance personnel who completed the 
survey form.  These comments concerned their perceptions of the impediments to the 
conduct of reliable maintenance activities.  In Chapter 8, a content analysis of the 
themes and super-ordinate themes in their comments is provided.  The results of the 
qualitative analyses provided supporting information that aided in the interpretation 
of the quantitative analysis findings presented in Chapter 7. 
 
Finally, Chapter 9 offers an overall discussion of the knowledge gained from the 
three studies.  Significant findings of this thesis concerning the influence of human 
factors on maintenance reliability are reviewed.  The investigations of human factors 
in failures, and the quantitative assessment of human factors in day-to-day reliability, 
are related to a theoretical understanding of the way that human factors impact on the 
workplace.  In addition, the development and use of suitable measurement 
instruments for obtaining human factors and reliability data in the petroleum industry 
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2.0 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, a cross-section of the research in the human factors, organisational 
psychology, and management literature will be reviewed in order to understand how 
the role of human factors in maintenance reliability and in the petroleum industry are 
currently viewed.  First, the literature relating to the concept of reliability in 
maintenance activities will be reviewed.  Examination of the traditional engineering 
approach to reliability will be complemented by reviewing the research concerning 
the influence of human factors on maintenance tasks at the individual, group, and 
organisational levels.  Consideration will then be given to the concept and 
requirements of a ‘High Reliability Organisation’ (HRO).  The chapter will finish 
with ideas about the research required to understand the human factors that 
determine organisational performance in the maintenance of petroleum operations. 
 
2.2 The Maintenance Task 
In order to understand the way in which the reliability of maintenance activities 
develop in a petroleum industry environment, and in turn the role of humans in 
addressing the faults and limitations in industrial equipment, it is important to 
consider the nature of maintenance processes.  The International Standards 
Organization (2006b) describes maintenance in an industrial environment as 
involving two essential types of activities, termed corrective maintenance and 
preventive maintenance.  Preventive maintenance refers to “maintenance carried out 
at predetermined intervals or according to prescribed criteria and intended to reduce 
the probability of failure or the degradation of the functioning of an item” (p.7).  The 
requirements for this are typically specified in routine preventative maintenance 
procedures, such as lubricating, adjusting, cleaning, and checking operating values.  
Some preventive procedures require a deeper understanding of the current state of 
the equipment, which can generally only be obtained through investigative processes 
termed condition monitoring (Moubray, 1997).  Typically, condition monitoring 
includes detecting the extent of wear, vibration, excessive power consumption, 
leakage, or physical damage, which may in turn require corrective maintenance. 
 
In contrast, corrective maintenance refers to restoring an item of equipment to a state 
in which it is able to perform its function, if it has been only partially functioning or 
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has stopped functioning altogether (Moubray, 1997).  This item can be as simple as a 
screw or as complex as an entire production plant.  In either case, equipment ceases 
to function properly for a wide variety of reasons, including wear, corrosion, the 
deleterious effects of other components, and physical or electrical damage.  It is the 
task of the maintenance technicians to determine what has failed and how best to 
repair the item in terms of available resources, such as time, budget, tools, spares, 
and expertise.   
 
At times, maintenance technicians will have the benefit of detailed procedures 
(Bourrier, 1996) to provide guidance concerning the correct course of action.  At 
other times, they may need to rely on past personal and industry experience to 
identify solutions.  For this reason, corrective maintenance often requires similar 
activities as preventive maintenance, but a different cognitive approach, as a greater 
degree of problem-solving and decision-making is required to eliminate faults.  An 
additional task that has been fundamental to the maintenance role, particularly in the 
aviation industry, is to not only correct a fault, but also to determine why it has 
occurred and to advise other interested parties of what has occurred in terms of both 
the problem and the solution.  Boeing (Rankin, 2007) has facilitated this process 
within aviation companies by supplying software called the Maintenance Error 
Decision Aid (MEDA).  MEDA was developed for recording and analysing 
maintenance incidents, and providing information to the industry on the means of 
addressing the causes of incidents (Latorella & Prabhu, 2000).   
 
Aside from initial design, the performance of maintenance activities, and particularly 
the analysis of faults, will determine how reliably equipment, and in turn, petroleum 
production processes will perform.  This concept of reliability is central to 
understanding the factors that influence the effective execution of maintenance tasks, 
and will be considered in the next section. 
 
2.3 Concept of Reliability  
Reliability is defined in theoretical terms (Sharma & Kumar, 2008) as “a measure of 
the probability for failure-free operation during a given interval” (p. 893).  More 
empirically, reliability is expressed as a function of the mean operating time between 
failures, known as the Mean Time-To-Failure (MTTF) (Lewis, 1996).  A concept 
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related to reliability, concerning the effectiveness of maintenance in petroleum and 
other industrial operations is availability (International Standards Organization, 
2006b).  Availability refers to the percentage of time that a plant or item of 
equipment can fulfil its intended function, and is the inverse of the non-operating 
time experienced, known as downtime.  Downtime can be either planned for 
maintenance activities or unplanned due to failures.  Methods for applying these 
concepts to the measurement of the performance of plant and equipment are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
 
Measures of reliability, availability, and downtime provide a means for determining 
the effective use of production facilities, involving both the maintenance and 
operation of equipment.  Krishnasamy, Khan and Haddara (2005) in their analysis of 
risk-assessment as a basis for maintenance strategies stated that: 
Profitability is closely related to the availability and reliability of the 
equipment.  The major challenge for a maintenance engineer is to implement 
a maintenance strategy, which maximizes availability and efficiency of the 
equipment; controls the rate of equipment deterioration; ensures a safe and 
environmentally friendly operation; and minimizes the total cost of the 
operation.  This can only be achieved by adopting a structured approach to 
the study of equipment failure and the design of an optimum strategy for 
inspection and maintenance (p.70). 
 
Reliability as a focus for structuring maintenance activities was developed 
conceptually by Moubray (1997) in his widely adopted approach to plant 
maintenance, termed Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM).  RCM is still 
considered a fundamental means of approaching the technical factors in industrial 
maintenance (Cheng, Jia, Gao, Wu, & Wang, 2008).  Moubray defined RCM as “a 
process used to determine what must be done to ensure that any physical asset 
continues to do what its users want it to do in its present operating context” (p.7).  In 
contrast, failures occur when equipment is “unable to fulfil a function to a standard 
of performance which is acceptable to the user” (p.9).  Thus, reliability not only 
requires that an item of equipment carries out the functions for which it was 
designed, but that it also reaches a specified level of performance that is acceptable 
to the owner or operator.  
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Closely related to the concept of reliability is the concept of process safety.  
Research on process safety and reliability are enmeshed in part due to ambiguity in 
the usage of the two terms.  Within industries viewed as high-risk, such as aviation, 
nuclear power production, and petroleum production, the terms safety and reliability 
are often used synonymously.  For example, safety in these organisations generally 
does not refer to eliminating occupational injuries, such as ‘slips, trips and falls’ 
(McDonald, Corrigan, Daly, & Cromie, 2000).  More often safety implies the 
reliability of equipment, that is, that the equipment carries out the function for which 
it was designed, and that the probability of failure-free operation is as high as 
possible.  For example, reliability of an aircraft implies that it will not fail during 
flight, and hence will not endanger passengers, crews, or communities in its flight 
path.  A factor in achieving this is the performance of maintenance and operational 
crews (Salas, Burke, Bowers, & Wilson, 2001; Salas et al., 1999).   
 
The occurrence of failures then implies lower reliability and a reduction in the level 
of safety.  Latorella and Prabhu (2000) examined a number of issues relating to 
aviation safety, focussing mainly on human errors that have been linked to fatal 
crashes.  The same analysis included maintenance-related issues of efficiency, in 
which maintenance errors required aircraft to turn back, return to the gate, or be 
otherwise delayed.  In Latorella and Prabhu’s discussion, safety was linked to 
reliable outcomes from maintenance activities.  Similarly, in discussing nuclear 
power plant safety, Pyy (2001) studied the impact of various types of maintenance-
related failures on plant operating systems, such as instrument valves.  Safety in this 
context particularly relates to the reliability of the safety systems designed to prevent 
loss of coolant, reactor fires, or release of radiation, as occurred in the Chernobyl 
nuclear reactor accident (Munipov, 1992).  The issue of process safety, whether in 
aviation, chemical processing, or petroleum production, is therefore closely related to 
the dimension of reliability. 
 
2.4 Cost of Unreliability 
As Cooke (2003) contends, “the nature of maintenance work has changed as a result 
of a huge increase in the number and variety of physical assets to be maintained, 
increasing automation, and complexity” (p. 239).  As a result, in the petroleum 
                                                     Human Factors and Plant Maintenance Reliability 9
industry, a considerable portion of budgets is devoted to the maintenance of the large 
number of items of processing equipment, operating in both marine off-shore and on-
shore environments.  For example, one petroleum production company estimated that 
~30% of their operating budget was expended on maintenance, accounting for 
$174.8 million in 2006.  Eti, Ogaji and Probert (2006) estimated that 40% of the cost 
of energy generation could typically be attributed to maintenance processes, but that 
this figure is up to 15% lower in better-performing organisations. 
 
In addition to these high costs associated with repair and servicing of production 
equipment, loss of production due to breakdowns, or unplanned maintenance 
downtime associated with the maintenance process, also represent a significant cost 
to the organisation.  An indication of the value of maintenance-related losses in 
production can be derived from production figures for a large petroleum gas plant.  
For example, Exxon Mobil’s Longford Gas Plant near Melbourne, Australia can 
produce 1000 TJ/day of Liquefied Natural Gas and 8M litres/day of Liquefied 
Petroleum Gas (Victorian Government Department of Primary Industry, 2009).  At 
current commodity rates, this equates to approximately US$225,000/hour, which 
could be lost as a result of a failure affecting a critical area of production.  On-going 
losses at this rate will affect commercial performance and ultimately the viability of 
the company.  Aoudia, Belmokhtar, and Zwingelstein (2008) examined the 
consequences of poor maintenance management in petroleum operations using 
interviews, questionnaires, and audits.  They found that although planned 
maintenance accounted for only 2% of unproductive time, unplanned maintenance 
accounted for 66% of unproductive time.  The cost to the company of this 
unreliability was equivalent to a 13% reduction in sales, not counting the indirect 
costs of ineffective maintenance, such as higher consumption of spares and damage 
to reputation.   
 
The effects of poor maintenance extend beyond lost production income for the 
company involved.  Sovacool (2008) estimated that total property damage due to 
infrastructure accidents in the petroleum industry from 1907 to 2007 amounted to 
US$ 10.1 billion.  For example, losses to the Western Australian state economy 
resulted from an explosion on 3 June 2008 of the gas installation on Varanus Island, 
Western Australia.  The explosion was the result of a gas leak due to a failure to 
                                                     Human Factors and Plant Maintenance Reliability 10 
conduct maintenance inspections of a critical pipeline.  The ensuing explosion 
caused loss of gas production for four months, representing 30% of the state’s gas 
supply.  The total loss to the state economy was estimated at between A$120 million 
and A$2.4 billion (Senate Standing Committee on Economics, 2008), depending on 
which impacts were included.  Another example of the high cost of a maintenance 
failure in a petroleum facility is the Piper Alpha oil platform disaster on 6 July 1988 
that led to the loss of 167 lives and a financial loss to the company of US$ 3 billion.  
Altogether, Sovacool (2008) estimated that 3,330 fatalities had resulted from 
infrastructure accidents in the petroleum industry from 1907 to 2007.   
 
The outcomes of a lack of reliability in maintenance are reduced performance of 
equipment, poor control over processes, and risk of financial and human losses.  Out 
of these losses developed a recognition of the need for maintaining a high degree of 
reliability, and the need for interventions to improve the maintenance of systems that 
were required to be as close to 100% reliability as possible (Hollnagel, 2006).  The 
following discussion is an examination of theoretical and empirical research into the 
dimensions of high reliability relating to the task of maintenance in petroleum 
operations.   
   
 2.5 Determining Reliability in Maintenance Operations 
As described above, the consequences of loss of reliability and control over 
processes have resulted in a range of adverse impacts on production processes 
(Pidgeon & O'Leary, 2000) as well as injuries to humans.  Both disruptions to 
production and injuries to people represent costs which organisations hope to avoid 
by determining reliability requirements.  As Reason and Hobbs (2003) discussed, 
past disasters demonstrated the need for organisations to maintain control over 
systems and processes, and manage human performance, in order to achieve 
reliability in maintenance.  However, this often does not happen, as Lofsten (2000) 
found in examining the maintenance approaches of eight Swedish companies.  
Although maintenance efficiency in operations was monitored, they rarely measured 
reliability, and so were not able to address the potential for failure and the 
consequent potential for the losses described above.  He argued for the need for a 
measure of the effectiveness that maintenance inputs had on the reliability of 
production.  Researchers in the energy field (Eti, Ogaji, & Probert, 2006) also 
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expressed the need for performance measures of “both effectiveness (doing the right 
things) and efficiency (doing those things right)” (p.306).    
 
However, as Cooke (2003) argues in relation to manufacturing firms, “What is 
lacking in the maintenance regime is to develop a far more rigorous maintenance 
strategy to look into improving the long-term reliability of the equipment” (p.242).  
In addition to a lack of a maintenance reliability strategy, another problem with 
determining reliability is the time lag that often occurs between performance of 
maintenance activities and observable outcomes.  A study of nuclear reactor 
incidents (Svenson & Salo, 2001) found that 40% of serious errors requiring licensee 
event reports could remain undetected for more than 10 weeks.  Thus, operations 
may experience a progressive reduction in the reliability of maintenance, with no 
indication of a need for corrective action before a major incident occurs.  Given that 
reliability encapsulates the ability of operations to continue to operate without 
failures, researchers such as Øien (2001a) sought ways to determine the risks to 
reliability in the activities of petroleum industry operations.  In Øien’s approach to 
reliability, he conceptualised the relationship between maintenance activities, 
reliability, and risk to production performance in his Organisational Leak Model 
(Figure 1).   
 
In this model, a number of factors are seen to impact on the corrective and 
preventative maintenance processes described in Section 2.2.  This includes initial 
design as well as factors relating to the individual (e.g. training and competence), 
workgroup (e.g. planning) and the organisation (e.g. procedures and organisational 
control).  These in turn impact on the physical condition of the plant (e.g. valves and 
instrumentation) which then influence Øien’s measure of petroleum plant reliability, 
namely the frequency of leaks.  Sklet (2006) further estimated that from 2001 to 
2004, 40% of these oil and gas releases were due to errors in manual work, such as 
maintenance, indicating the relevance of this model to reliability. 
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Figure 1.  Petroleum organisation reliability model (Øien, 2001a) 
 
Although the adverse impacts on production and their causes may vary depending on 
the organisational context, Øien’s approach represented a means by which companies 
could determine reliability based on the various risks to processes occurring within 
their operations. 
 
2.6 Engineering Approaches to Improving Reliability 
As a consequence of understanding the value of reliability in industrial operations, 
many researchers have focussed on methods for improving reliability (Saleh & 
Marais, 2006; Thomas, 2005; Vanderhaegen, 1999).  As failures were often viewed 
as faults in equipment, processes, and technologies, the approach to improving 
reliability was consequently viewed as a technical task, typically based on 
engineering methodologies (Lewis, 1996; Reinach & Viale, 2006; Scarf, Dwight, & 
Al-Musrati, 2005).  Engineering methodologies relied on making technical changes 
in order to re-engineer processes and technologies that were viewed as faulty or 
failure-prone (Wang, 2002; Zequeira & Berenguer, 2006).  These ‘re-engineering’ 
methodologies typically involved technical audits (De Groote, 1995), engineering 
risk assessments (Kadak & Matsuo, 2007), and design improvements to re-work 
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equipment layouts, processing stages, engineering specifications, and physical inputs 
to processes (Kinnersley & Roelen, 2007).  Technical designs and engineering 
specifications were thus considered to define the potential production output for a 
particular operation.   
 
The actual productivity of an operation was considered to be subject to a range of 
risk factors that might impact on the reliability of critical processes, as shown in 
Øien’s model (Figure 1).  From an engineering frame of reference (Bamber, Castka, 
Sharp, & Motara, 2003), most of the risk factors encountered in production appear to 
be concerned with the technical limitations to achieving the potential production 
output.  Bamber et al. discuss the concept of Overall Equipment Effectiveness as a 
measure of plant performance that is a function of 1) the time a machine is available, 
2) the rate at which it operates compared to its design rate, and 3) the quality of its 
output.  A machine’s Overall Equipment Effectiveness is impaired by technical 
factors, such as wear, corrosion, leaks, power outages, production bottlenecks, and 
shortages of spare parts.  Research in the various fields of reliability engineering has 
focussed on the development of technical concepts and reliability models concerning 
the probability and consequence of these risks eventuating (Dhillon, 2002).  For 
example, Krishnasamy, Khan, and Haddara (2005) considered risk-based 
maintenance methodologies in which maintenance activities were determined by the 
probability of a component or machine failing.  Again, risk assessments were only 
based on the probability of technical faults occurring.  These methods generally 
relied on the failure rates being known and constant.  Todinov (2004) examined the 
commonly accepted reliability measure of Mean Time-to-Failure (MTTF), and 
considered that it was only applicable to repeating failures, as in the case of 
components that wear out at a relatively constant rate.  He argued that, in its basic 
form, MTTF is difficult to apply as a reliability measure in situations in which 
failures occur randomly, as in the petroleum industry.  As an alternative, he 
suggested that the Minimum Failure-Free Operating Period was a better measure of 
reliability, as it provided a better indication of when preventative maintenance was 
required.  Different measures of reliability and risk will be discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 6.    
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Tixier, Dusserre, Salvi, and Gaston (2002) reviewed 62 different methods of risk 
analysis devised for industry.  They found that these analysis methods were designed 
to 1) identify risks based on activities and equipment, 2) evaluate the damage 
consequences or the probability of the risk, and/or 3) rank the risks so that the most 
severe risks are corrected first.  Methods, such as Reliability-Centred Maintenance, 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), have 
been developed as a basis for identifying all technical risk factors related to past and 
possible future failures (Lewis, 1996; Sharma & Kumar, 2008).  In each of these 
methods, the objective is to identify as many existing mechanisms of failure (e.g., 
FTA) or potential modes (e.g., FMEA) as understanding of the technology allows.  In 
this way, the engineering approach to reliability commonly involves using risk 
analysis techniques to capture all known and suspected causes of technical failure in 
a particular piece of equipment or a system. 
 
Following this approach, researchers in the petroleum industry such as Øien (2001b) 
have developed structured methodologies for reducing operational risk and 
improving reliability through maintenance effectiveness.  Øien developed a 
quantitative risk analysis model to characterise the technical ‘risk influencing 
factors’ that increase the potential risk (e.g., ‘probability of ignition due to drive 
unit’) and those that reduce the potential risk (e.g., ‘number of drillings and 
completions’).  The overall risk to reliability can then be calculated from the 
mathematical interaction of these probabilities of failure.  Insight into the current 
approach to reliability in industry can be gained by examining advertisements for 
Reliability Engineers.  In one advertisement (TiWest Joint Venture, 2007), the stated 
aim was to develop maintenance strategies and use “analysis of equipment and 
components to improve plant availability and reduce cost and ensure compliance to 
statutory standards” (p. 19).  Characteristically, the advertisement did not indicate 
recognition of the role of the humans charged with the task of maintaining this 
equipment and componentry.  The engineering approach involves addressing as 
many of these technical mechanisms as is practically possible and economically 
justifiable.  Although non-technical factors could be considered in these techniques 
for risk analysis and reliability measurement, in practice the engineering approach 
generally involves understanding the technical risk factors in order to improve the 
technology used. 
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2.6.1 Efforts to improve reliability through maintainability 
A part of the engineering approach to improving the reliability of technology 
involves ensuring that the technical design of equipment facilitates on-going 
maintenance, a dimension referred to as maintainability.  The International Standards 
Organisation (2006a) defines maintainability as the:  
Ability of an item under given conditions of use, to be retained in, or restored 
to, a state in which it can perform a required function, when maintenance is 
performed under given conditions and using stated procedures and resources.  
(p. 15) 
Thus, the implication of this concept is that the maintainability of an item of 
equipment is a function of its inherent ability to be maintained, i.e. its original 
design, and specified maintenance procedures (Mason, 1990).  These maintenance 
procedures are further defined (International Standards Organization, 2006a) as the 
“combination of all technical and administrative actions, including supervision 
actions, intended to retain an item in, or restore it to, a state in which it can perform a 
required function” (p.17).  Meanwhile, regarding this inherent design, the standard 
states: 
The design of an item shall ensure three things, namely:  
a) that it achieves the performance required of it 
b) that it is reliable 
c) that it is maintainable.  
The second and third of these characteristics directly affect the maintenance 
effort which shall be expended on an item in that the achieved reliability 
reflects the frequency of unscheduled maintenance and the maintainability 
reflects the effort necessary to undertake all maintenance.  
Therefore actions performed during the design of an item and intended to 
affect the failure rate and the severity of the failures call mainly for reliability 
techniques, but those intended to affect the preventive and corrective 
maintenance and the duration, cost, and support requirements of maintenance 
tasks call mainly for maintainability techniques.  An item that can be 
maintained easily and is supported by a competent and efficient maintenance 
organization has a greater availability and a reduced life cycle cost than one 
that does not have these attributes.  (pp. 17-19) 
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The implication of these examples is that, despite an acknowledgement of the role of 
the maintenance organisation, it is the quality of engineering design that will dictate 
the requirements for ‘competency and efficiency’ of maintenance personnel and 
maintenance strategies.  This is also reflected in the hope that maintainability can be 
designed into the equipment from the start, as described in the section of the 
International Standards Organization standard (2006a) entitled Statement of 
Maintainability Requirements, “Maintainability should be specified in such a way 
that the designer has a clear understanding of the need for maintenance and the 
manner in which the item is to be supported” (p. 25). 
 
Despite this recognised need for improved maintainability, Tjiparuro and Thompson 
(2004) argued, “maintainability evaluation methods are characterized by their 
fragmentation and lack of standardization, a factor that will contribute to their 
difficulty of implementation at design” (p. 105).  They suggested simplifying designs 
and improving labelling of parts as basic steps to improve the maintainability of 
equipment, contending that “ the possibility of introducing the wrong components or 
making incorrect adjustments is an area where poor maintenance can lead to 
reliability problems” (p.111).  Therefore, although it may be reassuring for 
technically-focussed organisations to believe that proper designs currently ensure 
that systems are both maintainable and reliable, this has not been supported by the 
evidence.  The examples mentioned above of serious technical failures of engineered 
systems and the complexities of ensuring maintainability indicate that an engineering 
approach that relies exclusively on technical factors may not be capable of reducing 
the risk of failure. 
 
2.7 Failure of the Engineering Approach 
2.7.1 Engineering design flaws 
In the Piper Alpha oil platform disaster mentioned above, Pate-Cornell (1993) traced 
many of the failure mechanisms back to the design of the platform.  Although she 
highlighted a number of organisational issues as being responsible for creating the 
potential for a disaster, she concluded that it was the ‘couplings and dependencies’ 
between systems that led to events spiralling out of control.  These couplings 
included the dependence of safety systems on the main power supplies, proximity of 
emergency control systems to production equipment, and the grouping together of 
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alternative escape facilities.  In addition, common-mode failures were not considered 
in the design, namely, those situations in which several emergency systems failed 
through a single, common cause.  Pidgeon and O’Leary (2000) contended that in 
many failures, the designs did not provide for complex, unexpected interactions 
within and between systems.   
 
The role of engineering design in failures in process industries, such as in petroleum 
and chemical plants, was further supported by data (Taylor, 2007) that 55% of the 
accidents in chemical industries were the result of design errors.  In the cases of 
reactor incidents, in which 46% of the errors made in incidents with nuclear reactors 
were related to design, Taylor listed among the causes of design error: oversights, 
unknown effects at the time of design, overlooked interactions, and communication 
problems.  Kinnersley and Roelen (2007) arrived at similar figures for design-related 
accidents, i.e.  51% for aviation and 46% for nuclear power generation.  However, as 
they explained, considerable understanding of the processes involved was required to 
determine whether or not design was a root cause of an accident, and other 
confounding issues might in fact have contributed to accidents, particularly with 
regard to operational procedures not intended by the designer. 
 
In their discussion of the interventions preceding the Challenger space shuttle 
disaster, Starbuck and Milliken (1988) postulated the reason why many engineering 
processes actually increased the probability of failure.  They called this a ‘fine 
tuning’ process in which “successes may induce engineers and managers to attempt 
to fine-tune a socio-technical system - to render it less redundant, more efficient, 
more profitable, cheaper, or more versatile.  Fine-tuning rarely raises the probability 
of success and it often makes success less certain” (p.323).  In effect, systems have 
been engineered to the point at which control became more difficult, despite so-
called ‘better designs.’  This and discussion of other accidents provided evidence of 
the paradoxes inherent in resolving problems exclusively through an engineering 
approach. 
 
Heimann (2005) used a further analysis of space shuttle accidents, as an example of 
why technologies experienced repeated failures.  Designs were presumed to be 
“well-defined, precise, and objective applications of technical knowledge” (p.110).  
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However, his investigations of technical failures revealed that there was in fact 
considerable ambiguity, deviation from specifications, and the need to make 
decisions without complete knowledge of the true situation, which effectively 
amounted to a loss of cognitive control.  Heimann then went on to say that technical 
failures continued to occur because organisations have continually tried to decide 
how to allocate resources to prevent failure, but lacked knowledge about the true 
state of their systems.  They believed that they understood their systems well enough 
to control them, but he contended that control also required understanding of the 
non-technical influences.  This was demonstrated by the Deepwater Horizon 
explosion and oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico on 20 April 2010, which was attributed 
(Urbina, 2010) not to the design of the rig, but to bad decisions, unheeded warning 
signs, compounding of small lapses, and “exceptions to rules [that] allowed risks to 
accumulate and made disaster more likely on the rig” (p.A1). 
 
As Bea (1998) argued, engineering practitioners have not sufficiently concerned 
themselves with the support systems needed for engineered structures, such as the 
non-technical systems for maintenance, warnings, communication, and information.  
More significantly, he contended that engineers have also not developed the human 
systems needed to cope with the evolution of critical failures of technical systems.  If 
this is the case, then the occurrence of failures identified in the studies described 
above as ‘design errors’ may not be the cause of failures, but rather a symptom of not 
recognising the role of non-technical factors in technical systems.  These non-
technical factors include the involvement of humans in constructing, selecting, 
operating, and maintaining the equipment and processes on which engineered 
systems rely.  For example, despite engineering improvements in the mining 
industry, Tomlingson (2005) estimated that since the 1970’s, maintenance activities 
have risen to 35% of mining costs and that “unnecessary downtime continues to 
threaten mining performance” (p.54).  He suggested that a major part of this is due to 
a failure of other departments to support the activities of maintenance personnel.  In 
theory, the efforts to engineer reliability and maintainability should over time have 
led to reliability improvement, and overall maintenance and downtime reductions.  
By utilising technical investigations and design improvements, the causes of failure 
in a particular technology should have been progressively eliminated.  However, in 
practice, the indications are that unnecessary costs and failures are not being 
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eliminated.  Ultimately, flawed technical designs may be only one consideration in 
failures of engineered systems, with a lack of support for humans working with those 
designs being an equally important consideration. 
 
2.7.2 Nature of problems highlights the non-technical issues. 
In regard to design-related failures, Kinnersley and Roelen (2007) commented on the 
need to widen the scope of determining the causality of failures: 
The observation that design issues were causal or contributing to the accident 
does not mean that other factors (such as human factors, operational 
procedures, maintenance issues, etc) did not play a role.  (p.34) 
Similarly, in a study involving 200 Offshore Installation Managers across the North 
Sea Petroleum Industry (O'Dea & Flin, 2001), many were of the opinion that the 
focus needed to change from technical and design issues to leadership, 
communication and employee motivation.  That is, in terms of operational reliability, 
technical design had not produced the required outcomes, and management believed 
that refocusing on managing workforce behaviour was necessary.  In addition to the 
design issues mentioned above in the Piper Alpha oil platform explosion, Pate-
Cornell  (1993) also attributed the failures to “inexperience, poor maintenance 
procedures, and deficient learning mechanisms” (p.232).  Therefore, it was not only 
the continuing occurrence of technical failures in complex systems that indicated to 
researchers that a change in paradigm was required, but also the recognition of the 
nature of these failures. 
 
The problems inherent in retaining control over systems in which humans interact 
closely with technology, termed socio-technical systems, was studied by Brehmer 
(1993).  He attributed loss of control in these systems to the understanding that 
modern technical systems were ‘complex, opaque, and dynamic.’  Specifically:  
• the complexity of tightly-coupled processes can involve conflicting goals 
• there are limitations to how much of these systems can be observed, and  
• these systems are changing, both by themselves and through organisational 
interventions. 
 
In Rasmussen’s (1997a) pioneering work on technical risk as a matter of loss-of-
control at the boundaries of safe operation, he reviewed the main non-technical 
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factors that contributed to the Zeebrugge shipping accident.  In this analysis of the 
Zebrugge capsizing, he observed that system design and decision-making were based 
on risk models of each of the systems involved (e.g. harbour design, cargo 
management, passenger management and vessel operation), without considering 
interactions between the separate systems.  His conclusion was that performance in 
complex system is better-controlled by making the boundaries of safe operation 
clear, and improving the coping skills of the workforce needed in situations in which 
control might be lost.  This shift in focus occurred with the conceptualisation that 
reliability depended on control of systems, in addition to design of systems.  As 
mentioned previously, design serves to determine potential performance, but systems 
researchers such as Rasmussen (1997a) and Hollnagel (2002) considered that actual 
performance depended on the degree to which technologies are under control in 
terms of their initial design, regulation, and maintenance.  Once this idea was 
introduced, there was an attendant recognition that non-technical, as much as 
technical, factors determined how well a system could be controlled. 
 
Finally, Munipov (1992) provided insights into the political and cultural factors 
behind the accident in the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (NPP).  He reviewed all of 
the apparent failings of the USSR’s nuclear industry, including that of the technology 
used.  Despite a thorough review of “problems due to the inadequate design of the 
reactor and absorbing rods” (p.339), he still concluded that “inadequate human-
machine interactions” were the main cause, quoting V. Konovalov, the Minister of 
Nuclear Power and Industry, as saying that, “Even the most effective sophisticated 
safety control system will fail to provide for plant reliability if human factors are not 
taken into account” (p.341).  Munipov’s contention was that, despite the focus on the 
extant technical deficiencies, the human factors in which humans interact with 
machines and systems were the ultimate determinant of the reliability of the technical 
systems at Chernobyl. 
 
Part of the engineering literature reviewed above presented reliability as an 
exclusively technical matter, often with what Schein (1996) refers to as a 
“preoccupation with designing humans out of the systems” (p. 14).  There was a 
belief on the part of these researchers that through engineering studies, failure 
investigations, and the setting of appropriate design standards, improvements in 
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design could prevent failures.  At the same time, there has also been recognition in 
other literature, particularly in the body of research aimed at investigating and 
understanding disasters involving technical systems, that human factors will 
continually feature in these failures.  It has become apparent to some researchers 
(Cooke, 2002; Dekker, 2005) investigating modern industry, that no amount of 
design change or technical strategy development can obviate the need for resolving 
the issues relating to human-machine and human-systems interactions in the 
workplace.  Hence, to understand the influences on the reliability of petroleum 
maintenance, it is necessary to review the literature concerning these human factors 
and examine their relevance to maintenance effectiveness. 
 
2.8 Human factors in Organisational Reliability at the Individual Level 
2.8.1 Human factors at different organisational levels  
Based on this recognition that human factors may play an important role in 
maintenance reliability, the following sections review the literature relating to the 
human component of systems in the workplace, and particularly the role of 
maintenance personnel responsible for the reliability of petroleum production 
systems.  As Figure 1 indicated, a range of individual, workgroup, and organisational 
factors influence petroleum maintenance activities, which in turn affect physical 
production systems and ultimately performance outcomes.  Many researchers (e.g., 
Torp & Grøgaard, 2009; Zohar & Luria, 2005) have recognised that organisational 
phenomena should be conceptualised and investigated at the individual, group, and 
organisational levels in order to properly understand the mechanisms involved.  
Their research differentiated the effects of phenomena at each level, as well as the 
effects of factors operating at one level on another level.  Therefore, the following 
examination of human factors in the maintenance workplace will consider each of 
these levels in turn, beginning with the individual level, in order to reflect current 
theoretical frameworks. 
 
2.8.2 Human error 
At the individual level, considerable research attention has focussed on the 
occurrence and causes of human error in maintenance activities.  Sklet (2006) 
estimated that 40% of oil and gas releases could be attributed to human errors in 
manual work.  Lorenzo, Vanden Heuvel, and Rooney (2006) quoted a figure of 41% 
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for maintenance and operator errors in petroleum refining and processing, arguing 
that “human errors have been significant factors in almost every accident, equipment 
shutdown or quality problem” (p.28).  Regarding other industries, Reason and Hobbs 
(2003) discussed the issue of managing human errors in maintenance quoting an 
estimate that 42-65% of the human performance problems in US and Japanese 
nuclear power plants are associated with maintenance errors.  In aviation, Shappell 
(2000) estimated that 70-80% of aviation accidents involve human error to some 
extent.  These errors may relate to the design of the aircraft, operation by aircrew, or 
maintenance of aircraft.  However, he maintained that “to attribute accidents solely 
to aircrew error is like telling patients they are simply ‘sick’ without examining the 
underlying causes or further defining the illness” (p. 1).  Furthermore, he contended 
that aviation accidents typically have multiple contributing causes, with human error 
merely being the last, and not necessarily even the primary, cause. 
 
Early in the history of psychology, William James (1890) began studying the 
dimensions of human cognition that played a contributing role to human error, 
including attention and memory.  By the 1950s, Hughes (1951) propounded a more 
specific approach to mistakes in the workplace based on the need to reduce and 
absorb the risk of error, mistakes and failures.  He discussed two issues in particular 
reflecting the origins of human error and its causal role in work-related failures.  
Concerning what he called a ‘jurisprudence of mistakes’, he raised the notion that a 
“colleague-group will consider that it alone fully understands the technical 
contingencies” involved in a job and has “the sole right to say when a mistake has 
been made” (p.323).  In essence, he considered that an action that was judged to be 
an error in hindsight might well have appeared logical at the time.  He also examined 
the role of art, cult, and ritual as being not only a basis for professional practice, but 
also connecting tasks “to the social system in which the work is done” (p.325).  In 
addition, he considered that art, cult, and ritual provided “organisational checks and 
balances against both the subjective and objective risks of the trade” (p.325).  These 
are the risks that are inherent in doing a particular job.  Altogether, Hughes’ writing 
represented an early attempt to explore work-related errors as symptomatic of the 
non-technical dimensions of the workplace, and not just as a label to explain why a 
technical system has failed. 
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In more quantitative research into reliability as an issue involving human 
performance, the relationship between humans and machines was explored through 
various methods of Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) (Kirwan, 1994).  
Cacciabue (2000) reviewed the forms of HRA that had been developed, comparing 
the earlier method of the Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) with 
Human Error Risk Management for Engineering Systems (HERMES) and the 
Dynamic Logical Analytical Method (DYLAM) (Cacciabue & Cojazzi, 1994).  The 
DYLAM approach was an attempt to integrate the probabilistic nature of component 
failures with the probabilities of human error.  All of these methods were aimed at 
statistically quantifying human failure rates in the same way that machine failure 
rates were calculated, for example as the Mean Time To Failures (MTTF) of 
components (Lewis, 1996).  This approach was applied to calculating probabilities of 
human error in petroleum operations (Khan, Amyotte, & DiMattia, 2006), using the 
Human Error Probability Index (HEPI), which was based on the Success Likelihood 
Index Methodology (SLIM) developed for the US nuclear industry.  The HEPI 
method incorporates Performance-Shaping Factors (PSFs) relevant to offshore 
operations based on expert judgements, where probability data on human error rates 
are not available.  PSFs are factors related to task execution that influence outcomes, 
such as stress, complexity, training, and experience in the study of Khan et al. 
 
The advantage of the HRA techniques was the ability to quantify the probability of 
human failure occurring, and to add this mathematically to the probability of 
machines failing, in order to produce an overall probability of failure.  For many 
industrial processes, the overall risk of failure is a useful measure.  However, in order 
to accomplish this form of analysis of human error rates, human errors needed to be 
treated generically, requiring different types of errors to be grouped together.  
Foregoing Hughes’ (1951) ‘jurisprudence of mistakes’ in order to quantify these 
mistakes meant sacrificing an understanding of the qualitative differences between 
human actions.  Without this understanding, the task of eliminating the sources of 
unreliability may be more, rather than less complicated.  
 
2.8.3 Characterising human error 
In contrast to the HRA approach, many researchers have concerned themselves with 
differentiating between different types of errors by monitoring and categorising the 
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‘risks of the trade’ that occur in various industries, such as petrochemical (Kariuki & 
Löwe, 2007), aviation (Hobbs, 2000) and nuclear power production (Pyy, 2001).  
Kariuki and Lowe developed a taxonomy of human failures to complement the 
categorisation of equipment failures for use in a Process Hazard Analysis, which is 
used to determine the potential contributors to a process-related accident.  The 
human factors that they considered as contributors to the occurrence or reduction of 
errors were: 
• Organisation (e.g., organisational learning and supervision) 
• Information (e.g., communication, training, and procedures) 
• Job design (e.g., staffing and work schedules) 
• Human system interface (e.g., design of controls) 
• Task environment (e.g., lighting) 
• Workplace design (e.g., accessibility) 
• Operator characteristics (e.g., attention/motivation) 
  
Similarly, in commercial aviation, studies of human error have been conducted to 
develop taxonomy based on 1) PSFs (Latorella & Prabhu, 2000) such as access, 
visibility, and judgement interference, and 2) the most common error-provoking 
conditions in maintenance tasks, which Hobbs and Willamson (2003) identified as 
time pressure, poorly-designed equipment, inadequate training, and poor 
coordination and communication between workers.  Having developed an 
appropriate taxonomy, the potential for errors to occur can then be managed by 
differentiating between the various PSFs and error-provoking factors in the 
workplace, and devising appropriate mitigation interventions (Reason & Hobbs, 
2003). 
 
Two conceptual developments in the understanding of human factors in the 
workplace have come from these taxonomies of error.  Reason (1987; 1997) devised 
a typology of errors that distinguished among the different cognitive bases for human 
failings.  His typology of ‘slips, lapses, mistakes, and violations’ differentiated errors 
on the basis of both the intention of an action, as well as the intentionality of the 
outcome of incorrect actions.  Thus, an incorrect action may be intended or 
unintended, and equally the outcome may be unintended or intended.  Each of these 
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possibilities results from a different cognitive and motivational process.  Rasmussen 
(1982) further contributed to an understanding of the cognitive origin of errors with 
his Human Malfunction model, using what he termed a multi-facet taxonomy to 
describe the causes of human error.  He described a hierarchy for human errors as 
being skill-based, rule-based, or knowledge-based.  By characterising the type of 
cognitive activity that was occurring at the time an error was committed, it was then 
more effective to devise a task-related strategy for avoiding recurrence.  
 
The error classifications developed by Reason and Rasmussen described above have 
provided a basis for further development of frameworks for empirical analysis of the 
relationship between human actions and unintended failures.  For example, a 
significant finding in Hobbs and Williamson’s (2002) study of critical incident 
reports obtained from aircraft mechanics concerned the relative prevalence of rule-
based errors in comparison to knowledge-based and skill-based errors.  The work 
demands for mechanics, who were not supervisors, entailed mainly skill-based tasks 
(65%) with a lesser number of rule-based (31.5%) and knowledge-based (3.5%) task 
demands.  However, a review of 101 incident reports indicated that the highest ratio 
of errors to task demands occurred for knowledge-based tasks (2.03) though the 
overall proportion of these errors (7%) was low.  The percentage of skill and rule 
based errors was approximately equal (~46%).  This meant that the ratio of errors to 
task demands for rule based tasks was more double that of skill-based tasks, i.e. 1.5 
compared to 0.7.  They concluded that knowledge-based activities, such as diagnose 
or decide (detection and decision-making) and functional testing (problem-solving), 
involved the greatest risk of error.  However, their results suggested that the greatest 
opportunity to reduce the absolute number of errors in a similar maintenance 
workplace would appear to be in the category of tasks based on rules.  This has 
important implications for both the analysis of the contributors to maintenance 
failures, which they describe elsewhere (Hobbs & Williamson, 2003), as well as the 
interventions that might be implemented to mitigate the occurrence of errors.   
 
Although errors remain an important consideration across all industries, several of 
the pioneers in human factors have come to regard errors as no more than indicators 
of more fundamental individual and organisational processes.  Rasmussen (1990) 
considered errors as an inevitable outcome of decision-making within the complex 
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constraints of a modern socio-technical operation.  He defined errors, when they 
occurred, as a ‘link in the chain’ of events informed by fundamental organisational 
processes.  He argued that they should not be considered evidence of the fallibility of 
humans as a root cause of unreliability, and instead concluded with the caveat: 
Work in modern, high-tech societies calls for a reconsideration of the notion 
of human error: research should be focused on a general understanding of 
human behaviour and social interaction in cognitive terms in complex, 
dynamic environments, not on fragments of behaviour called error.  (p. 1198) 
Therefore, it is important to bear in mind that, although human error is frequently 
identified as the primary or even the only non-technical factor in a particular failure, 
it can at most be considered a starting point in any analysis of the contributors to a 
failure.  The concept of identifying these contributors more holistically will be 
examined in greater detail in Section 2.11.1. 
 
2.8.4 Procedural violations  
Lawton (1998) suggested that training could reduce the occurrence of errors, but not 
the incidence of violations.  Similarly, Reason, Manstead, Stradling, Baxter, and 
Campbell (1990) considered violations fundamentally distinct from errors; that is, 
although errors and violations are both individual-level phenomena, violations unlike 
errors are defined by the social context, e.g. procedures, social norms, and perceived 
expectations of peers.  In a study of self-reported errors and violations among 
drivers, they found that the occurrence of violations was distinctly different to that of 
errors.  Their data indicated that violations were moderated by different motivational 
factors, gender differences, and what they termed ‘over-engagement’ of the 
individual.  Also, in contrast to errors, which have an entirely negative connotation, 
they reported that some high-violation groups studied could actually perform more 
effectively due to a better-developed ability to process information.  For example, 
they quote a study (Fergenson, 1971) in which some car drivers were found to have 
lower vehicle accident rates, despite being classed in the high-violation group. 
Controlling the intentional violation of rules, procedures, and behavioural norms 
potentially offers organisations a more effective means of influencing outcomes than 
trying to control unintended errors. 
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In aviation, Collier (2004) reported that in an analysis of US National Transport 
Safety Board records of adverse aviation events in which maintenance was 
implicated, failure to follow procedures was a factor in 76.5% of events, compared to 
15.2% for errors and omissions.  Reason, Parker, and Lawton (1998) considered that 
the structuring and imposition of rules and procedures was the principal mechanism 
that organisations had for regulating behaviour in the workplace.  For this reason, the 
underlying motivations and the circumstances under which violations of rules and 
procedures occurred have been of particular interest to hazardous industries, such as 
petroleum production (Hudson, Parker, Lawton, & van der Graaf, 2002).  Managing 
rule-breaking has been cited as an important element in a program for avoiding 
safety incidents in the petroleum industry (Hudson, 2007).  In further consideration 
of workplace behaviour, Reason, Parker, and Lawton (1998) identified 10 ways in 
which employees behave in relation to compliance with procedures.  These 
behaviours were dependant on organisational and motivational issues, such as the 
existence and appropriateness of an applicable procedure for the task concerned, 
whether the outcome was successful, and whether the behaviour was 
‘psychologically rewarding’.  These underlying factors led to the categories of 
behaviour in their taxonomy, such as Correct Improvisation and Incorrect but 
Rewarding Violation.  This taxonomy provided a means by which organisations 
could evaluate employee reactions to existing procedures.  Thus, in hazardous 
industries, Reason, Parker, and Lawton (1998) argued that the cognitive rationale for 
violations was as much of a concern as the fact that violations were being committed, 
as in the case where “variations in the local circumstances negate the applicability of 
the available rules” (p.301).  
 
Reason et al (1998) proposed that the solution to this apparent conflict between rules 
and behaviours, and the complexity of situations with which workers must work, did 
not lie in more procedures.  They recommended developing a better balance between 
the available control mechanisms, based on awareness by supervisors of local 
constraints to rule compliance.  Fewer process or administrative controls were 
required, to be replaced by a greater emphasis on controlling output.  Output control, 
in comparison to fixed rules, would be more closely related to the organisation’s 
immediate goals, and relied on self-imposed group-level and individual level control.  
Effectively, they contended that workers must be allowed to make workplace 
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decisions based on their abilities in risk perception, while bearing in mind that 
allowing employees to make what they referred to as optimising violations, i.e. 
breaking rules for their own benefit, created a climate in which rules become 
devalued.  A related finding by Lawton, Parker, Manstead, and Stradling, (1997) was 
that violations of road rules were more commonly associated with positive affect, 
indicating that for the individual, violating rules would not necessarily be 
experienced as negative behaviour.  This corresponded with the violation category, 
Incorrect but Rewarding Violation. 
 
Lawton (1998) later applied this knowledge gained from car drivers to a study of 
railway shunters.  She described the categories of violations involved, as well as the 
underlying reasons for committing them.  In terms of self-reported motives for 
violating rules, she found three common pairs of factors: attitudes and motivation, 
situations and control, and rules and knowledge.  Most often, factors external to the 
individual (e.g. time pressure and high work load) were identified as the reason for 
violations, compared to internal factors such as inexperience or lack of motivation.  
In another study of railway workers, Holmgren (2005) analysed 666 rail accidents 
and incidents that occurred in Sweden from 1988-2000.  He found that the activities 
of maintenance workers themselves, rather than a lack of maintenance, were 
responsible for the majority (79%) of maintenance-related events.  Of these, rule 
violations, such as performing track maintenance without permission was the second 
most frequent contributor to these incidents.  Torp and Grøgaard (2009) also 
examined the workplace climate and situational factors that determine the conditions 
under which compliance with safety rules will occur.  In addition to factors relating 
to the individual, they found that social support and management support were 
significant factors in compliance.  From the studies quoted above, it appeared that 
individual and organisational factors combined to motivate individuals to comply 
with or violate rules.  Investigation of the types of violations committed and the 
circumstances surrounding these violations can be a valuable indicator of what the 
motivations were, and additionally, what organisational changes are required to 
reduce the adverse effects of non-compliance. 
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2.8.5 Additional individual factors 
As mentioned above, the commission of violations was thought to be influenced by 
affective factors, such as motivation and satisfaction.  These and many other 
affective (Brief & Weiss, 2002) and cognitive (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2008) human 
factors operating at the individual-level have been considered to directly impact on 
organisational outcomes; and so, they might influence the performance of 
maintenance tasks as well.  Motivation and Job satisfaction, associated above with 
rule compliance, might be expected to have the greatest influence on the reliability of 
maintenance task performance.  Martin (2004) considered these two constructs, and 
the related construct of Commitment, to be dimensions of positive and supportive 
workplaces, and these will be considered here.  
 
Hudson (2007) examined the development of interest in the role of motivation in job 
performance in the petroleum industry after the Piper Alpha platform explosion.  He 
argued that developing motivation, particularly intrinsic motivation, was required in 
order to positively affect outcomes in relation to safety.  Behaviour could be changed 
through extrinsic motivation, but long-term changes in behaviour could only be 
affected by changing underlying beliefs, which needed to be intrinsically motivated.  
In their experiments, Cassignol-Bertrand, Baldet, Louche, and Papet (2006) found 
that potential candidates for a position were judged to be more useful to an 
organisation if they demonstrated intrinsic motivation as opposed to extrinsic 
motivation.  They concluded that intrinsic motivation was a social norm against 
which employees could be judged.  In a review of work motivation theories, Latham 
and Pinder (2005) highlighted many dimensions of work motivation that impacted on 
job performance, including job design, self-efficacy, and social skills.  For example, 
a motivationally-oriented job design, in which autonomy of workers was high, was 
important to performance, but only in less-routine jobs.  This type of job design was 
found to contrast with mechanistically-oriented designs, in which efficiency was of 
greater importance, confirming that job design needed to be considered in relation to 
the required outcomes.  Furthermore, levels of social skills and self-efficacy 
(Bandura & Locke, 2003; Choi, Price, & Vinokur, 2003) were mentioned as 
moderating factors that influenced the relationship between motivation and job 
performance.  Maintenance work consists of both routine and non-routine tasks, as 
discussed in the section describing the maintenance task.  The influence of 
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motivation might prove to be a factor in determining the reliability outcomes from 
maintenance activities, but the nature of job design for the majority of tasks needs to 
be considered.   
 
Meyer, Becker and Vandenberghe (2004) examined the contribution that 
commitment makes to motivated behaviour, particularly in relation to discretionary 
activities, not specifically required by the job.  They developed an integrative model 
which drew on various dimensions of commitment that support motivated behaviour, 
including goal regulation and empowerment.  They also discussed commitment as a 
component of motivation, relating to various social foci of workers, such as their 
organisation, their work, and their colleagues.  However, they concluded that “little 
attention has been paid to understanding how employee commitment affects 
behaviour” (p.1004).  One study that did examine commitments and outcomes was 
conducted by Loche and Lanneau (2004).  They conducted an 18 month longitudinal 
trial with two groups of workers (n=26 in each group) to study the short term and 
long term influence of commitment (l’engagement) on safety behaviour.  They found 
that, judging by four factors, developing commitment was more effective than 
persuasion in modifying attitudes and behaviour in both the short term and long term.  
The implications for the current study are that a maintenance workforce committed 
to their roles and supported in their work by the organisation (Muse & Stamper, 
2007), is more likely to take responsibility for equipment reliability than a workforce 
that requires on-going persuasion to do so.   
 
Carr, Schmidt, Ford, and DeShon (2003) further identified links between 
commitment, job satisfaction, and job performance, through their meta-analysis of 51 
studies.  They concluded that organisational commitment and job satisfaction 
mediated the relationship between several dimensions of workplace climate and job 
performance.  Other studies have also demonstrated that job satisfaction was 
associated with orientation towards successful outcomes (Martin, 2004) and positive 
task performance (Varca & James-Valutis, 1993).  Edwards, Bell, Arthur and Decuir 
(2008) analysed the influence of job satisfaction on job performance.  To determine 
the role of job satisfaction, task performance was assessed based on supervisors’ 
appraisals of subordinates’ work quality.  This was supplemented with measures of 
contextual performance, namely, willingness to participate in the workplace beyond 
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immediate responsibilities.  They had expected that job satisfaction would tend to 
favour task performance, but in addition, they found an equal impact on contextual 
performance.  In another analysis of the factors contributing to job satisfaction 
Axtell, Wall, Stride, Pepper, et al (2002) found that job satisfaction increased for 
workers exposed to new technology and work practices.  Interestingly, while all 
employees appeared to respond positively to increased complexity in their jobs, only 
workers in operational roles demonstrated greater openness to change.  Managers 
and engineers who had greater exposure to change became less open to change with 
time compared to the low exposure group.  The petroleum industry has experienced 
many technical innovations and so these results may indicate the potential for 
conflict between professional and non-professional roles as new technology is 
introduced.   
 
In much of the literature, the errors committed by humans in the workplace are still 
the most important factor in determining organisational reliability.  As a 
consequence, reducing the performance-shaping factors that provoke the errors made 
by individuals has been viewed as the major goal of reliability research.  However, 
along with a concern for errors, has been recognition of the impact on outcomes of 
deliberate violations of task-related procedures.  Motivation, commitment, and job 
satisfaction were viewed in turn as influencing both the compliance with work 
procedures, as well as having a direct impact on the performance of work tasks.  
Implicit in these affective factors is the social environment in which individuals 
perform these tasks.  In the next section, research on group-level human factors will 
be reviewed in order to understand the socio-technical context in which maintenance 
reliability develops. 
 
2.9 Human Factors in Organisational Reliability at the Group Level 
2.9.1 Team function. 
One of the group-level dimensions that was often invoked in research as a 
prerequisite for high-reliability in the petroleum industry was the effective 
functioning of work teams.  Attitudes to teamwork among team members was 
described as a factor in the effectiveness of 91 offshore oil drilling crew members in 
reducing errors and incidents (Crichton, 2005).  Crichton reported a generally 
positive attitude among off-shore teams to teamwork, such as 80% of respondents in 
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the survey agreeing that other team members supported them in their work.  Despite 
this, respondents acknowledged that communication, planning, and team stability 
were still the main problems that they faced.  Only 40% thought that team leaders 
described and explained their plans, and only 35% thought that they were given 
adequate, timely information.  As well as the petroleum industry, studies in health 
care offer insights into the value of effective team function.  In a survey of teamwork 
in hospitals (Flin, Fletcher, McGeorge, Sutherland, & Patey, 2003) 90% of 
anaesthetists were found to support the concept of teamwork in medical teams.  
Despite this overwhelming majority having a supportive attitude and also claiming to 
enjoy teamwork, they too reported problems in practice with a number of elements of 
teamwork.  Aspects of a properly functioning team include communication, a 
supportive environment, and mutual error-checking.  The study found that only 40% 
thought that communication (e.g. team briefings) was important for teamwork.  
Another 35% did not feel that operating staff worked as a team, indicating a less-
than-supportive environment for a large part of the team.  Finally, only 39% felt that 
mistakes were handled sufficiently well with the team to prevent recurrences by team 
members.  The implications for the current study of maintenance teams is that care is 
required in interpreting positive attitudes towards teamwork, as there may be 
significant shortfalls in the practice of the dimensions of teamwork.   
 
One of the most significant developments in understanding the characteristics needed 
in petroleum production and maintenance teams to ensure high-reliability, has been 
in the concept of Crew Resource Management (CRM) (Flin, O'Connor, Mearns, & 
Gordon, 1999).  CRM’s development has advanced furthest in the field of aviation 
(Salas, Burke, Bowers, & Wilson, 2001).  The concepts from aviation have been 
adapted into CRM training programs for offshore petroleum workers by O'Connor 
and Flin (2003).  Teamwork, leadership, situation awareness, team decision making, 
communication, and personal limitations were included in their training program.  
These relate closely to the various dimensions of teamwork in the studies described 
below, particularly in the requirement to detect and correct errors made by team 
members.  In relation to the value of CRM, Flin et al (1999) quoted a study of 1268 
incidents from off-shore production from 1994 to 1996.  Almost half (46%) of the 
human factors-related incidents were found to relate to the items included in CRM 
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training.  Other contributors to incidents included lack of skill or knowledge, or poor 
engineering designs, as discussed in Section 2.7.1. 
 
Another cognitive aspect of effective teamwork mentioned by O’Connor and Flin 
(2003) was the development among members of shared mental models.  Mathieu, 
Goodwin, Heffner, Salas, and Cannon-Bowers, (2000) considered that sharing an 
understanding between team members involved more than just a common concept of 
the required tasks, for example, agreement on which equipment needed to be 
repaired.  They suggested that a shared understanding of normative processes within 
the team was also required, that is, a common agreement concerning how a 
maintenance technician accomplishes those tasks.  Furthermore, for true team 
effectiveness, there also needs to be a common recognition of the capabilities and 
limitations of the team members themselves, such as a lack of critical knowledge 
within the team (Cooke, Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & Stout, 2000).  In their study, 
Mathieu et al (ibid) tested the influence of sharing both task-based and team-based 
mental models, and found that both were predictive of the performance of the 
participants.  Based on this, analysis of a maintenance failure should consider 
whether it was the task performance that was flawed, or team norms that were 
inadequate to the particular situation. 
 
Konogiannis (1999) contended that another important aspect of teams that promoted 
reliability was the ability to detect and correct errors committed by members of the 
team.  He explained strategies for how teams could deal with their own errors, with 
detection and feedback being the critical mechanisms.  He then argued that error 
recovery takes place based on an understanding among other team members of the 
actions of the error-maker and the outcome that was intended.  Therefore to be 
effective, this basis for detecting errors and communicating observations between 
team members should be a part of job design and team structuring. 
 
Sasou and Reason (1999) carried the concept of error correction within a team 
context further by developing a taxonomy for characterising shared team errors as 
distinct from individual errors.  They described the various internal and external 
PSFs responsible for errors that were considered to be shared among team members.  
These included Deficiency in Communication, Excessive Belief (e.g., assumptions), 
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and Excessive Authority Gradient.  They concluded with the statement, “Many of 
these problems have their origins in deficiencies of responsibilities” (p.8), which 
agrees with Hudson’s (2007) argument that internal motivation was mainly a 
function of sense of control.  Sasou and Reason’s concern with ‘vague 
responsibilities’ within the teams they studied, suggested that teams need to be 
designed around their required tasks.  Their concern with team-related errors further 
reinforces the argument for designing workplace systems around non-technical 
considerations, as well as around the technology used, as suggested by Bourrier 
(2005).  The design of workplace systems will be considered in Section 2.11.2. 
   
2.9.2 Supervision and leadership.  
A group-level dimension that has been frequently studied in relation to organisational 
outcomes in the petroleum industry is the influence of supervisory practices and 
leadership styles on work teams.  As well as examining teamwork, Crichton (2005) 
also examined the attitudes to leadership among petroleum drilling teams.  He found 
most drilling team members (83%) preferred a consultative style of leadership, 
though the style they worked under tended to be more autocratic.  Another study 
demonstrated that to be effective, a change to a group-level approach among 
managers was required to increase their effectiveness.  O’Dea and Flin (2001) 
examined the attitudes of Offshore Installation Managers in the petroleum industry 
towards leadership in relation to safety outcomes.  Although most managers 
considered that the elements of a Consulting/Participative style of leadership would 
produce greater improvements to safety performance, 57% preferred a Directive 
leadership style.  In keeping with their preferred leadership style, they ranked the 
causes of accidents as Not thinking the job through (#1), Carelessness (#2), and 
Failure to follow rules (#3), rather than attributing the causes to problems inherent in 
their organisation’s safety systems or work situations, such as Inadequate procedures 
(#13) or Lack of resources (#20).  As a consequence, they tended to believe that it 
was ‘not easy’ either to Get workers to accept ownership of safety (78%) or to 
Motivate subordinates to work safely (60%).  In contrast to this view of individual-
level interventions, 71% thought that Promoting an open atmosphere for reporting 
accidents would be ‘easy’, indicating a more positive attitude towards introducing a 
group-level approach.  
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The role of leadership in maintenance team performance has been examined in other 
industries, such as energy generation (Eti, Ogaji, & Probert, 2006) and transport 
(Hiller, Day, & Vance, 2006).  Eti, Ogaji and Probert investigated maintenance 
management in industry in Nigeria and concluded that wise leadership, 
communication, and attention to human factors were the most important dimensions 
of strategies in maintenance processes.  Hiller, Day and Vance studied Collective 
leadership in road maintenance teams to determine its effect on group performance.  
They found that collective leadership was generally associated with higher ratings of 
most aspects of group performance, with the exception of collective problem-
solving.  Furthermore, they commented that shared leadership behaviours seemed to 
be a better predictor of reliable performance than task-sharing behaviours.  Research 
indicating the potential effects of leadership on reliability has also originated from 
the field of workplace safety.  Barling, Loughlin, and Kelloway (2002) studied the 
links between leadership and outcomes, in this case injury rates.  They were able to 
develop a Structural Equation Model explaining the relationship between 
transformational leadership style and occupational injuries in restaurant workers.  
The best fit with their data was obtained with a model in which safety-consciousness 
and safety climate mediated between leadership and outcomes.  Of interest in the 
current research was the finding of Kozlowski and Doherty (1989) that the 
perceptions held by more-effective workers aligned with their supervisors’ 
perceptions on a number of scales.  These scales included Work structure, Job 
understanding, and Communication flow, all of which are important dimensions of a 
maintenance workplace, and therefore are likely to mediate the relationship between 
leadership and reliability.  As discussed above, reliability and safety have many 
shared characteristics and may be supported by similar organisational mechanisms. 
 
Wu, Chen and Li (2008) also developed and validated a Structural Equation Model 
for the linkages between leadership and safety performance, again mediated by 
climate, among faculty and staff in a university-based study.  Their Safety 
Performance Scale, which measured self-reported safety behaviours in an 
organisation, was used as the dependent variable in assessing the effects of Safety 
leadership, Safety performance, and Climate.  The relationship between Leadership 
behaviours and Safety climate was strong (β=.821) as was the relationship between 
Safety climate and Safety performance (β=.701).  The direct effect of Safety 
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leadership on performance was much weaker (β=.179), indicating the importance of 
considering the influence of climate factors in assessing the impact of supervisors. 
 
One of the moderating factors recognised as playing a role in the effects of 
leadership on safety behaviours is the form that supervisory practices take.  
Leadership has been considered an important factor in organisational performance, 
and specific types of behaviour of the leader were found to moderate outcomes.  
Kelloway, Mullen and Francis (2006) compared the frequencies with which safety-
specific transformational and passive supervisory behaviours were reported in 
relation to injuries experienced by university students in their workplace.  In their 
study, it was found that the extent of transformational leadership exhibited had 
increased both safety consciousness and climate, but passive leadership had a 
significantly negative effect.  Safety climate was in turn found to exhibit a negative 
correlation with safety events and injuries, mediating between the behaviours of 
leaders and outcomes. 
 
In another study of the effect of leadership style on safety performance, Zohar 
(2002a) examined the influence of supervisory practices on safety behaviours in 42 
manufacturing workgroups.  He found that the relationship between leadership, 
climate, and safety outcomes was dependent on the supervisory style.  Although 
leadership using a transformational or constructive style demonstrated a direct effect 
on injury rates, the effect of corrective leadership style was mediated by climate and 
moderated by Assigned safety priority, that is, the level of concern for safety 
communicated by the supervisor’s manager.  Of the climate variables measured, only 
Preventive action, and not Reactive action or Prioritization, mediated the effect of 
leadership on injury rates.  He concluded that leadership produced a noticeable effect 
on safety outcomes, but that the style of supervision and the influence of climate and 
upper management priorities also needed to be considered.  Zohar considered that 
reliable performance, characterised by a climate of monitoring and rewards, could be 
developed through a transactional relationship between supervisors and subordinates.  
However, in dealing with the potential for accidents in non-routine situations, a 
transformational style provides a better basis for open communication and 
development of employee decision-making skills.  This is relevant to the current 
research, as much of the maintenance task involves non-routine situations.  
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Therefore, in addition to the quality of supervision, the style of leadership would be 
expected to play a role in maintenance group performance. 
 
Zohar and Luria’s (2003b; 2005) studies also highlighted the importance of 
considering cross-level effects (including management priorities, supervisory style, 
and workgroup climate), arguing that much of the safety research had ignored group-
level effects in favour of either individual or organisational factors.  In applying this 
knowledge to interventions in a maintenance centre for heavy-duty equipment, Zohar 
(2002b) found that weekly communication of safety priorities from managers to 
supervisors resulted in an improvement in supervisory safety practices, as indicated 
by the frequency of supervisor/worker interventions, from an initial rate of 9% to a 
rate of 58%.  This, in turn, was accompanied by a decrease in micro-accidents, an 
increased use of earplugs, and an improvement in safety climate perceptions, which 
did not occur in the control group.  In a similar intervention in an oil-refining 
company (Zohar & Luria, 2003b), supervisors were given twice-weekly feedback 
from their managers concerning their safety interactions with sub-ordinates.  Over 
the 12-week intervention, the rate of supervisory interactions increased from 35% to 
50%, with a further increase to 70% during the 20-week follow-up phase.  At the 
same time, unsafe behaviours decreased from a rate of 20% to near-zero.  This was in 
contrast to earlier attempts to improve safety which targeted only the individual 
worker level.  This research suggests that efforts to improve maintenance outcomes 




As Muchinsky (2003) argued in his review of Systems Theory, “the Achilles’ heel of 
most large organisations is failure to communicate… because communication is the 
means by which the system can be responsive to its environment” (p.250).  As 
suggested above, research into several aspects of petroleum operations have included 
an examination of communication effectiveness.  CRM training in offshore 
operations specifically included a module devoted to communication (Flin, 
O’Connor, Mearns & Gordon, 1999).  The topics in this module were: 
• The advantages and disadvantages of one- and two-way communication 
• The importance of feedback 
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• Internal and external barriers to communication  
• Requirements of good communication (p.4) 
 
Crichton (2005) in his survey of off-shore drilling teams, found that nearly all 
respondents (>90%) agreed that pre-task briefings were essential to teamwork and 
that social skills were as important as technical skills.  Despite this, only ~40% 
agreed that team leaders communicated and explained procedures and decisions, and 
ensured that these were understood.  Consequently, he commented that 
“Planning/anticipating events unsurprisingly was considered to be the main challenge 
to teamwork, followed closely by communication” (p. 679-696) with communication 
suggested by respondents as the most favoured means of improving teamwork.  
Similarly, in surveying the perceptions held by Offshore Installation Managers in the 
petroleum industry, O’Dea and Flin (2001) found that the fourth most commonly 
suggested cause of accidents was Lack of communication.  Furthermore, in their 
opinion Offshore Installation Managers considered that “the non-technical issues, 
such as leadership, communication and employee motivation, are the issues which 
now need to receive some attention, as opposed to the technical and design issues 
which have been the principal concern in the past” (p.51). 
 
Similar developments in Maintenance Resource Management (Taylor, 2000), 
modelled on CRM, included an emphasis on communication between management 
and aviation maintenance technicians.  Factor analysis highlighted the relationship 
between communication and effective coordination as well as the important role of 
pre-assignment briefings and de-briefings for coordinating tasks.  As a further 
example of communication in maintenance activities, Holmgren (2005) investigated 
the causes of 263 track-related railway derailments and collisions in Sweden.  Of the 
30% of accidents that could be attributed to maintenance work, the majority had as 
an underlying cause of poor communication, such as between maintainers and train 
dispatchers, and a resulting lack of information.  In his opinion, not fully utilising 
maintainers’ skills was one of the consequences of poor-quality communication with 
maintainers.  He expected that the use of contractors, particularly with limited 
experience of a particular workplace, would require even more effective transferring 
of information in order to mitigate risks.     
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Information transfer to ensure quality decision-making was also reported to be 
critical to health care workers.  Roberts and Tadmor (2002) analysed the way in 
which a breakdown of communication between crew members resulted in a naval 
accident, and then demonstrated how the same process could occur among hospital 
teams.  They explained that this occurred when status and authority gradients take 
precedence over effective information transfer.  Communication across status levels 
appeared to be the source of medical errors in various studies quoted by Alvarez and 
Coiera (2006).  In one study, the activities of doctors and nurses in an Intensive Care 
Unit, and the attendant errors, were recorded over a four-month period.  Despite 
doctors communicating verbally with nurses in only 2% of these activities, 37% of 
the reported errors involved doctor/nurse communications.  This may be analogous 
to communications between engineers and maintenance technicians in industrial 
environments.  It would therefore be instructive to monitor mis-communication 
between these groups in investigations of petroleum industry failures. 
 
Information transfer between hospital teams during patient handovers was also found 
by Horwitz et al (2009) to be critical.  In a survey of 139 emergency department 
physicians and internists, they concluded that “Communication failure was 
implicated in most errors [relating to handovers from the emergency department] and 
included failures of message and failures of interpersonal relations” (p.707).  Much 
of the difficulty involved lack of communication across discipline boundaries, as 
well as differences in understanding between people working in different disciplines.  
A similar effect would be expected in communications between off-shore 
maintenance technicians and on-shore engineers in the petroleum industry, who also 
are required to communicate across discipline boundaries.  A solution that Horwitz et 
al proposed for ‘message-related problems’ is to standardise the information content 
of messages.  For example, the design of message checklists could be specified in 
order to set a benchmark for the minimum information levels required.  This is a 
concept that could be operationalised in petroleum maintenance activities, in which 
work orders derived from computerised maintenance management systems (CMMS) 
are generated for most maintenance activities. 
 
In addition to the quality and content of communication, the medium used has also 
been identified as a factor affecting the reliable transfer of information.  Considerable 
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interest has developed regarding the efficacy of contemporary communication media, 
particularly in comparing synchronous to asynchronous media (Baker, 2002), and 
computer-based to face-to-face communication (Baltes, Dickson, Sherman, Bauer, & 
LaGanke, 2002).  Baltes et al in their meta-analysis of group decision-making found 
significant effects on work outcomes, time-to-decision, and member satisfaction 
associated with computer-based communication compared to face-to-face meetings.  
No significant effects were found relating to group size or type of task, but groups 
communicating by computer performed more poorly on problem-solving and 
negotiation type tasks.  Furthermore, the effectiveness of computer-based 
communication was not significantly different to face-to-face groups when the 
members were anonymous and had no time limits on making decisions.  However, as 
the authors explain, these do not constitute the usual situation in organisations.     
 
In a study of the way that members of an armoured brigade communicated, Zohar 
and Luria (2003a) found that the format of communicating messages was also 
associated with communication effectiveness.  Specific within-group dialogue 
formats, which they called ‘meta-scripts’, were used to manage both the complexity 
of operational situations, as well as the variety of actions required.  As the 
complexity that a situation required increased, so did the script complexity.  The use 
of 15 meta-scripts, which were particularly meaningful to the members of the units in 
the study, was found to be the basis for the efficient transmission of critical 
information needed to coordinate activities.  This form of communication allowed 
the generation of shared mental images in a short timeframe and with a parsimonious 
use of language.  Zohar and Luria found that, as well as a basis for decisions and 
actions, meta-scripts also accommodated organisational learning, as new 
understandings could be rapidly adopted through modification of existing scripts.  
This compliments the findings of Tucker, Edmondson, and Spear (2002) concerning 
the problems encountered by nurses.  The absence of an efficient format for 
communication meant that second-order problem-solving, required for organisational 
learning, did not occur.  Nurses did not have sufficient time available to them to 
compensate for the prevailing inefficient modes of communication.   
 
A central aspect of maintenance group performance is inter-group and intra-group 
communication, as all maintenance activities require some form of interchange 
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between the various participants.  The need for efficient formats of communication in 
the petroleum industry may prove particularly relevant to the current study in which 
maintenance teams, engineering and vendor support, and management were 
distributed across a distance of over 2000 km with limited opportunity for face-to-
face exchange of information.   
 
2.9.4 Decision-making. 
Another process considered by researchers to be central to the function of 
workgroups is decision-making (Wright, 1974), particularly under organisational 
pressures.  Researchers have been investigating the decision-making process for 
some time, both at the individual level (Janis & Mann, 1977) and at the group level 
(Kerr & Tindale, 2004).  Decision-making is a critical dimension of reliability 
through its mediating role between the workplace inputs, essentially task demands, 
and the required workplace output (Oedewald and Reiman, 2002).  Several aspects of 
the literature on decision-making are particularly relevant to the current study of 
maintenance work groups.  Ajzen’s (1991) Theory of Planned Behaviour, which in 
turn was based on the Theory of Reasoned Action, would appear to be consistent 
with decision-making in a workplace in which repair of advanced technical 
equipment is involved.  The Theory of Planned Behaviour would explain that 
maintenance decision-making consists of rational consideration of repair alternatives, 
followed by selection of suitable actions in accordance with group and organisational 
norms.  Contrasting this, later research suggested that the decision-making process in 
an industrial environment follows a less-predictable cognitive process.  Rasmussen 
and Jensen (1974) investigated the cognitive process used by maintenance 
technicians responsible for repairing electronic equipment.  They identified that only 
20% of trouble-shooting processes were based on ‘careful reasoning’ related to a 
mental model of the faulty system, while 70% were based on faster, experience-
based recognition of the fault.  Carvalho, dos Santos and Vidal (2005) found a 
similar ratio when they examined the decision-making process among shift 
supervisors in a Brazilian NPP.  They observed that 80% of decisions were made 
with a ‘pattern recognition process’, and only 20% through a decision-making 
process that was similar to that described by the Theory of Planned Behaviour.  
Carvalho et al concluded that most of the processes they had observed were 
consistent with the pattern recognition process termed Recognition-Primed Decision-
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Making by Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu, and Salas (2001), in which decisions are made 
on past experience.  Past experiences generate internal Condition/action rules, which 
then take precedence over the organisation’s operating procedures.  In Recognition-
Primed Decision-Making, the first option encountered that fulfils the requirement 
criteria with a sufficient probability of success would be accepted by the decision-
maker, generally without consideration of further options.  Lipshitz et al argued that, 
“If a moderately experienced person can generate a workable solution as the first one 
considered, there may be reduced incentives and benefits from generating and 
evaluating additional courses of actions” (p.337).  However, on this basis, 
assumptions can enter into the decision-making process at an early stage in order to 
compensate for a lack of complete information, and the need to arrive at a 
sufficiently-acceptable solution under time pressures.  This may be typical of a 
related concept, Naturalistic Decision-Making (Klein, 1997), which is more likely to 
occur within complex environments with multiple objectives and time pressures, and 
where information is limited and procedures are at times poorly-defined. 
 
Interestingly, Carvalho et al (2005) reported that the decisions of shift supervisors 
were “biased by underlying assumptions” (p.642) that were different to those of the 
control room operators.  These differences in biases could be explained by the 
existence of shared and unshared information among group members, described as 
the concept of Hidden profiles by Stasser and Stewart (1992).  Hidden profiles are 
related to the concept of shared mental models, described above in Section 2.9.1 on 
Team Function.  Stasser and Stewart observed that knowledge of experienced group 
members was not always shared with other group members, if seemingly enough 
shared information was available to the group.  When this occurred, the group’s 
objective was consensus rather than making the correct decision, in a process they 
term ‘judgement vs. problem-solving’.  Consensus required only a mutually 
acceptable judgement, but a correct solution was seen to require problem-solving.  In 
their experiments, they found that unshared information only became more critical to 
the group when there was a perception that a correct solution existed.  However, they 
described how, in another study, personal accountability was found to influence the 
acceptance of shared compared to unshared information.  These findings have 
implications for decision-making within maintenance groups in terms of the need to 
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encourage information sharing, foster a perception of accountability, and recognise 
the importance of genuine problem-solving over judgements.  
 
2.9.5 Problem-solving behaviours 
As described in Section 2.2 on The Maintenance Task, corrective maintenance work 
requires problem-solving to restore equipment to fully operating condition.  
Reliability in corrective maintenance depends on achieving a correct diagnosis and 
applying an effective solution when dealing with faulty equipment.  Schaafstal, 
Schraagen, and van Berlo (2000) investigated problem-solving behaviour among 
maintenance technicians in the Dutch navy.  They observed a tendency of technicians 
to use Case-Based Reasoning rather than a structured approach in trouble-shooting 
equipment.  In effect, they attempted to relate problems to previously encountered 
problems, a process similar to Recognition-Primed Decision-Making described 
above.  They regarded novice maintenance technicians as particularly lacking a 
functional understanding and consequently not developing a logical strategy for 
‘reducing the problem space’.  They argued that in order to improve the performance 
of maintenance technicians, training should have a greater focus on ways of 
developing trouble-shooting strategies, and less on acquiring system knowledge.  
Although many of the same considerations may apply, maintenance in major 
petroleum facilities poses additional challenges compared to the repair of individual 
items of equipment.  Hokstad, Øien, and Reinertsen (1998) considered that for 
offshore petroleum facilities, for which the high level of reliability often meant that 
little failure data was available, expert judgements could be integrated with 
operational data to solve existing and potential reliability problems.  They considered 
that experts could support decision-making through structured judgements better than 
engineering analyses could.  This demonstrated the value of an innate understanding 
of the processes involved compared to a solely technical analysis of data.  
 
Dorner (1987) also studied problem-solving behaviours in complex, non-transparent, 
dynamic environments, and described the flaws in cognitive processes that he 
observed.  He developed a simulated problem-solving experiment, constructed 
around deliberately complex decisions on the part of the participants.  The 
experiment involved the participants making decisions concerning the running of a 
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fictional European town represented in a computer model.  The flawed problem-
solving processes that he identified included: 
• focus on the status quo and an inability to observe trends 
• linear thinking instead of visualising the causal nets which link aspects of the 
problem 
• ‘thematic vagabonding’ in which the subjects considered a topic, but only 
superficially, before moving onto another topic 
• tendency to accept confirmatory information while ignoring contradicting 
information 
• tendency to form hypotheses around global concepts rather than around specific 
observations. 
 
Dorner considered that these flaws in problem-solving processes identified in his 
experiments would also occur in real-life situations, and that in an emergency 
situation these tendencies would become even more pronounced.  As much of the 
maintenance task involves finding solutions to failed or poorly-operating equipment, 
there is a danger that these tendencies will influence the cognitive processes of 
maintenance technicians.  Furthermore, the greater the pressure to complete repairs 
in order to restore production quickly, the more likely flawed problem-solving is to 
occur.  As the current research is concerned with past failures, it will be instructive to 
determine if these impediments to problem-solving are a contributing cause.   
 
In an empirical study of problem-solving in American hospitals, Tucker, 
Edmondson, and Spear (2002) observed that nurses successfully solved immediate or 
first order problems, a process colloquially known as ‘fire-fighting’.  However, 
without second-order problem-solving, that is, genuine elimination of the underlying 
causes of problems, the same failures would generally reoccur.  This was attributed 
to a lack of methods for resolving problems, as well being a function of the 
organisational climate.  The climate observed was typically characterised by 
inadequate mechanisms for communicating problems and a shortage of resources, 
such as time.  Tucker, Edmondson and Spear found that only 8% of problems were 
genuinely resolved by nurses and that these “efforts were often opportunistic, weak 
and unrecognised as a request for organisational improvement” (p.130).  They argued 
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that changing this required a workplace that provided opportunities for feedback 
from workers to management, and that encouraged “workers’ motivation to engage 
in longer-term improvement efforts” (p.135).  Tucker et al. considered that these 
issues applied to ‘frontline workers’ in general, and many of their situational 
descriptions could easily be applied to maintenance technicians in the petroleum 
industry.  For example, they discussed situations in which doctors ignored nurses’ 
recommendations concerning patient treatment because of the lower status that 
nurses had in relation to doctors.  For a similar reason, Cooke (2002) found 
maintenance technicians often expressed the feeling that their ideas about improving 
equipment repair procedures were not heeded by engineers.  Allowing technicians to 
up-date procedures based on problem-solving experience is an important element of 
organisational learning, which will be discussed in Section 2.10.3.   
 
The development of a problem-solving culture was further explored by MacDuffie 
(1997).  He examined the way that functional problem-resolving embedded within 
organisational processes provided workers with the means to eliminate the 
underlying causes of failures.  In his analysis, he compared the problem-solving 
processes within work teams at three automobile manufacturing plants in the United 
States (i.e. Ford, General Motors, and Honda).  Each of the three plants studied 
exhibited a different organisational approach to problem-definition, problem-
analysis, and solution-generation behaviours within the workforce.  The most 
effective problem-solving processes were identified within the Honda plant, where 
problems and small failures were viewed as an opportunity to learn, to adapt, and to 
prevent more expensive systemic failures.  Particular heuristics that were embedded 
in the organisation assisted in creating a problem-solving culture.  One such heuristic 
was called ‘actual part, actual situation’.  In this approach, the person solving the 
problem was encouraged to observe the situation first hand in order to “analyze it 
systemically, to communicate the problem more accurately to others in his/her team, 
and to be motivated to find a preventive remedy” (p.492).  Other organisational 
approaches to problem-solving described by MacDuffie included: 
• The formation of problem-solving teams based on ability to contribute to the 
resolution of the problem, that is that problems belong to the entire company. 
• Elimination of status barriers between groups and individuals, as the solution 
of problems in other companies were often inhibited by these barriers. 
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• Acceptance of changes and the possibility of resulting failures, as in the quote 
attributed to Soichiro Honda, the founder of Honda, “It’s OK to fail 99 times, 
as long as you succeed on the 100th time” (p.499).  This is complemented by 
a standardisation process for precisely assimilating successful developments 
into work processes. 
MacDuffie concluded by acknowledging the importance of “the development of a 
common language for discussing problems” (p.501), and acquiring the information 
needed to develop a range of perspectives on a problem.   
 
The studies on problem-solving demonstrated that an effective problem-solving 
climate needed to be based on the institution of methodologies and heuristics within 
the organisation.  Proctor and van Zandt (1994) explained that many methodologies 
and heuristics had been developed to aid problem-solving; but cautioned that many 
common fallacies in logic had lead people to the wrong conclusions.  They 
contended that these fallacies in logic often occurred because required information 
was presented in a complicated format, or because of the way that problems were 
framed.  In the complex environment of petroleum operations, the use of decision-
support methodologies and training in problem-solving have the potential to improve 
the mental representations of maintenance problems and hence reduce the potential 
for errors of logic to occur. 
 
2.10 Human Factors in Organisational Reliability at the Organisational Level 
Although, the preceding section has focussed on the factors that are principally 
manifested at the group-level, namely team work, communication, decision-making 
and problem-solving, the literature has demonstrated that these processes are 
associated with processes at the organisation level.  Organisations have a significant 
role to play in terms of facilitating group processes and assisting maintenance groups 
to perform their tasks successfully.  The following is a review of organisational-level 
processes that may contribute to reliability through their impact on maintenance 
groups. 
 
2.10.1 Organisational climate. 
At the organisational level, much of recent research has been concerned with what 
has come to be called Organisational climate.  Parker, Baltes, Young, Huff, 
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Altmann, Lacost, and Roberts (2003) considered climate to be a “property of the 
organisation itself and represents employees’ descriptions of an area of strategic 
focus or organizational functioning” (p. 391).  They distinguished organisational 
climate from other climates, such as psychological climate, which represents an 
individual level dimension, and from particular climates, which relate to specifics 
aspects of the workplace, such as safety climate (Cox & Cheyne, 2000; Mearns, 
Whitaker, & Flin, 2003; Sorensen, 2002; Zohar, 2008).  Zohar and Luria (2005) 
considered climates to manifest at all organisational levels, existing as “level-
adjusted perceptions or appraisals of relevant policies, procedures, and practices as 
indicators of desired role behaviour” (p.616).  In contrast to the focus of 
organisational climate on employees’ perceptions, Schein (1996) viewed 
organisational culture as being concerned with a “set of basic assumptions about how 
the world is and ought to be” (p.11).  Schein further explained that “perceptions, 
thoughts, feelings and to some degree their overt behavior” (p.11), result from these 
shared assumptions.  In relation to maintenance technicians, culture relates to shared 
beliefs about how the company expects maintenance to be executed, while climate 
describes the experience of trying to conduct maintenance activities in a particular 
workplace.   
 
Research in the area of off-shore safety climate was useful as a means of 
understanding the way that organisational climate has the potential to affect 
reliability in petroleum operations.  As discussed earlier, safety and reliability were 
frequently associated in the literature, particularly when the term safety was used to 
refer to reliable operation of hazardous technology.  Case studies by Hokstad, Oien 
and Reinertsen’s (1998) indicated that the concept of reliability in organisational 
processes has more in common with developments in process safety climate than it 
has with engineering design principles, with which it is usually associated 
conceptually (Lewis, 1996).  Further, in common with workplace safety, the climate 
experienced by maintenance technicians in a complex socio-technical system 
emerges from the continuous interactions between humans and complex, potentially 
dangerous, machines.  In his early work, Zohar (1980) was one of the first to 
formulate a connection between the safety of workers in industry and their 
performance in relation to reliable maintenance work.  His idea was that, “When all 
these organizational characteristics are integrated, it is possible to form a coherent 
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organizational pattern of a highly safe company…This climate results in increased 
performance reliability of workers, good housekeeping, and high design and 
maintenance standards” (p.97).   
 
Extrapolating from this connection between safety climate and reliability, the climate 
factors that influence safe behaviours therefore are logical candidates as the 
dimensions of reliable maintenance work.  Mearns, Whitikaer, and Flin (2003) 
measured the dimensions of safety climate that contributed to safety performance in 
13 offshore installations.  They found that communication and decision-making 
variables were significantly correlated with accident rates, both factors identified 
above in the literature on reliability.  They attributed the importance of these two 
factors to their role in organisational learning, discussed below in Section 2.10.3.  
Flin, Mearns, O’Connor, and Bryden (2000) examined the changes in measures used 
to determine safety climate in the energy industry.  They found that organisational 
measures related to risk, competence, and perceptions of management attitude were 
more commonly used in the 18 methods that they examined rather than injury rates.  
The effects of risk, competence, and management processes on climate variables 
would be applicable to reliability studies, though data on injury rates would not.  In 
reviewing studies on climate and safety (Geller & Douglas, 2005; Glendon & 
Litherland, 2001; Torp & Grøgaard, 2009), a number of factors contributing to 
organisational climate, such as job demands, decision authority and social support 
were implicated as influencing outcomes, notably the reported injury rates.  
Furthermore, Zohar (2008) discusses dimensions of organisational climate beyond 
safety climate, suggesting that work-ownership climate also impacts independently 
on safety-behaviour.  His description of work-ownership as including commitment to 
the work and “a proactive orientation characteristic of stewardship and citizenship 
behaviour” (p.382) could underpin good practice in maintenance as well as safety, as 
it mirrors the concepts of monitoring, anticipating, and reacting in Oedewald and 
Reiman’s (2003) maintenance core task model discussed later in Section 2.11.2.  In 
Zohar and Luria’s (2005) study of production workers in small and medium sized 
manufacturing, they further explored the effects of organisational safety climate in 
the workplace.  They found that group safety climate mediates between 
organisational safety climate and role behaviour, with the effect moderated by the 
actions of supervisors.  The amount of discretion supervisors had was in turn 
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negatively related to the level of routine in the workplace.  The implications are that 
while climate in maintenance groups should be closely related to organisational 
goals, supervisors will have an important influence on how these goals are 
understood, particularly where maintenance activities tend to be less routine in 
nature, as in complex off-shore facilities.  
 
Although it is reasonable to postulate that there are climate factors that will influence 
all workplace behaviours, studies have indicated that differences may exist between 
the specific factors responsible for personal safety outcomes and those responsible 
for maintenance reliability.  Most importantly, attitudes and motivation towards risk-
taking may be different (Glendon, Clarke, & McKenna, 2006), depending on whether 
these are technical risks, or health and safety risks.  Glendon, Clarke, and McKenna 
characterised technical risks as engineering assessments of the probability and 
magnitude of failure, along with considerations of the benefits to be gained by taking 
a given risk.  Maintenance departments assess the risk of deferring maintenance tasks 
on this basis (Moubray, 1997; Krishnasamy, Khan, & Haddara, 2005) and even the 
maintenance technicians themselves make these judgements informally, particularly 
when time constraints and difficult tasks are involved (Mason, 1990).  On the other 
hand, Glendon et al contended that the developed countries have become risk-averse 
with regard to health and safety, despite the relative safety of contemporary society.  
The result is that the organisational climate may be characterised by a different level 
of risk with regard to safety compared to that of reliability.  Therefore, although 
safety research may provide useful clues as to how climate influences outcomes, the 
role of climate factors must be considered specifically in relation to petroleum 
maintenance activities. 
 
2.10.2 Maintenance reliability climate. 
In an approach based on safety climate research, Reiman and Oedewald (2004) 
investigated the role of workplace climate in NPP maintenance operations.  They 
developed their CULTURE survey and tested its validity and reliability as an 
instrument for revealing the differences in perceptions of climate among 
maintenance workers.  The CULTURE scales are based on established climate 
markers, such as effective communication, control over one’s work, and the 
meaningfulness of work as measurable organisational phenomena.  The survey 
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results were expected to reveal intrinsic differences in maintenance approaches 
between companies, which could be related to differences in attitudes and observable 
performance among maintenance workers.  Reiman and Oedewald anticipated that 
these latent climate factors would moderate the relationship between underlying 
personal and team dimensions, and objective measures of task effectiveness.  
 
Reiman, Oedewald, and Rollenhagen, (2005) then applied the CULTURE 
questionnaire in a study of two Scandinavian NPPs to examine the relationship 
between climate factors in maintenance workplaces and workgroup efficiency and 
performance.  In one of the NPPs they surveyed, the workers reported that learning 
and problem-solving were critical to their concept of safety and reliability.  In the 
other NPP, their survey highlighted adherence to procedures and pre-existing 
knowledge as the perceived basis of reliability.  They concluded that ultimately 
several psychological factors needed to be considered in workplace design within an 
organisation, irrespective of the specific cultural orientation of the work teams.  
These factors were communication quality, job control, the meaningfulness of the 
job, and the structuring of well-defined goals, tasks, and responsibilities.  In their 
discussion of communication climate, they concluded that as an organisation became 
more complex, for example organised along a matrix structure, structuring 
communication became both more difficult and more critical to effective functioning. 
 
In further studies, Reiman and Oedewald (2005) also investigated the effects of 
organisational change on safety and reliability.  They found that during a period of 
workplace re-structuring, the psychological factors that were deemed necessary for 
the reliable performance of maintenance work, including Goal clarity, 
Meaningfulness of work, and Sense of responsibility, had changed in the responses 
from workers.  Their concern was that organisational change could affect both 
workplace structure and organisation-wide perceptions of these dimensions.  They 
argued that although structural change was generally planned, the changes in 
organisational processes that ultimately affected perceptions of organisational 
climate were more likely to occur through “migration or drift in practices and 
assumptions” (p.5).  In their opinion, drift in practices to accommodate a new 
structure was not necessarily a negative process, but takes time and can detract from 
performance.  Impacts on the workplace climate brought about by management 
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decisions (e.g. clarity of responsibilities, communication structure, and sense of 
control) needed to be considered when structural changes were introduced into a 
complex workplace in order to avoid unintended outcomes, such as decreased 
reliability. 
 
2.10.3 Organisational learning.  
As discussed above, problem-solving is a critical process in the maintenance task, 
part of which involves the organisation acquiring knowledge gained from solutions, 
through a process known as Organisational learning (Lipshitz, 2007).  Carroll 
(1998) examined organisational learning in a chemical process plant and evaluated 
the logic behind the need to learn from past problems.  Analysing recurrent problems 
through a Root Cause Analysis program provided a mechanism for learning from 
pre-cursors and near-misses, rather than trial-and-error.  He argued that in high-
hazard industries organisational learning would be able to provide the resilience and 
ability to anticipate that was required to avoid ‘cyclical crises’.  An important aspect 
of maintenance reliability in the petroleum industry is whether maintenance 
technicians, having resolved a particular task-related problem, can then translate that 
into new knowledge within the organisation to prevent reoccurrences of similar 
problems at other times and in other situations.   
 
The connection between problem-solving and organisational learning has been 
explored in depth in the US medical industry by Tucker and Edmondson (2003) 
based on earlier work by Edmondson (1996; 1999).  In observations conducted 
within hospitals, it was found that resolving problems that impeded the 
accomplishment of critical tasks rarely resulted in acquiring the knowledge needed to 
prevent reoccurrences (Tucker & Edmondson, 2003).  Tucker and Edmondson 
attributed this lack of learning to three seemingly positive dimensions: Individual 
vigilance, Efficiency, and Empowerment.  Individual vigilance led nurses to take 
responsibility for resolving problems, without consideration of the flaws in 
organisational systems, or feedback to correct these systems.  Similarly, 
empowerment meant that nurses were expected to work autonomously without 
adequate access to, or support from, management.  Finally, the almost universal drive 
for efficiency meant that once a problem was resolved, nurses could not devote 
further time to feeding back learnings to others in the hospital system.  The ‘work-
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arounds’ observed were employed to resolve task impediments, but in effect 
prevented the systematic learning needed to remove the root causes of systemic 
failures.  All of these factors that inhibit organisational learning have analogues 
within petroleum maintenance teams.  As in the medical industry, the drive for 
efficiency might be the main reason for failure to devote the time needed to learn 
from past failures and resolve what are considered root causes.   
 
For Edmondson (1996; 1999) the concept of learning behaviour is central to avoiding 
the types of error that compromise reliable task performance for nurses.  In her study 
of eight hospital teams, she measured the relationship between workplace climate 
factors and error frequencies.  Behavioural observations and a survey provided the 
independent variables, while the number of Adverse Drug Events was the dependant 
variable.  From the results, she concluded that better workgroup processes 
contributed to higher levels of reporting and discussion of Adverse Drug Events.  
This then led to the Second-order learning described by Argyris and Schon (1996).  
In their experience, organisations typically devote time and resource to resolving 
their immediate problems (first-order learning), but do not carry this to the next stage 
by applying the knowledge gained to prevent recurrences.  One reason for the lack of 
analysis that could lead to second-order learning is that organisations prefer to learn 
from their successes, rather than their failures (Baumard & Starbuck, 2005).  In their 
case studies of organisational failures, Baumard and Starbuck found that small 
failures, particularly ones that challenged core beliefs, either were discounted by 
managers, or were attributed directly to the person responsible for the failed venture 
or experiment.  Large failures were likely to be attributed to outside factors or people 
outside the company.  They concluded that by failing to interpret correctly the 
underlying contributors to both small and large failures, the potential to avoid future 
failures was lost.  
 
The recognition of both the importance and the difficulty of promoting learning 
across organisations, has led to the development of many strategies for organisational 
learning.  This includes strategies for both encouraging learning by individuals 
within organisations (Gherardi, Nicolini, & Odella, 1998) as well as developing the 
processes by which organisations as a whole can learn (Lipshitz, 2007).  The 
organisational learning process, formalised by the US Department of Energy in their 
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Lessons Learned Program (Carnes & Breslau, 2002) was considered to be critical to 
the development of proper procedural documentation and training within NPPs.  
Similarly, LearnSafe (Jones & Cox, 2003), a project funded by the European Union, 
has among its concerns, the “ageing of personnel and preservation of competence” 
(p.12).  As a result of recognition of the value of organisational learning, a common 
aim of many of these programs was to develop instruments for measuring 
organisational learning in NPPs (Wahlstrom, Wilpert, Cox, Sola, & Rollenhagen, 
2002).   
 
A generic instrument to measure organisational learning is the Dimensions of the 
Learning Organisation Questionnaire (DLOQ) developed by Marsick and Watkins 
(2003).  It was subsequently tested for construct validity and reliability by Yang, 
Watkins, and Marsick (2004) in a sample of 836 participants from various service 
and industrial companies.  The DLOQ has been used to measure employee 
perceptions of learning within an Australian auto parts manufacturer (Dymock & 
McCarthy, 2006).  In that study, the DLOQ was used as part of a program to develop 
workplace learning among the workforce in order to improve company performance.  
As a result, some employees saw the approach as empowering, for example, with 
regard to decision-making in their roles.  Others were more sceptical about the 
company’s motives.  To operationalise a learning environment required 
organisational change and socialising of group members to encourage participation.  
Lipshitz (2007) studied this process of socialising pilots into what he termed a 
‘debriefing culture’.  He found that such a culture existed in the form of post-flight 
reviews in his studies of an air force unit.  In this environment, the pressures to avoid 
making errors were high.  Despite this, he observed that errors were admitted during 
the thorough peer analysis of the post-flight review process.  He noted that there was 
sufficient psychological safety, a dimension described by Edmondson (1999), to 
ensure that participants felt that they could admit to errors, thereby allowing 
organisational learning to take place.   
 
Among maintenance teams there are a number of reasons why this may not occur 
(Reason & Hobbs, 2003) including a “natural disinclination to confess one’s 
blunders” p.151), as well as concerns about being named in a failure report, and a 
perception that nothing will be done to rectify the causes.  If the organisation does 
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not promote a ‘reporting culture’, the process of identifying errors before they cause 
a failure will likely not involve the maintenance technicians themselves.  The 
literature then suggests that organisational learning, and consistent feedback to 
maintenance technicians, is unlikely to occur (Edmondson, 1996; Tucker & 
Edmondson, 2003).  The probable result is one of experiencing the same failures 
repeatedly, due to what Cannon and Edmondson (2005) describe as, “both technical 
and social barriers to organizational learning from failure” (p 300), and particularly 
the situations in which “when failures are identified, social factors inhibit the 
constructive discussion and analysis through which shared learning occurs” (p 303).  
In the following section, the issue of identifying failures in relation to the human 
factors discussed above will be examined more closely.  Of particular interest is the 
investigation of failures in order to understand the organisational processes operating 
in the workplace that contribute to the occurrence of failures. 
 
2.11 The Impact of Human Factors on Reliability    
2.11.1 Models of organisational failure and reliability 
Although many of the earlier studies in human factors cited above had focussed on 
the role of the individual worker, later research recognised the implications of 
individuals operating in an organisational context.  In groundbreaking work, 
Rasmussen et al. (1981) considered that the flaws in group-level exchanges and 
organisation-level processes were ‘performance-shaping factors’ which could be 
considered the most fundamental root causes of accidents and failures.  This 
represented a shift in the conceptual framework regarding failure mechanisms 
involving humans; that is, from one in which humans fail the system (Cacciabue, 
2000; Gertman et al., 2002; Vanderhaegen, 1999), to one in which organisational 
processes are flawed and humans provide the final barrier against systemic failures 
(Edmondson, 1996).  So too have the models relating to reliability changed, from 
ones primarily concerned with individual-level phenomena (e.g. errors and 
violations) to those which also consider group- and organisation-level processes (e.g. 
communication, supervision, and climate).  Thus Reason’s (1997) Defences-in-Depth 
or ‘Swiss Cheese’ model is widely accepted by failure investigators as able to 
represent flaws which can occur at different organisational levels and within a 
variety of processes.  In the model, a failure or accident can only occur when all the 
organisational barriers that are designed to safeguard a system have flaws (‘holes’ in 
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the ‘Swiss Cheese’) or have been breached, allowing a failure sequence to proceed.  
Reason used this approach to examine the long history of maintenance failures and 
organisational accidents as part of his discussion of strategies for managing 
organisational accidents.  He described several of the more infamous fatal industrial 
accidents in which maintenance practices were an identifiable contributor.  These 
included the Flixborough cyclohexane plant explosion (28 killed), the Bhopal methyl 
isocyanate plant leak (2500 killed), and the Phillip 66 polyethylene plant explosion 
(23 killed).  Reason then proceeded to review the endemic organisational behaviours 
that contributed to maintenance failures.  These included incorrect installations, 
omissions of necessary steps in a task, deliberate violations of procedures, and 
flawed decision-making by management. 
 
In a parallel conceptualisation of organisational failure, Rasmussen (1997a) 
developed a model of “migration towards a boundary of functionally acceptable 
performance” (p.190) based on his theoretical framework of systemic failures 
(Rasmussen, 1990).  Rasmussen objected to the Defences-In-Depth model of failure, 
believing instead that as work systems adapted to their environment, ‘catastrophic 
system behaviour’ could still occur if local activities were not controlled in relation 
to absolute rather than relative boundaries of safe action.  Drift of entire systems 
under organisational pressures was more of a concern than the appearance of 
localised flaws in processes, activities, and barriers.  He argued that in fact, it was the 
organisation’s views of itself as coping relatively successfully with the dangers that 
often allowed perceived safety margins to drift closer to real boundaries of safe 
behaviour.   
 
The concept of drift in safety margins was later expanded by Hollnagel (2002) in his 
discussion of Systemic Accident Models and by Dekker (2005) in his discussion of 
Drift Into Failure.  Hollnagel first reviewed features of the Defences-in-Depth model, 
which he refers to as an ‘epidemiological model’, and considered it as problematic in 
terms of his views on accidents in organisational systems.  Dekker (2006) also 
argued against an epidemiological model, preferring a systemic model.  In his 
opinion: 
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• An epidemiological model, to be useful, relies on identifying ‘latent pathogens’, 
when in reality virtually every facet of an organisation could be the source of 
these pathogens. 
• In addition to latent pathogens, this type of model also focuses on ‘active errors’, 
typically inferred to be failings in human performance (e.g. unsafe acts, poor 
designs, or bad management decisions).  In reality, these so-called active 
errors are typically normal work activities. 
• Even epidemiological models tend to reduce accidents to a sequence of events, 
which is overly linear and too narrowly focussed too provide an understanding 
of the contributors.  Failures are defined by their ‘causes’, which tend to be 
difficult to prove and prevent other factors from being considered.   
 
Dekker (2005) then explored various concepts of failure in relation to systems 
thinking as a way of modelling the type of accidents in socio-technical systems 
caused by normal departures from acceptable practice.  As an alternative to the 
epidemiological model, Dekker expanded on the role of humans in a systemic model 
recognising that: 
• The actions of workers and supervisors prior to a failure typically appear normal 
to them and could only be understood within the context existing at the time.  
In that sense, Dekker’s concept of these failures aligned with Perrow’s (1994) 
concept of ‘systems accidents’ described in his Normal Accident Theory.  
Perrow’s Normal Accident Theory attributed these failures in modern 
industrial organisations to a combination of the complexity of interacting 
systems with their tight-coupling.  With tight-coupling, incipient failures 
propagated both more quickly and with less opportunity to intervene, 
presenting a serious threat to high-risk technologies.  All this occurs in what 
appeared to be normally functioning systems.  Here, the ‘drift into failure’ is 
characterised by an acceptance of the status quo as both normal and relatively 
safe, especially by managers for whom there are political considerations 
involved in acknowledging safety risks. 
• Failures represent a loss of control over safety constraints.  The level of control 
required can gradually change over time.  This may be as basic as the loss of 
experience in a workforce due to high turnover of staff.  When loss of control 
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extends over multiple interacting factors, which singly could not cause a 
failure, the probability of failure has been found to increase greatly 
(Antonovsky, 2006). 
 
Hollnagel (2002) contributed to the development of the concept of a Systemic 
Accident Model by arguing for assessments of risk to be based on the way that 
complex interactive systems function, and not on the probability that humans will 
make errors.  In fact, even assigning the label incorrect action is only possible once 
the outcome is known.  He contended that humans are involved “at all levels, from 
the initial design to repair and maintenance” (p.1:3), but that this cannot be invoked 
as the cause of an accident.  Instead, he argued that “variability-rather than human 
failures-is the central issue” (p. 1:5) in accidents.  Hollnagel (2006) also considered 
that with control came the ability to remove ‘unwanted variability’ in a system, and 
at the same time prevent unexpected, and presumably unwanted, events.  Hollnagel’s 
model invokes what Dekker (2006) calls the Local Rationality Principle; that is, a 
working assumption that people will make the best decisions that they can, given the 
interacting, and at times conflicting, objectives of the organisation, and a complex 
workplace context.  
    
In any analysis of human behaviour, a framework or frame of reference is needed to 
make sense of the motivations and activities of individuals in a specific context 
(Hollnagel, 2002).  As Einstein (1926) observed, “Whether you can observe a thing 
or not depends on the theory which you use.  It is the theory which decides what can 
be observed.”  In the case of judging the origins of failures and their causal 
mechanisms, the conclusions drawn will depend on who assigns causes, and what 
constitutes their frame of reference (Hughes, 1951).  These pioneers in the field of 
human factors, namely Rasmussen, Reason, Dekker, and Hollnagel, strove to 
develop frameworks in which human activity was intimately connected to the 
systems in which the work is done.  The systems not only determined the positive 
outcomes of work, but also the negative results in the form of workplace failures.  
They considered that further research and analysis of the role of human factors in 
reliability should be aimed at not just examining performance and outcomes.  
Research was also required to investigate systems at the workgroup and 
organisational levels, where ‘interactive complexity’ and an incomplete 
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understanding of the tight couplings in the workplace, were most likely to cause 
failures.   
 
Such a framework, drawn from studies of humans interacting with advanced 
technology control systems, was developed in the early writings of Rasmussen and 
his associates (Rasmussen, 1982; Rasmussen et al., 1981) on human malfunction.  In 
his Human Malfunction model, consideration was given to the various accepted 
mechanisms of human and systemic dysfunction, internal behaviour drivers, 
performance shaping factors, and situational factors discussed above.  Thus, one 
aspect of this malfunction was the ‘misfit’ between workers and machines, or 
between workers and tasks.  Rasmussen’s framework recognised the impact of the 
internal cognitive elements of human malfunction, such as acquiring information, 
assessing situations, and deciding how to proceed.  It also included all of the 
elements of the external work environment that shaped the way that humans perform.  
Finally, his framework provided a basis for assessing the observable characteristics 
of malfunction, such as omissions of tasks, inaccurate performance, or commission 
of an error.  Altogether, the model succeeded in incorporating many of the 
dimensions that were reviewed in the human factors literature in this chapter as 
influences on organisational behaviour and performance, including decision-making, 
communication, tasks not performed, and equipment design.  This framework 
provided a starting point for making sense of how workplace design and the humans 
in the workplace ultimately influenced the reliability of technical systems.  Based on 
this framework, there appeared to be a need to design workplaces and work systems 
so that they supported the required work processes and outcomes.  In the following 
sections, these issues are explored in considering the role of workplace design in 
managing the risks of maintenance failures, which then leads to consideration of the 
workplace design features inherent in the concept of a High Reliability Organisation 
(HRO). 
 
2.11.2 The role of workplace design. 
Much of the current understanding of the role of maintenance workplace design is 
derived from research in NPPs.  From her research on NPP maintenance, Bourrier 
(2005) concluded that, in addition to addressing the human factors in technological 
organisations to achieve the best outcomes, organisations needed to be designed from 
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the start in tandem with the technology employed.  Otherwise, there existed the 
danger that existing systemic failure mechanisms would remain present to cause the 
normal accidents or systems accidents described above.  In addition, the greatest 
gains in reliability were to be achieved through considerations of organisational 
design rather than technical improvements.  These design considerations included the 
“coordination of workers and structuring of tasks” (Bourrier, 1996 p.104), as well as 
formally recognising the need to modify procedures appropriately.  Therefore, 
processes for assessing and correcting the design of a maintenance workplace would 
be required in any credible reliability improvement strategy. 
 
Reiman and Oedewald (2006a) considered that before a workplace design was 
assessed to determine if it could fulfil its required functions, a coherent concept of 
those functions was required.  Oedewald and Reiman (2002) conceived of these 
functions in maintenance work as the ‘organisational core task’.  They postulated that 
a clear conception of the organisational core task might be more important to 
achieving desired maintenance outcomes than enforcing specific practices and 
procedures.  The maintenance core task for them entailed a number of job demands, 
which they incorporated into the Core Task Model (Oedewald & Reiman, 2003).  
These job demands were comprised of critical demands (i.e. monitoring, 
anticipating, and reacting) and instrumental demands (i.e., methodicalness, 
flexibility, and learning).  In addition there were the working demands, such as 
adhering to procedures, coordination, and defining responsibilities.  These constructs 
were similar to the ones that Bourrier (1996) used to assess the successful operation 
of two American NPPs.  Her assessments of their performance were based on 
comparing the differing strategies in the two NPPs for handling the demands of 
maintenance.  The measure used to judge successful performance was a qualitative 
assessment of the relative success of these plants in handling four core elements of 
the maintenance shutdown process: 
• coordinating Maintenance and Operations Departments 
• complying with procedures 
• adapting to unexpected situations 
• controlling the quality of maintenance work. 
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Bourrier considered that these dimensions of workplace design corresponded to the 
properties identified in HRO research.  Despite having very different workplace 
designs, in her opinion, the two NPPs that she assessed had operated as HROs.  
However, she also contended that HRO research had not focussed sufficiently on the 
way in which HROs emerge out of the behaviour of their workers, an important 
aspect of her findings from the two NPPs.  Therefore, it is worthwhile, to consider 
these characteristics of HROs more fully, as potential criteria for assessing human 
factors in maintenance reliability. 
 
2.11.3 The high-reliability organisation 
Researchers have investigated high-risk operations, such as petroleum production 
(Øien, 2001a), medicine (McKeon, Cunningham, & Oswaks, 2009), military units 
(Roberts, Rousseau, & La Porte, 1994), aviation and NPPs (Klein, Bigley, & 
Roberts, 1995) in order to understand how these operations managed to avoid 
failures in organisational systems.  Their work led to the development of High-
Reliability Theory (HRT) and the concept of the High-Reliability Organisation 
(Roberts, Rousseau, & La Porte, 1994; Klein, Bigley, & Roberts, 1995).  Researchers 
such as Rochlin (1999) attempted to establish the generic characteristics that define 
HROs, rather than focus on the reliability of specific tasks in a particular workplace.  
He observed that a range of types of HROs, e.g. air traffic control operations, 
military operations, and nuclear power generation, were characterised by a focus on 
risk, continuous learning at all levels of the organisation, and efforts to maintain 
communication.  The features of HROs were further evaluated by Vogus and 
Welbourne (2003) in their study of 184 software firms.  They hypothesised that the 
latent dimensions mediating between the workforce and company performance were 
Emphasis on training, Commitment to resilience, and a Reluctance to simplify 
interpretations.  La Porte (1996) also formulated a conceptual framework around his 
observations of the internal processes and external relationships that characterised 
large HROs.  Concerning the internal processes, he observed that consideration of 
the consistency of processes was of equal importance to the performance of 
objectives.  This was accompanied by a high level of operator autonomy, including 
considerable decision-making at lower levels in the organisation.  At the same time, 
relationships with the external environment were intensely managed in order to 
maintain the support and trust of outside agencies, such as regulators and community 
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groups.  As a result of these studies, a theoretical understanding of a collection of 
organisational characteristics came to be accepted as constituting an HRO. 
Roberts, Rousseau, and La Porte (1994) adopted a more empirical approach to 
determining if the characteristics of an HRO were present on a U.S. Navy vessel.  
Using the Organizational Culture Index (OCI), they determined that the officers and 
enlisted men registered a high level of satisfaction with both the high task demands 
and high control of behaviour.  In this HRO, the reliability of processes was 
considered to be of greater importance than the reliability of outcomes.  Klein, 
Bigley, and Roberts (1995) used the same instrument to examine organisational 
cultures in two distinct types of HROs.  In this study, the U.S. Air Traffic Control 
system achieved its high reliability through an ability to reduce tight-coupling and 
interdependence in an emergency.  They referred to this system as a decomposable 
HRO.  In contrast, the NPP in the study achieved high reliability by maintaining a 
high level of coordination of organisational systems, referring to this as a holistic 
HRO.  As Bourrier (1996) observed, it is possible for different workplace models to 
support high operating reliability. 
 
The research on HROs demonstrated that remaining within the boundaries of reliable 
operation required a greater level of cognitive ability, situation awareness, and 
operating experience on the part of workers, compared with organisations that are 
based on less-hazardous technology.  These sources of reliability in the workplace 
are responsible for what Weick (1987) termed ‘dynamic non-events’, that is, 
successful processes in an ever-changing workplace.  Furthermore, as noted earlier, 
the position of these boundaries is a function of organisational constraints and tends 
to drift under organisational pressures, such as time and financial constraints 
(Rasmussen, 1997a), and political imperatives (Sagan, 1994).  Thus, in Rasmussen’s 
model, workloads and economic pressures will tend to drive organisationally 
accepted safety limits into the marginal areas of safe operation and towards a higher 
probability of accidents.   
 
As the researchers studying the management of hazardous technologies such as 
petroleum production have realised, resolving problems in technically-complex and 
tightly-coupled systems required consideration of workforce/technology interactions 
(Heimann, 2005) within a framework based on an understanding of human factors.  
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In turn, many of the theoretical advances in understanding the role of human factors 
in workplace effectiveness have developed out of this realisation and empirical 
studies of organisations that could be considered as HROs.  A further stage in this 
process would be to identify those factors that have the greatest influence on 
maintenance reliability, and to quantify the extent of their influence.  This is, in fact, 
the basis for the three studies in the current research. 
 
2.12 Summary of Existing Research 
As the literature examined in this chapter demonstrated, maintenance reliability is an 
important issue for any organisation which depends for its success on the predictable 
operation of facilities and equipment.  This is particularly the case for hazardous 
technologies, such as petroleum production, in which failures can have severe 
implications for workgroup, community, and environmental safety (Pate-Cornell, 
1993).   
 
Ensuring the reliability of complex equipment has traditionally been viewed as a 
matter of technical concern (Dhillon, 2002); that is, the solution to faults and failures 
lies in improving the technology employed.  Consequently, much research has 
focussed on the contribution of engineering design to failures, with estimates 
(Taylor, 2007) that 55% of failures in process industries could be attributed to design 
flaws.  However, despite a solely technical approach prevailing in much of the 
engineering literature, researchers (Crichton, 2005; Flin, O'Connor, Mearns, & 
Gordon, 1999) studying petroleum operations began to consider the human factors in 
maintenance-related failures and in the potential for disasters.  Typical industry 
figures quoted (Reason & Hobbs, 2003) for maintenance failures associated with 
human performance were in the range of 42-65%.  Studies cited in the literature have 
demonstrated that many instances of failures and accidents are the result of not 
considering the human element in the maintainability of equipment.  Practitioners in 
maintenance reliability in the petroleum industry (Bea, 1998; Øien, 2001a) have 
therefore recognised that the non-technical contributors to reliability need to be 
considered alongside the technical factors. 
 
The influences on maintenance reliability, as with other indicators of organisational 
performance, can be conceptualised as situated at the individual-, group- or 
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organisational-levels (Figure 2).  At the individual level, human error and procedural 
violations have long been the concern of both researchers (Khan, Amyotte, & 
DiMattia, 2006) and accident investigators (Sklet, 2006) in petroleum operations.  In 
these hazardous, tightly-coupled workplaces they were seen as the immediate pre-
cursors to accidents.  Other individual level factors considered likely to be important 
to maintenance reliability were affective factors, including motivation, commitment, 


























Figure 2.  Summary of factors expected to influence maintenance reliability 
 
Further research cited, particularly in the field of industrial maintenance and safety 
(Zohar & Luria, 2003b), demonstrated the need to address the underlying causes of 
these errors, violations, and affective reactions through understanding of group-level 
and organisational-level processes.  Among these group-level processes identified in 
the literature were team functions, supervision, and leadership, communication, 
decision-making, and problem-solving.  A number of studies in the petroleum 
industry and many others in comparably hazardous industries have identified the 
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important role of team functions (Crichton, 2005), communication (O'Connor & Flin, 
2003), and supervision (O'Dea & Flin, 2001) in supporting the activities of 
maintenance personnel.  As examples, mutual error checking within teams, the style 
of leadership used, and effective communication between team members were all 
group-level factors demonstrated to influence workplace performance.  These 
processes in turn supported the output of maintenance work-groups in the form of 
decision-making and problem-solving.  The prevalence of Recognition-Primed 
Decision-making in operating environments (Carvalho, dos Santos, & Vidal, 2005), 
and the possible need for more analytical decision-making and higher-order problem-
solving in maintenance activities were also examined by researchers (Hokstad, Øien, 
& Reinertsen, 1998; Schaafstal, Schraagen, & van Berlo, 2000).    
 
Studies of organisational-level processes demonstrated their critical role in 
supporting the work of maintenance personnel.  Workplaces, particularly in complex 
socio-technical systems, needed to be designed from the beginning with 
consideration of the human factors as well as the technical factors (Bourrier, 2005).  
These designs were dependent on an understanding of the core tasks of the 
maintenance workplace (Oedewald & Reiman, 2002), out of which evolved its 
organisational climate.  Among these dimensions of a climate that created reliability, 
was an ability of the organisation to learn from its failures and the solutions to these 
failures (Tucker, Edmondson, & Spear, 2002).  Organisational Learning was 
considered to be critical to workplace performance (Carroll, 1998), especially in 
complex organisations, where interdependencies between systems and tight coupling 
of human-machine and machine-machine interactions magnified the effects of any 
weaknesses in organisational processes.  Pioneers in the field of human factors have 
attempted to model the effects of these weaknesses in organisational systems as a 
means of understanding the basis for reliability.  This has given rise to the concepts 
of Defences-in-Depth (Reason & Hobbs, 2003), the Human Malfunction model 
(Rasmussen et al., 1981), the Systemic Accident Model (Hollnagel, 2002) and the 
Drift Into Failure model (Dekker, 2005).  These models demonstrated in various 
ways the mechanisms through which organisational processes supported reliability or 
contributed to failures of human work activities.  
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As a result of this increased understanding of the organisational processes mentioned 
above, as well as concerns about managing hazardous industries (Heimann, 2005) 
such as petroleum production (Øien, 2001a), there have been numerous 
investigations into the dimensions that are responsible for their relative success (e.g., 
Rochlin, 1999).  Attempts to characterise the common elements have given rise to 
the concept of the HRO (La Porte, 1996), which was intended to serve as a model for 
structuring organisations that are responsible for operating hazardous technologies.  
Consideration of the HRO has highlighted the importance of understanding human 
factors at all levels in an organisation in order to ensure reliable performance (Vogus 
& Welbourne, 2003).   
 
Although a number of studies relating to reliability in the petroleum industry were 
identified, many of the advances in understanding were derived from studies of 
maintenance in other hazardous industries.  In addition, the importance of 
understanding human factors and their potential influence on maintenance reliability 
were frequently discussed in the literature cited, but it has not been clear which 
among these human factors have the greatest impact on maintenance reliability in the 
context of petroleum production, or how strong the association may be between 
specific human factors and measurable outcomes.  In the next chapter, a rationale for 
continuing the investigation of contributors to maintenance reliability in petroleum 
operations will be provided, as well as the need for research to quantify the 
relationship between reliability and specific human factors. 
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3.0 Research Rationale 
 3.1 Past Research  
As discussed in Section 2.3, maintenance reliability is defined as the probability of 
failure-free operation of equipment and plant.  Literature cited in Section 2.7 has 
demonstrated that many instances of maintenance failure are the result of not 
considering the maintainability of technical equipment in the original designs of 
production systems.  In addition, researchers studying both equipment reliability, as 
well as major disasters, have recognised that the human factors contributing to 
failures related to maintenance need to be considered alongside the technical factors.  
Many researchers (Section 2.11) have examined the human factors in failures, and 
based on these events, developed models of the processes involved, and 
conceptualised the requirements for maintaining high reliability in operations. 
 
In order to understand the requirements for high reliability, as well as the 
contributors to failures, past studies have examined human factors at the individual-, 
group- and organisational-levels (Figure 2).  At the individual level, human error and 
procedural violations were frequently investigated (Section 2.8) as the contributors to 
failures of technical systems, through the actions of humans in the design, operation, 
and maintenance of these systems.  However, research, particularly in the field of 
process safety (Section 2.11.1), has demonstrated the need to address the underlying 
causes of these errors and violations through an understanding of group-level and 
organisational-level processes.  Literature from the petroleum industry has examined 
such group-level factors (Section 2.9) as teamwork, communication, decision-
making, and problem-solving.  These group-level factors were in turn described as 
being influenced by organisational-level factors (see Section 2.10) including 1) the 
design of workplaces, 2) the emergence of various organisational climates, and 3) the 
ability of an organisation to learn from events.  The incorporation of these group-
level and organisational-level dimensions into Crew Resource Management training 
in the petroleum industry has demonstrated the importance that they have in regard to 
reliability and process safety.  
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3.2 Justification for Conducting Further Research 
3.2.1 Importance of research in petroleum industry operations 
As discussed in Section 2.4, research into the factors responsible for reliability in 
petroleum production is of interest to the petroleum industry due to the hazardous 
operating environment, coupled with the high value of production.  Reliability levels 
influence the probability of failure, and consequently, affect the productivity as well 
as the costs of maintaining this production, which was estimated to be approximately 
30% of production costs for a large petroleum producer.  At the same time as there 
are financial benefits for successful petroleum producers, there is also the potential 
for an explosion or environmental release of hydrocarbons, as was witnessed in the 
destruction of the Deepwater Horizon (Urbina, 2010) and Piper Alpha (Pate-Cornell, 
1993) platforms, and in other petroleum industry disasters (Sovacool, 2008).  Aside 
from the damage and injury which could occur in a serious accident, the loss of fuel 
supply for an extended time has significant economic implications for the broader 
community, as described in Section 2.4.  Therefore, advances in the area of reliability 
offer an opportunity for both less costly and safer operation for producers, and 
security of supply for the community.  Research to understand the contributing 
factors in production losses also represents a means of identifying the impediments 
to maintenance activities and improving the effectiveness of these activities. 
 
3.2.2 Need for further research on human factors in hazardous workplaces 
As petroleum operations become more reliant on technology that is in turn based on 
complex human-machine interactions, further research is needed in the field of 
human factors to understand how their reliability might be enhanced.  The flaws in 
human-machine and human-system interactions are exacerbated by the tight 
couplings and dependencies created through the design of automation and control 
systems, and a prevailing tendency to use advanced technologies to minimise human 
intervention (see Section 2.11).  An example of this type of flawed human-system 
interaction in a socio-technical system was the explosion and oil release at the 
Deepwater Horizon oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico.  Professor Patzek in the Petroleum 
and Geo-systems Engineering Department of the University of Texas was quoted 
(Urbina, 2010) as describing the oil rig as, “a very complex operation in which the 
human element has not been aligned with the complexity of the system.”  The tight 
couplings and interdependencies of humans and complex technology have been 
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similarly recognised as risk factors in other research into petroleum operations (Øien, 
2001a; Øien, 2001b).  There is a justification therefore, for extending current 
knowledge concerning the role of human factors in petroleum operations by applying 
learnings gained in other hazardous industries, such as aviation and nuclear power 
generation. 
 
Comparisons between industries have been shown to be useful in exploring the 
influence of the human factors common to the hazardous industries.  For example, 
despite the contextual differences, comparative research between air traffic 
management and nuclear power generation (Straeter & Kirwan, 2002) and between 
medicine and aviation (Sexton, Thomas, & Helmreich, 2000) has provided 
indications of the areas in which progress in human factors can be achieved.  Many 
of the factors of importance in reliability in these domains, such as decision-making 
and communication, are expected to be relevant to petroleum production operations.  
In terms of maintenance in a production context involving heavy machinery, 
complicated process-control equipment, and containment of high energy sources, the 
petroleum industry is likely to be analogous to the nuclear power industry.  The 
maintenance activities required in both industries are expected to place similar 
physical and cognitive demands on maintenance workers.   
 
Despite these apparent similarities between maintenance tasks and roles in the 
petroleum industry and nuclear power industry, there are also a number of domain-
dependent differences that justify research that is specific to the petroleum industry.  
First, due to public concern with accidents involving nuclear power plants, the 
industry is closely regulated by government agencies, and the maintenance activities 
are highly proceduralised compared to maintenance in the petroleum industry.  As a 
consequence, much of the attention in human factors studies of the nuclear power 
industry has been on human error, as well as accidental and deliberate violations of 
regulatory and operational procedures (Munipov, 1992).  In contrast, the petroleum 
industry has been less-regulated and has tended to operate more autonomously 
(Urbina, 2010). 
 
Furthermore, the difficulties of access to off-shore petroleum facilities, and the wide 
geographical distribution of these facilities, provide additional constraints relating to 
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human factors in the workplace, particularly with organisational communication and 
the supervision of workers.  Maintenance teams can be responsible for a variety of 
production systems, often under changing operational conditions, with a wide range 
of failure modes.  As a result, many areas of the petroleum industry rely on a high 
level of workgroup autonomy, with fewer established procedures.  Autonomy 
implies a greater reliance on decision-making and problem-solving processes among 
the workforce.  In addition, a high degree of mobility among petroleum industry 
personnel in Australia means that behaviours relating to teamwork, communication, 
and organisational learning may be more important factors than in industries that are 
not as geographically distributed.  These differences between organisational 
structures and activities in the petroleum industry, compared to other potentially 
hazardous industries, justify the need for an investigation of the role of human 
factors in this domain. 
 
Finally, past research in the petroleum industry has tended to focus on a limited 
number of human factors, such as teamwork and leadership (e.g., Crichton, 2005).  It 
has also often been the case that the human factors examined are those that relate to 
the safety of workers.  Although the role of human factors in achieving a safety 
culture in the petroleum industry has been well-documented (Flin, Mearns, 
O'Connor, & Bryden, 2000), the role of human factors in achieving a reliability 
culture in this industry has not been as clearly delineated in the literature reviewed.  
As discussed in Section 2.10.1, the need to avoid injuries has often generated a focus 
on particular risk factors, which may be different to the risk factors in maintaining 
reliable operations.  For example, as a consequence of the concern with the safety of 
workers, research on leadership and decision-making (O'Dea & Flin, 2001) and 
failure investigation methods (e.g., Gordon, Mearns, & Flin, 2000) have tended to 
predominate over consideration of other factors, such as organisational 
communication, problem-solving behaviour, and organisational learning, which may 
be equally relevant.  Research into a broader range of factors is warranted to provide 
guidance for future interventions aimed at improving reliability.  For these 
interventions to be effective, it is important that they be targeted towards risk factors 
specific to the petroleum industry, rather than towards generic factors which are 
presumed to influence all organisational outcomes.   
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3.2.3 Benefits: development of theoretical concepts 
The framework for the current studies is based on models of systemic failure within 
organisations as reviewed in Section 2.11.1.  These provide a basis for 
conceptualising the mechanisms through which industrial failures might occur.  
Analyses of workplace events would assist in demonstrating whether these models 
are appropriate means of categorising and explaining observations relating to failures 
in petroleum maintenance operations.   
 
Similarly, the concept of reliability relies on engineering models that are based on 
the probability of failure-free operation of technical equipment and operations (see 
Section 2.5).  These models are used to underpin engineering designs and analyses of 
the maintainability of critical equipment.  Many of the theoretical reliability models 
refer to failure rates of individual components and machinery, often relying on 
estimations of failure rates (Todinov, 2004).  In order to conduct the current research, 
collection of data was needed based on the reliability level of entire work areas.  
Consequently, a benefit of the current studies is in demonstrating that reliability 
measures based on theory are able to provide a valid means of differentiating 
reliability outcomes between similar work areas. 
 
3.2.4 Benefits: development of practical measures 
In addition to advancing theoretical understanding of the mechanisms of reliability in 
an industrial context, industry-based research should also produce practical benefits.  
One of the potential outcomes of this project is a refinement of methodologies for 
investigating maintenance-related failures.  Researchers consider that analysis of 
incidents is critical to understanding the interactions between factors that may occur 
in unexpected failures (see Section 2.11.1).  A benefit of this research will be to 
evaluate investigation tools of potential use in identifying human factors in failures 
in a petroleum industry context.   
 
There have been efforts to analyse improvements to organisational reliability based 
on a human factors approach, particularly in HROs (Vogus & Welbourne, 2003; 
Klein, Bigley, & Roberts, 1995).  However, these studies have generally relied on 
qualitative assessments of reliability (La Porte, 1996).  Even when quantitative 
measurements were made of the human factors in an organisation (Roberts, 
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Rousseau, & La Porte, 1994), there do not appear to have been equivalent 
quantitative measures of task performance.  Therefore, it is not clear which among 
the various human factors have the greatest impact on maintenance reliability in a 
particular domain, and how strong the association may be between specific factors 
and measurable outcomes.  As Reiman and Oedewald (2004) commented in relation 
to the aims of their own CULTURE survey of the maintenance culture in 
Scandinavian NPPs,  
 
The research did not aim at finding performance indicators or other objective 
characteristics to validate the connection of the results to the operational 
reliability of the plant…Further research should aim at clarifying the 
influence of organisational culture [on] objective measures of plant 
reliability.  (p.886) 
 
In Reiman and Oedewald’s (2006a&b; 2007) numerous assessments of maintenance 
climate, a framework was developed for linking specific factors to maintenance 
outcomes.  The current thesis is intended to advance the theory and practical 
investigations of researchers such as Reiman and Oedewald, by identifying a suitable 
measure of reliability and then determining if statistically significant relationships 
exist between this measure and specific human factors.  If relationships can be 
identified, then these measures can be used to develop practical interventions based 
on a human factors approach to maintenance reliability, and to demonstrate the 
benefits that can be achieved.  Demonstrating the measurable role of human factors 
in reliability will then provide a further impetus for integrating a human factors 
approach with an engineering approach to solve problems in the reliability of 
technically-advanced operations. 
 
A further benefit of this research will be to advance the awareness of the value of a 
human factors approach in designing facilities and specifying maintenance activities.  
It is hoped that in addition to gains in the efficiency and effectiveness of maintenance 
workgroups, this research will also encourage a conceptually broader and more 
human-focussed approach to maintenance management. 
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  3.3 Research Aim and Objectives 
3.3.1 Overall research aim 
The literature surveyed in Chapter 2 showed that the impact of specific human 
factors on reliability in maintenance work was of sufficient interest to warrant further 
investigation.  The overall aim of this thesis is then to identify the human factors that 
have the most influence on maintenance reliability in the petroleum industry, and 
determine their quantitative relationship with outcomes.  
 
3.3.2 Specific research objectives 
Based on models of failure in socio-technical systems (see Section 2.11.1), the 
human factors contributing to maintenance failure will be investigated in the context 
of petroleum maintenance operations.  As was the case with studies of maintenance 
performance in the aviation (Hobbs, 2000; Latorella & Prabhu, 2000), railway 
(Holmgren, 2005), and nuclear power (Pyy, 2001) industries, the starting point for 
understanding maintenance reliability in the petroleum industry will be a detailed 
study of the human factors that were extant when maintenance failures occurred.  To 
identify the human factors contributors to these incidents, Study 1 examines the data 
that the target organisation has collected as reports of adverse events, and Study 2 
analyses the data derived from structured interviews with maintenance personnel.   
 
A failure investigation taxonomy is needed to accomplish this objective of analysing 
past failures.  As explained in Section 2.8.3, many of the developments in the field of 
human factors have been based on frameworks for categorising erroneous human 
actions and flawed organisational processes.  An objective of the current research is 
to select a taxonomy from among those that have been developed in the course of 
human factors research (e.g., Reason, Parker, & Lawton, 1998; Marx, 1998), and 
adapt it to studies of failures in petroleum operations.   
 
Research objective of Study 1: To determine the human factors that appeared most 
frequently in company-based reports of maintenance-related failures in petroleum 
industry operations.  A secondary objective of Study 1 is to select and refine a 
taxonomy for analysing the human factors contributors to maintenance-related 
failures. 
 
                                                     Human Factors and Plant Maintenance Reliability 73
Research objective of Study 2: To determine the human factors that contributed 
most frequently to maintenance-related failures in petroleum industry operations 
based on structured interviews with maintenance personnel. 
 
Once the most-frequent contributors to past maintenance failures in the target 
organisation have been identified in Studies 1 and 2, the objective of Study 3 is to 
evaluate the human factors characteristics of higher and lower reliability work areas 
in a petroleum production company.  Therefore, one objective is to select an 
appropriate measure for comparing reliability levels that would be commensurate 
with current principles of maintenance reliability engineering (Dhillon, 2002; 
International Standards Organization, 2006b).  Another objective of Study 3 is to 
determine if higher and lower reliability work areas can be differentiated on the basis 
of their human factors characteristics.  This necessitates selecting appropriate, 
reliable, and validated scales for measuring the perceptions of maintenance personnel 
regarding the predominant human factors that were identified in Study 2.  In 
addition, a qualitative analysis of the perceptions of maintenance personnel, 
concerning the influences on reliability in their work areas, is beneficial in 
supporting the data derived from quantitative measures.  This additional data will 
provide a means of triangulating quantitative data in order to reduce the potential for 
bias from using a single method of data collection. 
 
  Research objective of Study 3: To determine if higher and lower reliability work 
areas in the target organisation could be differentiated by the perceptions of 
maintenance personnel concerning the human factors identified in Study 2 as 
contributing most-frequently to maintenance-related failures.  A secondary objective 
is to use qualitative data to triangulate the quantitative data from the survey in Study 
3, in order to aid in the interpretation of the inferential analyses in Study 3. 
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4.0 Study 1: Investigating Human Factors in Company Incident Reports 
4.1 Introduction 
Study 1 involves the selection and refinement of a taxonomy for analysing the 
mechanisms of maintenance failures in a petroleum industry operation, and the 
application of this method to determine the human factors that appeared most 
frequently in company-based reports of maintenance-related failures.   
 
4.1.1 Framework for Study 1 
As discussed in Section 2.11.1, a framework is required to make sense of the 
decisions and actions of individuals in their workplace.  A useful framework 
provides a basis for understanding the mechanisms expected in the particular domain 
being investigated.  Since Rasmussen described his Human Malfunction model in 
1982, many researchers (e.g., Reinach & Viale, 2006; Hobbs & Williamson, 2002; 
Gordon, Flin, & Mearns, 2005) have made use of this model to investigate the role of 
human factors in failures of safety and reliability.  This model, in conjunction with 
his (Rasmussen, 1997a) concept of drift across boundaries of safety limits and safe 
operation, provided a far-reaching frame of reference with which to assess the 
mechanisms whereby human factors contribute to failures in an industrial context.  
The two models conceptualised the individual maintenance technician not as an 
independent entity entirely responsible for outcomes, but as a participant in a 
dynamic system, engineered for reliability, but subject to drift towards failure under 
organisational pressures.  This has changed the focus to a conceptual realm in which 
individual performance intersects with engineering design and workplace systems.  It 
is in considering the role of these three aspects of the workplace that the strength of 
the Human Malfunction model serves as a comprehensive basis for understanding the 
mechanics underlying maintenance reliability in technology-based systems.   
 
4.1.2 Taxonomies of failure  
Rasmussen et al (1981) provided advice on how research might quantify the 
contributors to failure: 
To be able to quantify the frequency of inappropriate human acts in a 
meaningful way, it is necessary to separate cases of intrinsic human 
variability and spontaneous human errors from cases of psychologically 
normal human reactions to external events or changes in the work situation, 
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This means that a simple classification of human errors with reference to the 
task sequence in terms of omission, commission, timing errors etc. is not 
adequate.  Careful efforts should be spent to identify potential external causes 
with reference to categories which allow estimates of frequencies in another 
particular situation.  (p. 5) 
 
 
One approach to determining the predominant contributors to accidents has been 
through the development of investigation methodologies for characterising the 
human factors responsible for reliability-related incidents, such as maintenance 
failures.  Taxonomies have been created for describing and categorising the various 
contributors to outcomes, both positive and negative, deriving from human-machine 
and human-task interactions.  Taxonomy logically evolves out of the framework 
adopted for observing and understanding these interactions.  Therefore, the 
taxonomy for Study 1 must be consistent with the framework, while capturing the 
various workplace behaviours related to desired maintenance outcomes (Ross, 
Wallace, & Davies, 2004). 
 
Two crucial tasks in developing failure investigation methods are the selection of 
taxonomy and the application of the taxonomy to failures.  There has been a 
tendency apparent in the literature to consider the technical, individual, and 
organisational aspects separately in a way that depends on the field of investigation 
of the researcher.  Put another way, in Dekker’s (2006) discussion of accident 
models he warns that the model selected will depend on how the investigating 
organisation believes that accidents occur, which in turn will tend to dictate what 
causes are identified.  For example, a commonly used technique for analysing 
potential causes of failure in a system is known as Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA) (Moubray, 1997).  Referring to the way that maintenance analysts 
conduct this analysis, Moubray commented, “Some even go so far as to specify that 
FMEA’s…should deal only with failure modes caused by deterioration and should 
ignore other categories of failure modes (such as human factors and design flaws)” 
(p. 58).  Wallace and Ross (2006) explained that a danger in the use of taxonomic 
systems to categorise human errors is that low inter-rater reliabilities can occur due 
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to differing frames of reference, either between raters with differing backgrounds, or 
between raters and the developer of the taxonomy. 
 
Due to differing frames of reference in different industries, a common approach to 
analysing human factors in incidents has been through the development of industry-
specific failure investigation taxonomies.  These provide a basis for categorising the 
human factors responsible for maintenance failures and other reliability-related 
incidents, and thereby attempt to provide an understanding of the mechanisms of 
failure, within a frame of reference.  A number of industries have designed 
investigation tools for accident investigators operating in a specific domain, 
including: 
 
• British Airways’ Human Factor Reporting Programme (O'Leary, 2002). 
• Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) for use in 
military aviation (Shappell, 2000) and rail operations (Reinach & Viale, 
2006). 
• Human Error Reduction in Air Traffic Management (HERA) and JANUS 
techniques (Pounds & Isaac, 2003) developed for air traffic management 
(ATM) using a structured interview approach to retrospectively analyse 
past incidents. 
• U.S. Department of Energy’s (1999) Accident Investigation Program for 
nuclear power plant investigations. 
• Human Factors Investigation Tool (HFIT) developed for the North Sea 
petroleum industry (Gordon, Mearns, & Flin, 2000). 
 
Each of the above provides a taxonomy that is relevant to a specific field of practice 
and is based on an existing conceptual approach to the causes of failure recognised 
by that field of practice, which Hughes’ (1951) termed a ‘jurisprudence of 
mistakes.’ 
 
4.1.3 Justification for selecting HFIT investigation taxonomy 
Gordon, Flin and Mearns (2005) developed the Human Factors Investigation Tool 
(HFIT) in an effort to utilise the elements of Rasmussen’s Human Malfunction 
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model, as well as to integrate other applicable elements found in existing 
investigation taxonomies into an appropriate investigation tool for the offshore 
petroleum industry (Gordon, 1998).  With HFIT, they succeeded in translating a 
number of theoretical constructs of human factors into a practical instrument for 
conducting detailed investigations into failures and accidents.  It was intended for 
use by engineers and other investigators in the petroleum industry, who would have 
varying degrees of expertise in human factors.  This is in contrast to the other 
investigation tools listed above which were designed for use by human factors 
specialists in the respective fields of aviation, rail operations, air traffic control, and 
nuclear power production.  HFIT was selected for the current research as it is both 
relevant to the petroleum industry and depends for its underpinnings on 
Rasmussen’s framework, which is the frame of reference that has been adopted for 
this study. 
 
HFIT provided for consideration of a comprehensive range of human cognition, 
performance-shaping, and error-promoting factors described in Sections 2.8-2.10 as 
influences in the workplace.  These influences are represented by the major 
categories in HFIT of Situation Awareness, Action Errors, and Organisational 
Threats.  A further strength of HFIT lies in adopting a multi-level approach to 
analysing the factors associated with failures (see Section 2.8.1).  Such a multi-level 
approach to workplace factors is supported by Zohar and Luria’s (2005) research 
into industrial safety.  Their hypothesis was that safety drivers can reside at any of 
the three organisational levels within the work environment, namely the individual, 
the workgroup, or the organisational level.  An accident analysis then proceeds from 
consideration of the contribution of each of these levels.  Similarly, HFIT is 
structured in such a way as to allow an analysis of the individual, workgroup, and 
organisational contributors to a failure under investigation.  At the individual level 
are dimensions such as Omission, Violation, and Work Quality.  The workgroup 
level includes the dimensions of Teamwork, Supervision, and Communication, while 
the organisational level includes Procedures, Organisational Culture, and Work 
Environment. 
 
A complete human factors based investigation of a maintenance failure required 
both an understanding of the workplace factors experienced at the time by 
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maintenance personnel, as well as an empirical assessment of the dimensions of the 
organisation that could be observed and analysed via descriptions of past events.  
The HFIT taxonomy and format provided a suitable instrument for accomplishing 
this task. 
 
4.1.4 Research setting: The target organisation 
The research setting for this study was a large, independent producer of oil and gas 
products in Australia.  Products produced include liquefied natural gas (LNG), liquid 
petroleum gas (LPG), condensate, and oil.  The organisation considers itself as a 
“reliable supplier [italics added] with a focus on delivering on our commitments”.  
As such, it was deemed a suitable candidate for determining the extent to which this 
reliability of supply was influenced by human factors. 
 
The target organisation is composed of three distinct types of production facilities, 
i.e. off-shore gas platforms, off-shore Floating Production, Storage and Offloading 
(FPSO) vessels, and an on-shore gas processing plant (the Process Plant).  The gas 
platforms are larger, more complex faculties processing gas from undersea wells.  
The FPSOs are simpler facilities built into ships, and designed to extract oil and 
pump it into oil tankers for refining elsewhere.  The Process Plant consists of a 
number of production trains that separate and process gas from off-shore wells and 
other operational areas.  Liquefied natural gas is stored and loaded into LNG tankers 
for export, while Liquefied Petroleum Gas is piped to communities for domestic 
consumption (DomGas). 
 
There are a number of examples of each type of facility within the company, 
providing an opportunity for within-group and between-group experimental designs.  
The maintenance workforce includes both maintenance technicians directly 
employed by the company and contractors who work for third-party companies that 
supply services.  In addition, there are Core Crews who are based on the facilities, 
and Major Maintenance crews that are based at the geographically-separated central 
administration, and brought on-site for specialised shutdown activities.  The 
maintenance work required is divided between electrical / instrumentation 
maintenance and mechanical maintenance activities.  These distinctions provide a 
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further level of analysis between different types of work processes, involving both 
basic and more technically-advanced task procedures.   
 
These technologically-advanced processes are conducted in production facilities that 
are complex and hazardous in terms of both worker-safety and the potential for major 
facility and environmental disasters.  As such, petroleum production represents a 
high-level of safety-criticality, but has not been researched as thoroughly as, for 
example, commercial aviation and nuclear power plant operations.  In contrast to 
these other hazardous industries, petroleum production is less subject to regulation 
by government authorities and workplaces are more widely-distributed 
geographically.  For these reasons, petroleum operations are a distinctly different 
type of work environment, offering an alternative view of the role of human factors 
in the workplace. 
 
As discussed in Section 3.2.1, maintenance personnel in the petroleum industry tend 
to have a higher degree of autonomy in their day-to-day activities than in many 
other hazardous industries.  With more discretion in determining how tasks are to be 
done, and less regulatory over-sight, there is a greater range of acceptable practice.  
Consequently maintenance technicians have more individual responsibility for 
interpretation of information and decision-making within their job function.  
Petroleum processing is therefore an ideal environment for studying the impact of 
human factors in critical situations in which workers have a greater level of control 
over work processes.  The consequences of incorrect behaviours and decisions in 
petroleum production can be almost as severe as in a nuclear power plant, but the 
levels of workplace control are more akin to that in general industry.  Altogether, the 
particular characteristics of the target organisation provide an opportunity for 
understanding of the role of human factors in an industry that warrants further study. 
 
4.1.5 Summary of objectives 
Based on the considerations described above, the principal objective of Study 1 was 
to identify the human factors that were most-frequently mentioned in company-based 
reports of maintenance-related failures in petroleum production operations.  A 
secondary objective of Study 1 was to select and refine a taxonomy for analysing the 
human factors contributing to maintenance failures.  This taxonomy was required to 
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be consistent with Rasmussen’s Human Malfunction model and be appropriate for 




Adverse events, hazards, and investigated failures are recorded in the company’s 
Information Management system in an incident reporting database called First 
Priority.  It is described on the entry screen as an “enterprise-level compliance, risk, 
and knowledge management system.”  First Priority records the significant 
operational failures that have resulted in production losses, equipment damage, 
environmental threats, and personal injuries occurring throughout the company.  
Data is submitted by incident investigators via both on-line and on various versions 
of paper-based incident recording forms.  Supplementary material, which includes 
more detailed, follow-up investigations, is often appended to the forms.   
 
The entries in the First Priority database were examined for one calendar year, 
namely 2007, the first full year of this research.  Of interest in the current research 
were the entries in First Priority categorised as Incident - Asset Damage and Lost 
Production.  This is the category reflecting the outcomes of maintenance and 





There are also categories for recording identified hazards which do not eventuate as 
incidents.   
 
4.2.2 Measure 
HFIT was designed as a comprehensive accident investigation method, and, as it is 
currently configured (Gordon, 2001), consists of 54 pages of queries arranged into 
flow charts.  HFIT is structured as an ‘expert system’, which leads the investigator 
through a series of topics and questions covering the possible human factors involved 
in a failure or accident sequence.  The analysis leads from the more general, over-
arching organisational issues to the specific group and individual level details of the 
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incident or accident.  In HFIT, consideration of multiple levels is achieved by 
considering the three organisational levels influencing an event.  The major 
categories specified in HFIT are Action Errors, Situation Awareness, and 
Organisational Threats.  
 
Action Errors refer to the immediate actions undertaken preceding the failure.  These 
generally relate closely to the actions of individual workers, and included errors of 
omission and commission, violations of procedures and poor work quality.  Codes in 
the category of Situation Awareness, such as Assumption or Decision-making, tend to 
directly precede the failure.  A loss of situation awareness may also evolve over time 
prior to the fault occurring, as with a progressive loss of attention due to fatigue or a 
failure to detect prior warning signals (O'Leary, 2002).  On first consideration, 
aspects of Situation Awareness in HFIT appear to relate mainly to the individual.  
However, the codes pertaining to Situation Awareness, such as Detection, 
Assumption, Interpretation, and Decision-making, have been described by Stasser 
and Stewart (1992) as at least socially-influenced, if not a direct outcome of group 
thinking.  The literature on shared mental models (Mathieu, Goodwin, Heffner, 
Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000) and detection of team-based errors (Sasou & 
Reason, 1999) would also suggest a greater influence at the workgroup level.   
   
Finally, the most temporally distant, and organisationally distributed are the 
Organisational Threats.  They include such organisational dimensions as leadership, 
training, planning, organisational learning, teamwork, and communication.  These 
are often depicted as containing latent and omnipresent pathogens in the local 
workplace (Reason, Parker, & Lawton, 1998), if not across the whole organisation.  
Effectively, these are the holes in Reason’s Defences-In-Depth (see Section 2.11.1), 
which remain latent over a period of time within organisational functions.  They can 
be expected to contribute to a wide range of failure types.  As such, they are the most 
difficult to both identify and correct.  Issues such as technical design, work 
environment, organisational culture, and work procedures represent fundamental 
organisational processes that are generally controlled at the highest levels of the 
organisation.  HFIT also provides codes for Error Recovery (detection, indication, 
and correction).  However, as the concern of Study 1 was events that eventuated as 
failures, Error Recovery categories were not coded. 
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Altogether, a broad range of organisational, workplace and performance-shaping 
factors are considered in HFIT.  Most are squarely situated in the human-system 
interface, in other words, where the organisational and work environment impact on 
the individual’s ability to make decisions and act.  The varieties of human behaviour 
required to control and maintain modern technology in the petroleum industry, called 
Requisite Variety by several authors (Reason, Parker, & Lawton, 1998; Zohar & 
Luria, 2003b), meant that there was a large pool of potential failure modes involving 
workers.  Capturing and analysing these factors required a taxonomy with a 
comprehensive, but manageable range of descriptive codes.  The codes in the HFIT 
model provided sufficient differentiation for a detailed taxonomic analysis covering 
most of the concepts in the Human Malfunction model. 
 
4.2.2.1 Validity and reliability of HFIT 
As a part of the development of HFIT, the validity of the constructs involved and the 
inter-rater reliability were evaluated (Gordon, Flin, & Mearns, 2005).  HFIT was 
tested in trial investigations of an incident, by four oil and gas exploration companies 
and the UK Health and Safety Executive.  The inter-rater agreement between 
investigators (rwg) was recorded for each of the 27 codes surveyed in HFIT.  Of 
these, there was good agreement (rwg> 0.66) for six items, moderate agreement (0.33 
≤rwg≤ 0.66) for six items, and poor agreement (rwg< 0.33) for 15 items.  Gordon et al 
believed that the low inter-rater reliability for some of the items might have been 
because the users were mainly engineers who had had experience with accident 
investigations, but only a limited background in human factors.  However, an 
additional factor in low inter-rater reliability may have been differences in 
interpretation by the raters of interviewee responses.  Wallace & Ross (2006) 
contended that differing frames of reference are one of the main causes of variability 
in inter-rater reliability. 
 
Validity was determined by asking the 25 experienced investigators who trialled 
HFIT to evaluate the HFIT model using a series of criteria.  Based on four questions, 
such as “Is the model a technically sound framework that can test the quality, 
validity, and relationships of data developed during an investigation” (p. 166), the 
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authors concluded that “the majority of investigators reported that HFIT addresses 
the key causes of incidents” (p. 162). 
 
From the validity testing of HFIT by Gordon et al (2005), most of the 25 
investigators confirmed that the items in the investigation tool had construct validity.  
Regarding face validity, the items in HFIT appeared to describe clearly situations 
that could potentially contribute to an incident according to the Human Malfunction 
model.  However, the low inter-rater reliability data for 15 items indicated that 
discriminant validity might not have been sufficiently high.  As a result, the 
individual items in HFIT were examined as part of the current research to determine 
which items might be ambiguous and could lead to disagreement between raters.    
 
4.2.2.2 Adapting HFIT for Study 1 
To address the issue of inter-rater reliability in HFIT (Gordon, Flin, & Mearns, 2005) 
and thereby improve consistency in assessing failures, the naming of and 
differentiation between codes was carefully reviewed prior to its use in Study 1.  
Concerns were identified that could have contributed to low inter-rater reliability.  As 
a consequence, the following modifications were made to the format and use of 
HFIT: 
• Naming of codes.  Table 1 provides a list of the HFIT codes pertaining to 
each of the major categories.  Several of the top-level codes were renamed to 
better reflect the questions used in HFIT.  For example, Communication 
appears twice, both as an Action Error and again as an Organisational 
Threat.  Communication Errors in the Action Error category was therefore 
renamed Information, as most of the questions concern the quality of 
information supplied.  The code for Communication then refers only to the 
questions on flawed communication processes listed in Organisational 
Threats.  Plant, Parts, Tools, and Equipment was renamed Design & 
Maintenance, as plant design and maintenance condition are the two principal 
lines of questioning, and to better distinguish this code from Human-Machine 
Interfacing, which includes questions that are mainly concerned with alarms.  
The generic code Quality was clarified by considering it as Work Quality in 
order to focus on this important source of maintenance failures.   
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Table 1.  Major categories, and individual, group, and organisational level codes in 
HFIT. 
Action Errors Situation Awareness Organisational Threats 
Omission Loss of Attention  Inadequate Procedures  
Timing errors  Detection failures  Inadequate Work Preparation 
Sequence errors Memory faults  Job Factors  
Selection mistakes  Interpretation errors  Person Factors  
Work Quality  Decision-making errors  Lack of Competency & Training 
Incorrect Information  Mistaken Assumption Faulty  Communication  
Procedure Violations  Flawed Execution  Teamwork issues  
  Insufficient Supervision  
  Organisational Culture  
  Difficulties with the Work Environment 
  Human-machine interfacing (HMI) flaws  
  Inadequate attention to Design & 
 Maintenance 
  Difficulties in accessing Policies & 
 Standards  
N.B.  HFIT code names are highlighted in bold. 
 
• Interpretation of codes.  The code Organisational/Safety Culture included a 
broad range of organisational dimensions, such as the existence of 
management commitment, a reporting culture, and improper incentives, much 
of which would be difficult to identify unambiguously in a brief interview.  
Also included in this code were questions concerning organisational learning.  
In consideration of the prominence in the literature of this construct with 
respect to organisational outcomes, Organisational Culture refers to flaws in 
organisational learning in the incident.  The code Procedures, Standards, and 
Policies refers generically to management documents, but also includes 
procedures, which has a separate code.  Therefore, in considering the 
importance of standards and technical drawings to a technology-intensive 
operation, this code applies to insufficient technical documentation.  All 
failures attributed to procedures are included in the Procedures code. 
• Overlap between codes.  Despite the conceptual distinctions between codes, 
there remained overlaps between the sub-factor questions in several of the 
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codes.  This could lead to variability in attributing the event to one factor over 
another.  For example, there is conceptual overlap between the categories of 
Omissions and Memory, and Selection and Decision-making.  As a result, 
some overlap in coding was anticipated.  Further refinements to the 
instrument resulting from experience with using it for this study are discussed 
in Section 4.4.1. 
 
Despite these modifications, there may still be variability in coding due to lack of 
clarity in the descriptions of events.  An understanding of plant engineering and 
maintenance activities was needed to resolve some of the ambiguity in the event 
descriptions and the causes attributed to the incidents in the reports.  Industrial 
failures generally involve multiple failure modes contributing to the malfunction of 
materials and components (Antonovsky, 2006), resulting in the potential for 
variability in assigning one or more appropriate codes to an event.  As the company 
personnel reporting failures in First Priority were generally not versed in human 
factors theory, the imprecise use of terms reduced the reliability of the coding 
process.   
 
4.2.3 Procedure  
Entries in the First Priority database for the year 2007 were examined to identify 
maintenance failures with one or more human factors contributing to the event.  
These were found in the category Incidents - Lost Production/Asset Damage.  The 
incident description pertaining to each event was examined to determine if a failure 
of a maintenance process was specified or implied.  For each maintenance-related 
incident, the entire data record was examined to determine if one or more human 
factors were implicated as a contributing factor to the failure.  As an example of a 
maintenance-related failure, First Priority Report Event 07080046 described an LNG 
hot water header that failed to open due to a faulty pilot valve.  It was found in the 
subsequent investigation that maintenance technicians were unaware of the reason 
for pumps tripping, that operating documents relating to the relief valve were not 
easily accessible, and that work procedures had not been followed. 
 
The data for incident entries are recorded in two formats: 
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• Database fields for direct entry of information.  These fields consist of Event 
Details, Investigation Findings, Immediate Cause, Root Causes, and Key 
Learnings.  These are fields for free entry of information relating to the 
incident. 
• File attachments containing text information generated by the personnel 
involved and in the case of more serious incidents, company investigation 
reports.  This includes scanned versions of the Incident/Hazard Report form 
used by the company to record the details of incidents.  On the incident 
recording forms, the field pertaining to the causes includes tick boxes for a 
list of 38 possible causes, such as ‘Inattention/poor judgements/decision 
making’.  These include both technical and human factors categories, though 
no guidance is provided as to the interpretation of the human factors listed. 
 
Both formats often contained information on the factors relating to the incident, and 
therefore all entries and attachments were examined.  The wording used in each entry 
was taken as the basis for assigning codes according to the taxonomy in the revised 
form of HFIT, with as little interpretation of the wording as possible.  This was to 
leave the interpretation of events to those involved and thereby reduce the influence 
of bias on the part of the coder.  Each incident that had at least one identifiable 
human factor as a contributing cause was recorded on a spreadsheet with 
demographic details concerning the identification number, date, location, facility 
type, and work category (i.e. instrumentation/electrical vs. mechanical).   
 
  4.3 Results  
4.3.1 First Priority incident data 
The total number of Asset Damage/Lost Production incident reports analysed from 
the First Priority database in 2007 was N=1821.  The number that were identified 
from their event description as relating to maintenance work was N=397 (21.8%).  
The remainder primarily referred to accidental damage or described failures caused 
by operations personnel.  Of the maintenance-related reports, 61.6% related to 
mechanical maintenance work and 38.4% related to instrumentation/electrical 
maintenance work.  Among these reports, n=194 (48.9%) were found to specify one 
or more human factors, as defined by HFIT, as contributing to the failure.   
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Table 2.  Code frequencies for incidents reported in First Priority in 2007.   
Category HFIT Code FPSOa Gas Platform Process Vessel Total
Omission 1 0 4 1 6 
Timing 1 2 1 0 4 
Sequence 0 1 0 0 1 
Work Quality 8 7 4 3 22 
Selection 7 7 8 2 24 
Information 2 7 7 1 17 
Action Errors 
Violation 12 9 22 2 45 
Attention Failure 6 10 11 1 28 
Detection 10 18 4 3 35 
Memory 1 1 1 0 3 
Interpretation 1 0 5 0 6 
Decision-making 9 10 13 2 34 
Assumptions 0 5 15 1 21 
Situation 
Awareness 
Response Execution 1 0 1 1 3 
Procedures 5 8 13 4 30 
Planning & Prep. 5 8 12 2 27 
Job Factors 0 1 3 1 5 
Person Factors 0 0 0 0 0 
Skills/Training 5 4 8 3 20 
Communication 0 8 8 1 17 
Teamwork 1 2 2 0 5 
Supervision 3 5 7 1 16 
Org. Culture 1 5 2 0 8 
Environment 4 2 0 1 7 
Human/Systems Int. 3 11 8 0 22 




Standards 3 1 0 0 4 
Total  104 147 166 33 450 
a FPSO= Floating Production, Storage, and Offloading vessel  
 
HFIT coding was conducted on all 194 cases of maintenance failure that had some 
reference to human factors as a contributing cause.  The remainder may have had 
contributing human factors as well, but these were either not recognised by the 
incident investigators as contributors to the failure, or were not reported due to 
sensitivity concerning the issues involved.  This sensitivity may relate to a reluctance 
to reveal knowledge of personal actions in production failures or to ascribe blame to 
workmates.  Table 2 shows the frequency of HFIT codes, arranged by facility type, 
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identified in the maintenance-related incidents recorded in the First Priority database 
in 2007 in which at least one human factor was mentioned.  A mean of 2.32 codes 
per incident was observed in the First Priority reports.  A histogram of the 
frequencies of codes reported in incident reports is show in Figure 3. 
 
Number of Reported Occurences (Year 2007)
































Figure 3.  Histogram of the failure codes recorded in First Priority incident reports.   
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4.3.2 Examples of reports 
A discontinuity in the slope can be observed in the histogram of failure code 
frequencies (Figure 3) between Decision-making (fourth most frequent code) and 
Procedures (fifth most frequent code), indicating a visibly higher reporting rate for 
the first four codes.  A second discontinuity was observed indicating low reporting 
rates of the 12 least-reported contributors.  The following are detailed examples from 
the four most frequent codes. 
 
#1.  Violation 
In one incident, a fault occurred during software testing.  The testing, namely 
entering a ‘fire detected’ signal, required disabling several data points beforehand, 
one of which was not disabled.  When the software test was executed, the Hot Oil 
Circulation pump and the Hot Oil Heater were accidentally tripped.  A condition of 
testing the system was that it be ‘peer-checked,’ which was not done.  In the incident 
report, the Immediate Cause was recorded as ‘Inattention/poor judgements/decision 
making,’ which was chosen from a list of 38 possible causes.  The Root Cause, 
which is entered as free text, was recorded as ‘Procedures not followed.’  No further 
details as to the workplace situation, prevailing circumstances, or motivations for the 
failure to check the state of the system before testing were recorded.     
(First Priority Report Event 07110152) 
 
#2.  Design & Maintenance 
A vent valve that was designed to vent high pressure gas failed to open when 
operated.  This valve prevents gas bleeding past another valve from collecting in 
sufficient quantity in the turbine casing to cause an explosion.  A similar fault had 
occurred 6 months previously, which had been attributed to a faulty operating coil.  
However, the correct replacement was not available at the time and another valve 
was substituted, which was not suitable for the application.  In the incident report, the 
Immediate Cause was recorded as ‘Inadequate guards, barriers, or safety device,’ 
which was chosen from a list of 38 possible causes.  The Root Cause was recorded as 
‘Incorrect spares held in stock.’  No Key Learnings were recorded in First Priority in 
the section provided.  In addition, the decision-making related to using an incorrect 
spare and not determining the potential danger was also not recorded.   
(First Priority Report Event 07020075). 
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#3.  Detection 
An investigation of a compressor trip revealed that wiring circuits in the control / 
start panel had abraded through the insulation and electrically shorted causing an 
electrical failure.  In addition, the enclosure was found to be corroded, the rail 
supporting the electrical equipment had vibrated loose, and the back plate was held 
on with only two screws causing an elevated level of vibration in the control panel.  
A potential existed for sparks and an explosion, with the potential damage assessed 
in the category A$ 100K-A$ 1M.  In the incident report, the Immediate Cause 
selected from the list of causes was ‘Damaged/ tools/equipment.’  The Root Cause 
was recorded as ‘Risk not adequately assessed / Regular inspection against 
performance criteria was poor - vibration effect on associated equipment was not 
adequately considered when developing inspection criteria.’  No Key Learnings were 
recorded in the section provided in First Priority.  In addition, there was no indication 
of what factors contributed to the equipment reaching this state of maintenance or 
why there had been a failure to detect the deteriorating condition of the electrical 
cabinet.   (First Priority Report Event 07070017) 
 
#4.  Decision-making 
In a mechanical maintenance incident hand holes were being drilled from the top and 
bottom.  The maintenance technicians on the bottom level, who were cutting out 
coupons of metal and working their way around a column, drilled the wrong holes 
and did not realise that the nozzle they were drilling into was not marked on their 
drawing.  The original First Priority report indicated that the Immediate Cause 
selected from the list of causes was ‘Inattention/Poor judgement/ Decision-making.’  
The Root Cause was recorded as ‘Lack of communication between ops [Operations 
staff] and KEQ [contractor].’  In addition to decision-making and the other 
contributors mentioned in the First Priority entry, a follow-up investigation report 
mentioned additional contributing factors including a lack of written or verbal 
instructions to the maintenance technicians, procedures being available for similar 
activities but not this activity, and required identification checks on the location of 
relevant pipe-work not being carried out.  (First Priority Report Event 07050028) 
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4.3.3 Analyses 
Statistical analyses of the incident data were conducted to determine if the observed 
differences in occurrence of codes were statistically significant or no better than 
randomly distributed.  As the data were not normally distributed, and the factors 
were not independent of each other, non-parametric methods for related variables 
were used (Siegel, 1956).  For dichotomous responses with k-related factors, 
Cochran’s Q test can be used to determine if observed differences between codes are 
statistically significant.  In this study, codes (k=27) were tested for each of the 
incidents examined (n=194).  For this dataset, Cochran’s Q = 291.36, df=26, (p<.001, 
α=.05), indicating that a significant difference in the frequency of reported factors 
exists in the data. 
 
The Cochran’s Q test however does not indicate where the significant difference 
occurs in the frequency data (Allen & Bennett, 2008).  To determine where there 
were significant differences between reported factors, pair-wise McNemar Tests 
were conducted.  The McNemar Test of Change is a non-parametric test for 
significance in the case of two related samples consisting of dichotomous data 
(Siegel, 1956).  A discontinuity in the slope of the code histogram (Figure 3) was 
observed between the 4th and 5th most frequent codes, and so the five most-frequently 
occurring codes were subjected to McNemar Tests.  The test results (Table 3) 
indicated that differences in reported frequency between closely-ranked codes were 
not significant, but that there was a trend towards a significant difference between 
codes with a greater difference in rank order (e.g., 1st and 5th most frequent). 
 






Violations(#1)  vs. Design & Maintenance (#2) .657 ns 
Design & Maintenance (#2) vs. Detection (#3) .620 ns 
Detection (#3) vs. Decision-making (#4) 1.000 ns 
Decision-making (#4) vs. Procedures (#5) .651 ns 
Violation (#1)  vs. Procedures (#5) .092 Trend 
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4.4 Discussion 
4.4.1 Objective 1: Selecting and refining a methodology for identifying 
human factors in maintenance failures 
Based on the theoretical framework described in Section 4.1.1, and supported by 
taxonomy appropriate to the petroleum industry, the Human Factors Investigation 
Tool (HFIT) was selected as the method for identifying those human factors that are 
the main contributors to maintenance-related failures in petroleum operations.  By 
adapting the terminology used and modifying the format of HFIT, a methodology has 
been demonstrated for determining the human factors which recur most frequently in 
company-based failure reports.  The results (Figure 3) indicated that a differentiation 
between the frequencies of factors could be obtained.  In addition, the Cochran’s Q 
test indicated that the differences observed between the frequencies of codes were 
significant.  The McNemar test however, indicated that the differences observed 
between the four most-frequent codes were non-significant.     
    
4.4.2 Objective 2: Identifying the most frequent human factors in First 
Priority failure data 
The most-frequently reported code in the First Priority data was that of Violation, 
occurring in 23.2% of the incidents.  Violations of procedures were frequently 
selected from the list of causes in the Immediate Causes section of the First Priority 
incident record, though as in the example provided, supporting information for this 
assessment was often not provided.  The prominence of this code accords with the 
finding of the National Transport Safety Board in the US (Collier, 2004) that 76.5% 
of adverse events in aviation related to maintenance involved ‘failure to follow 
procedures.’  The frequency of occurrence may have been lower in the present study 
because maintenance procedures are more extensive in the aviation industry (Hobbs 
& Williamson, 2003) and their enforcement more rigorous than in the petroleum 
industry.  
 
The next most prominent code, Design & Maintenance, is associated with the aspects 
of equipment design and component quality that have resulted in maintenance 
failures.  The prominence of this item as the second most frequent code in First 
Priority reports reinforces the view that original designs and the availability of 
quality spares are recognised as an influence on the ability to maintain plant 
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(Tjiparuro & Thompson, 2004; Wani & Gandhi, 1999) and in turn ensure plant 
reliability.  A focus on technical factors was discussed by Bea (1998) who 
considered that design engineers do not tend to concern themselves with the human 
support systems required for engineered systems.  It may also indicate that the 
technical components of failure were more readily recognised in investigations than 
most of the other human factors examined.  As in the Design & Maintenance 
example provided above, most of the initial First Priority incident reports and the 
subsequent investigation reports provided extensive detail concerning the technical 
aspects of the fault, but only allusions to human factors, with little actual 
investigation of the circumstances surrounding the execution of maintenance 
activities (refer to Holmgren, 2005). 
 
Detection, the third most-frequent code, represents incidents in which the 
investigator or reporter deemed with hindsight, that there existed information at the 
time of the incident that the maintenance crews could have seen, but did not notice.  
The prominence of this code agrees with the research conducted into loss of situation 
awareness, particularly with flight crews (O'Leary, 2002) and air traffic control 
(Pounds & Isaac, 2003; Straeter & Kirwan, 2002).  As Dekker (2006) commented in 
his description of hindsight bias, ‘failure to detect’ (i.e. loss of situation awareness) 
and ‘poor decision-making’ are forms of human error that are attributed in hindsight 
when determining ‘what people should have noticed’ and ‘what people should have 
done’.  As expected with hindsight bias, the example above illustrated that First 
Priority entries tended to attribute incidents to individuals failing to observe faults.  
At the same time, entries often neglected to identify the failure of organisational 
systems to put measures in place to check for evolving failures.  This in itself was an 
important finding of Study 1.   
 
A consequence of a focus on detection failures is the assumption that subsequent 
decisions were flawed as a result of loss of situation awareness.  Thus, the fourth 
most-frequent code reported in the First Priority database was Decision-making.  An 
attribution of poor decision-making as a failure cause will be expected where third 
parties, such as supervisors, are responsible for assigning the causes of a failure, as 
often occurs with reports in First Priority.  As with detection, Dekker (2005) 
considered that any attempt in hindsight to attribute erroneous or inappropriate 
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decisions to the people involved with a failure would be flawed by Hindsight Bias.  
He invoked the Local Rationality Principle, namely, that at the time of an incident, 
the decisions of the participants appear to be rational to them.  In the example above, 
there was an expectation in retrospect that the maintenance technicians should have 
made better decisions.  This conclusion was reached despite the subsequent report 
that technicians were not given appropriate written or verbal instructions, there was 
no procedure for the activity, and that a failure to communicate was acknowledged as 
a root cause. 
 
4.4.3 Value of First Priority data    
Study 1 relied on an analysis of past adverse incidents to develop an understanding 
of the role of human factors in failures.  Information was gained by extracting 
maintenance-related incidents with at least one human factor cause mentioned.  
Analysing incident reports in First Priority was intended as a preliminary 
investigation of existing data on company failures.  The data was available 
electronically, and therefore easily accessed, and provided a large sample population 
of incidents.  The investigations conducted and reports filed at the time of the failure 
would have the advantage of recency over descriptions of events and contributing 
factors collected later.  On the basis of associated demographic data, First Priority 
also provided a means of comparing the relative frequency of human factors in 
failures occurring across different facility types (Table 2).  Among the three most 
frequent codes discussed (Section 4.3), Violation was proportionally highest in the 
Process Plant, Design & Maintenance was proportionally highest on the FPSOs, and 
Detection was proportionally highest on the gas platforms.  The differences in 
Design & Maintenance may relate to the process of constructing an FPSO by 
converting a ship to an oil production plant.  The reasons for relatively more 
detection errors on gas platforms and violations in the Process Plant were not clear 
from the reports, but may be an indicator of different workplace designs (e.g., 
offshore vs. onshore), and consequently different reliability climates.  
 
Examination of the database provided an opportunity to trial HFIT as a method for 
investigating incidents retrospectively, and in situations in which the ability to obtain 
additional information is limited.  It was found that some reports explored 
organisational contributors in detail, while other reports only attributed failures to 
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Violations and Detection errors.  By examining the data and reports in First Priority, 
it was also possible to understand the limitations in company failure investigations, 
and determine how they could be improved in order to better assess the contribution 
of human factors.     
 
4.4.4 Biases in First Priority data   
The information available from reports filed within the incident recording database 
was found to be rich in event descriptions, but poor in contextual and motivational 
analysis.  As noted in the examples, information concerning organisational 
contributors to the incidents was needed to understand why decisions and actions 
were taken.  Understanding underlying motivators might have explained, for 
example, why an unsuitable substitute component was used in the example given 
earlier involving a Design & Maintenance incident. 
 
Reports of organisational and personal factors associated with failures can also be 
expected to have a degree of bias, depending on how the person examining the 
incident deconstructs the events in their own mind, and what type of accident model 
they apply to the circumstances (Dekker, 2006).  The root causes ultimately 
identified will depend on the perspective and mental model of the investigator.  
Therefore any factors that do not fit with a participant’s reconstruction of events may 
be difficult to elicit.  The data in First Priority suffered from some of the faults which 
were also encountered by Pyy (2001) in his examination of maintenance history 
reports at the Olkiluoto NPP in Finland.  He described flaws found in the data 
relating to subjective bias, lack of human factors categories in reports, a tendency 
towards better reporting of specific types of faults, and variability in the quality of 
reporting depending on the area of the plant involved.  Similarly in Study 1, although 
12 incidents involving violations were reported in FPSOs, no incidents involving 
communication were reported.  From an organisational perspective this seems 
unlikely.  At the same time, gas platforms and the Process Plant reported eight 
incidents each involving Communication, supporting Pyy’s contention that 
operational areas tend to report specific types of failures.  Similarly, in the First 
Priority reports, categories available to reporters were often poorly differentiated, 
such as the single category of Inattention/Poor judgement/ Decision-making.  This 
might have led to higher reporting of certain categories, such as Violation, and lower 
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reporting of underlying factors.  For this reason, in order to reveal the human factors 
influence on failures, direct examination of incidents by an investigator with human 
factors expertise is likely to be more effective. 
 
4.5 Summary and Conclusions 
      The objectives of the first phase of Study 1 were to select and refine a 
methodology for determining the human factors involved in petroleum industry 
failures, and apply the method to determining the human factors that most frequently 
contributed to maintenance-related failures.  Using HFIT to analyse a company-wide 
incident database, Study 1 provided a large quantity of data that supported these 
objectives.  In total, 397 maintenance-related adverse events reported in 2007 in the 
company’s production facilities were identified, with a description of circumstances 
surrounding the associated maintenance activities.  At least one human factor was 
found in reports from 48.9% of these incidents, indicating that at least this proportion 
had an identifiable human factors influence.  However, the quality of the data 
provided did not support a comprehensive analysis of the human factors contributors 
to maintenance failures.  This conclusion was based on the findings in this chapter, 
namely:  
• the lack of investigative detail, particularly in the incident report sections 
entitled Immediate Causes and Root Causes; 
• a tendency for reports to focus on technical causes, rather than underlying 
organisational contributors; 
• biases identified in reporting of specific factors on particular facilities; 
 
In conclusion, Study 1 provided many indicators, from the perspective of company 
personnel, of the possible role of human factors in maintenance-related failures.  
However, a more accurate means of determining the frequency of occurrence of 
human factors in failures was required, including greater consistency in assessing 
each of the factors which contributed to a specific incident.  In the next chapter, 
Study 2 provides a more rigorous and detailed investigation of the human factors 
contributing to maintenance-related failures within the company’s operations. 
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5.0 Study 2: Identifying Human Factors through Failure Interviews 
5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1 Background and justification for Study 2 
In Chapter 4, the selection and refinement of a methodology was reported for 
determining the human factors that most-frequently contributed to maintenance-
related failures in petroleum industry operations.  The methodology was then applied 
to a representative sample of maintenance-related Lost Production/Asset Damage 
incidents reported in a 12-month period, obtained by examining First Priority, the 
company-wide database of adverse incidents.  An investigation of the First Priority 
incident reports provided substantial data concerning the types of failures that result 
from maintenance activities in a petroleum operation.  A benefit of exploring the 
database was that it provided preliminary data concerning the human factors 
regarded by company investigators as the immediate and root causes of these 
failures.  In addition, it provided comprehensive demographic data relating to the 
failures, including the work category (mechanical or instrumentation/electrical), 
facility type (FPSOs, gas platforms, or Process Plant) and work area (facility or 
process plant area).  However, as described in Section 4.5 the quality of data was 
found to be impaired by a lack of human factors content, inconsistencies in reporting 
between individuals on different facilities, and biases, particularly towards reporting 
violations and human error, in assessing the causative factors involved.   
 
Dekker (2006) cautioned against taking accident history out of context in order to 
reconstruct the causes in hindsight, in a process he termed ‘cherry-picking’ through 
an accident sequence.  He argued that there is a tendency to pull together fragments 
of information relating to an event and then to construct causality around it.  The 
high frequency of First Priority reports naming violations and human error (e.g. 
Detection and Decision-making) as the cause tended to support his contention.  In 
recognition of the possible flaws in company incident reports, greater depth of 
human factors analysis was required to provide the necessary background 
information required for this research.  Consequently, an alternative source of data 
concerning maintenance failure history was sought.  This was the basis for 
conducting Study 2. 
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In order to avoid the flaws in Study 1 described above, incidents needed to be 
discussed directly with the participants involved, using a standardised format to 
maintain the consistency of analyses between the incidents, and a consistent 
interpretation of the contributing factors.  To accomplish this, Patton (2002) 
recommended using a Standardized Open-Ended Interview format, namely one in 
which the order and structure of questions is consistent between interviews, but 
interviewees are also allowed to express their perspective.  Using the questions in 
HFIT, the interviewee’s perception of events, which Patton regards as “meaningful, 
knowable, and able to be made explicit” (p. 341), could be reduced to a dichotomous 
choice between Present or Not present for each possible factor.  At the same time, 
the richness in the interviewee’s understanding of how a particular factor contributed 
to the failure could also be recorded.  In this way, a structured interview 
methodology could provide consistency between interviews and reduce the potential 
for bias on the part of the interviewer, while observing Patton’s contention that, “The 
fundamental principle of qualitative interviewing is to provide a framework within 
which respondents can express their own understandings in their own terms” 
(p. 348).  At the same time, the use of HFIT provided a structure to ensure that a 
comprehensive range of possible human factors contributors to failures was 
examined. 
 
5.1.2 Study 2 objective 
Based on the use of structured interviews with maintenance personnel, the principal 
objective of Study 2 was to determine the human factors that contributed most-
frequently to maintenance-related failures in petroleum maintenance operations.  
Detailed structured interviews using HFIT were considered less likely to suffer from 
the data collection flaws that were found in the First Priority reports examined in 
Study 1. 
    
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants 
Experienced instrumentation/electrical and mechanical maintenance personnel 
(N=38) participated in the interviews for Study 2.  All participants were over the age 
of 18 years old.  The demographic distribution of participants involved in Study 2 is 
provided in Table 4.  Participants included maintenance technicians, coordinator/ 
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planners, and supervisors.  Maintenance personnel generally fall into two distinct 
categories, namely facility-based Core Crews and fly-in/fly-out Major Maintenance 
crews responsible for assisting during shutdowns.  Core Crews are employed at a 
particular facility, either on a full-time basis in the case of the on-shore Process Plant 
or on a fly-in/fly-out roster on the off-shore facilities.  Major Maintenance crews are 
based at the company’s headquarters and are sent to off-shore facilities when large 
maintenance projects or plant shutdowns are undertaken.   
 
Table 4.  Distribution of participants in Study 2 interviews. 



















Core Crew (Off-shore) 




















a Based on overall operational staffing levels 
 
 
5.2.2 Measure: HFIT 
HFIT (Gordon, 2001), as adapted and described in Section 4.2.2, was used to gather 
human factors information in the structured interviews conducted with participants.  
The modified codes and the sub-factors under-lying the main codes were arranged 
into an interview template (Appendix A).  Each page provided tick boxes to record 
the ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ responses from the interviewee to interview questions concerning 
the top level HFIT code and the under-lying sub-factors.  The format also provided 
space for recording comments made by the interviewee relating to the code under 
discussion.  Comments were valuable as background information to support the 
interviewer in interpreting the dichotomous responses received from the interviewee.  
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5.2.3 Procedure 
5.2.3.1 Interviews 
Approval for the research was granted (Approval Number HR 147/2007) by the 
Human Research Ethics Committee of Curtin University of Technology (Appendix 
B).  For Study 2, a cross-section of maintenance personnel was obtained by 
recruiting interviewees from the Process Plant, off-shore Core Crews from one of the 
FPSOs, and from the Major Maintenance crews.  Names of maintenance personnel 
were suggested by team leaders.  They were then contacted by telephone or e-mail in 
order to describe the reasons for the interview and the procedure to be followed, and 
invite them to participate.  Most of the maintenance personnel contacted agreed to be 
interviewed, with six declining due to scheduling difficulties.  An Information Sheet 
(Appendix C) describing the purpose of the research and the procedure for the 
interview was sent to potential participants by e-mail.  In the letter they were advised 
that the interview was voluntary, and that the company would not know who had 
participated.  The information sheet also informed them that the interview would be 
recorded, but would be de-identified, and that raw recordings would not be made 
available to the company.  Only one interviewee refused to be recorded, but still 
agreed to proceed with the interview, and this interview was included in the data.  All 
interviewees were advised that they could withdraw from participating at any stage 
in the process, though no one elected to do this. 
 
Interviews were conducted from February to July 2008.  Personnel who agreed to be 
interviewed were invited to a one-to-one interview session.  The interviewee was 
asked to recall a failure with which they were personally involved, preferably in the 
past two years.  This served to eliminate selection bias on the part of the interviewer.  
A failure was defined as any type of maintenance activity that did not produce the 
anticipated outcome, such as: 
• a maintenance activity that failed to correct the existing problem, 
• activities carried out that caused a new problem, which resulted in a 
production failure afterwards, or  
• a maintenance activity that did not proceed as planned. 
 
The HFIT template (Appendix A) was used to structure the interviews.  This 
consisted of a large number of questions drawn from the original version of HFIT 
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(Gordon, 2001).  In the time available for an interview, it was not possible to ask all 
of the questions.  Therefore, they provided a guide for questioning the interviewee 
about whether the code under discussion was a contributor or not.  The questions 
were also useful in eliciting supporting information.  The interpretation of the 
meaning of the codes adopted in Study 1 was continued in Study 2. 
  
 Each interview was recorded, for review of the responses and to obtain verbatim 
quotes.  Recordings were converted to a compressed file format (i.e., MP3) and 




The recordings were analysed a short time after the interview to ensure recency in 
interpreting each interview.  This included selecting the code and sub-factor, and 
recording relevant comments on the interview sheet.  A second coder (the research 
supervisor), dual-coded a random sample of interviews.  Clarification of items was 
resolved through this process.  All interviews were also re-coded at the end of the 
interview phase to ensure that interpretation was consistent across all interviews.  
 
In addition, each incident was assigned a severity rating.  The criteria applied for 
assessing severity, derived from the International Standard “Petroleum, 
petrochemical and natural gas industries-Collection and exchange of reliability and 
maintenance data for equipment” (International Standards Organization, 2006b, 
Table C.1) were as follows: 
 
• Minor- the incident resulted in organisational costs (< $50,000) but did not 
result in lost production or provide the potential for a future stoppage. 
• Moderate- the incident resulted in a number of hours of lost production, 
additional repair costs ($50,000-250,000) or a minor injury, or created the 
potential for a significant stoppage or injury. 
• Severe- the incident resulted in a number of days of lost production, 
additional repair costs (>$250,000), or serious injuries, or created the 
potential for major damage to plant, such as an explosion.  (p. 134) 
 
                                                     Human Factors and Plant Maintenance Reliability 102 
 5.3 Results  
5.3.1 Interview incident data 
Table 5 shows the classification of interviews (N=38) by work category, production 
product, and severity of the consequences.  The incidents investigated occurred 
between Jan 1998 and July 2008 with the majority (58%) occurring in the previous 
12 months.  At one extreme were relatively minor incidents, such as one involving 
delivery of incorrect regulators due to problems with the electronic work order 
system, and which resulted in a short delay to the maintenance task.  At the other 
extreme were major incidents such as a faulty repair to a davit that was incorrectly 
specified, severely injuring 13 people, and a poorly organised shutdown that resulted 
in $50,000 of additional maintenance costs, and $3 million in lost production.  The 
most severe incident resulted in a situation in which the potential for an explosion 
existed, the interviewee commenting, “We could have lost the gas plant.”   
 
Table 5.  Classification of incidents reported in the Study 2 interviews 


















Gas (Platforms and            
 Process Plant) 
























a Based on entries in First Priority for maintenance-related incidents (Year 2007) 
b Based on entries in First Priority for maintenance incidents with a reported human factor (Year 2007) 
 
 
5.3.1.1 Failure code frequency 
The frequency data for HFIT codes and severity data attributed to failures in the 
interviews with Major Maintenance crew, Process Plant Core Crew, and the FPSO 
Core Crew are provided in Appendix D.  Multiple contributors to each failure were 
reported in the interviews (Table 6), with the mean number of reported factors, 
kmean= 9.47 (Range= 6 to 15, SD=2.25).  Graphical comparisons of the data in 
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Table 6 indicated no apparent association between facility types and the frequency of 
codes recorded or the severity ratings of the incidents.   
 
Table 6.  Number of reported codes per incident and severity rating, arranged by 
facility type. 













MMO1 Med 7 MMG1 Low 11 GPP1 Med 12 
MMO2 Med 9 MMG2 Med 10 GPP 2 High 7 
MMO3 Med 9 MMG3 Med 6 GPP 3 High 8 
MMO4 Med 6 MMG4 High 9 GPP 4 High 13 
MMO5 High 8 MMG5 High 10 GPP 5 High 13 
MMO6 Low 10 CCG1 Low 8 GPP 6 High 9 
MMO7 Low 9    GPP 7 Low 9 
MMO8 Med 7    GPP 8 Med 15 
MMO9 Med 10    GPP 9 High 13 
COS1 Low 9    GPP 10 High 9 
COS2 Low 12    GPP 11 Med 12 
COS3 Med 8       
COS4 High 13       
COS5 Med 7       
COS6 Med 9       
COS7 High 9       
COS8 Med 7       
COS9 Low 10       
COS10 Med 6       
COS11 Low 9       
COS12 High 12       
 
As an example of multiple factors occurring in a single incident,  Interviewee GPP1 
reported an incident involving a new turbine bearing that was leaking oil on being 
brought up to pressure after maintenance.  Leaking oil flashed off the overheated 
bearing, tripping an infra-red detector which then shut down the turbine.  The 
maintenance supervisor reported that the design of the turbine involved two different 
sized bolts, and using the wrong bolt prevented the cover from sealing, allowing oil 
                                                     Human Factors and Plant Maintenance Reliability 104 
to escape (Design & Maintenance).  In addition, it was “assumed that a big block of 
metal would sit flat” and that the oil had been leaking from the oilways, and not the 
cover (Assumption).  Therefore a decision was made not to check the cover 
(Decision-making).  The manufacturer did not supply information concerning the 
bolts or the final checks needed to be done on the cover (Procedure).  The 
procedures also had not been up-dated, with incorrect drawings showing a wrong 
location of the hole for the rotor (Policies, Standards, and Procedures). 
 
The frequency of major HFIT categories, namely Action Error, Situation Awareness, 
and Organisational Threat, reported in the interviews is shown in Table 7.  The 
frequency of these categories were relatively evenly distributed among the different 
types of facilities, work categories (mechanical and instrumentation/ 
electrical), and severity ratings.  The overall numbers of Organisational Threats 
tended to be high due to the larger number of codes (13 codes) relative to Action 
Errors (7 codes) and Situation Awareness (7 codes).  The frequency of individual 
codes, also arranged by facility type, work category, and incident severity is shown 
in Table 8. 
 
 
Table 7.  Frequency of major HFIT categories arranged by facility type, work 
category, and severity. 
 FPSO Platform PP Instr/Elect. Mech. Severe Mod. Minor Total 
Action Errors 47 10 25 35 47 29 32 21 82 
Situation 
Awareness 52 14 24 38 52 35 35 20 90 
Organisational 
Threats 111 24 53 79 109 69 73 46 188 
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Mech Severe Mod Minor Total
Assumption 17 5 8 13 17 11 12 7 30 
Design & 
Maintenance 17 4 6 13 14 12 9 6 27 
Communication 17 4 4 12 13 11 7 7 25 
Omission 11 2 9 8 14 6 10 6 22 
Decision-
making 13 3 5 10 11 10 8 3 21 
Information 9 2 6 5 12 4 7 6 17 
Procedures 7 5 5 4 13 3 10 4 17 
Competency 12 1 3 8 8 7 4 5 16 
Detection 10 2 3 7 8 6 4 5 15 
Plan.  & Prep. 9 1 5 6 9 5 5 5 15 
Org. Culture 8 1 6 7 8 6 6 3 15 
PSP 8 3 4 5 10 5 7 3 15 
Job Factors 9 2 3 6 8 6 5 3 14 
Timing 8 2 4 6 8 6 6 2 14 
Selection 7 2 3 6 6 4 4 4 12 
Attention 5 2 5 4 8 4 6 2 12 
Supervision 7 0 4 6 5 5 4 2 11 
Work 
Environment 6 1 4 3 8 2 5 4 11 
Work Quality 6 2 2 6 4 6 4 0 10 
Teamwork 4 1 4 3 6 2 5 2 9 
Person Factors 5 0 3 4 4 3 3 2 8 
Violation 6 0 1 4 3 3 1 3 7 
Memory 3 1 2 0 6 0 3 3 6 
HMI 2 1 2 2 3 2 3 0 5 
Interpretation 3 0 1 3 1 3 1 0 4 
Execution 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 2 
Sequence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
Figure 4 provides a histogram of the distribution of codes in rank order of frequency.  
Frequencies of reports by facility type are also shown.   
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Figure 4.  Histogram of the failure codes displayed according to facility types.     
 
Visual interpretation of this data indicated a discontinuity in slope occurred between 
Communication (#3) and Omission (#4), with a larger discontinuity between 
Decision-making (#5) and the remaining codes.  Based on this, the following is a 
detailed review of the five most-frequent factors found to be contributors to the 
failures discussed in the interviews: 
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#1) Assumption.  Reported in 79% of cases.  This item included any failure 
associated with assumptions made on the part of maintenance technicians or 
support personnel (e.g. supervisors, planners, supply chain personnel, or 
vendors).  These were cases in which decisions were made based on inaccurate 
knowledge, and additional information would have avoided a failure.   
 
For example, in a number of cases the correctness of components or procedures 
to be used was assumed but not verified.  In one example, the failure of a 
transducer required a circuit breaker to be shut off.  It was assumed that the 
breaker could be shut off without affecting other units.  However, due to poor 
labelling of the unit involved, inaccurate drawings, and the fact that 
“maintenance procedures haven’t been addressed” compressors were also 
switched off causing the entire production stream to shut down.  The 
maintenance technician commented, “The majority of our work is trying to find 
the information to hand on to the inexperienced guys to make their work task 
safe, because they don’t have that local knowledge.”  (Interview COS8) 
 
In another example from an interview describing an oil spill from an open valve, 
the person involved isolated a critical valve and “made the assumption it was 
working.  If you close a valve, you assume it’s closed.”  (Interview COS3).   
 
#2) Design & Maintenance.  Reported in 71% of cases.  This item included 
maintenance difficulties attributed to the design of equipment or components, or 
difficulties caused by insufficient regular maintenance or a need for condition 
monitoring.  This code was intended to capture failures due to deficiencies in the 
maintainability of the engineering design or a failure to provide on-going 
maintenance.   
 
In a serious failure described, a modification to correct a design fault almost 
caused an explosion on-board an FPSO.  The water seal used in a Pressure-
Vacuum (PV) breaker was used to isolate hydrocarbon storage tanks from 
exposure to air.  The gauge measuring the level of water in the seal was checked 
daily.  However, due to insufficient maintenance, the gauge was difficult to read.  
New designs were considered, but never implemented.  As a consequence, a 
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maintenance technician decided to modify the gauge in order to alleviate the 
difficulties with reading it.  Part of his modification included an elbow joint 
which eventually corroded, allowing water to drain from the seal.  This released 
poisonous inert gas from the tank and exposed explosive hydrocarbons in the 
tank to air.  (Interview COS12) 
 
In another example, a steampipe for oxygen removal in an aerator was poorly 
designed and manufactured, and eventually cracked, shutting down the steam 
plant.  Rather than re-manufacturing the pipe to a higher specification, a welder 
was flown to the FPSO to repair the crack.  The pipe cracked again, this time 
causing 3-4 days of lost production, and risking damage to a boiler.  If accurate 
drawings had been available, the pipe could have been replaced in 48 hours with 
a new pipe manufactured on-shore.  (Interview COS4) 
 
#3) Communication.  Reported in 66% of cases.  This included any lack of 
communication or mis-communication between the relevant stakeholders, 
including maintenance technicians, supervisors, on-shore and off-shore crew, and 
vendors of equipment and parts.   
 
For example, changes made to a lip sealing arrangement by a vendor in 
conjunction with the Engineering Department were not communicated to the 
shutdown team installing the seal.  The changes were also not communicated via 
the on-line Bill of Materials parts list.  The interviewee commented that 
communicating the change could have been as simple as marking the change of 
seal on the machine concerned.  As the shutdown was re-scheduled from mid-
week to the weekend, obtaining the correct seal required helicopter transport, at a 
total excess cost of $3 million in transport and lost production.  (Interview 
MMG4) 
 
In another example, scaffolding was required for a task, but a lack of 
communication between planners and maintenance technicians meant that the 
need for scaffolding was not discussed, and not included in the work plan.  A 
mechanical fitter reported that a job that should have taken a “couple of days, 
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ended up taking a week, [due to] miscommunication between [our company’s] 
resource estimators and [the contracting company].”  (Interview GPP7) 
 
#4) Omission:  Reported in 58% of cases.  If an integral task or step in the work 
process was not carried out, and this was associated with the failure, an omission 
was considered to have occurred.  Failure to check work done or parts used was 
considered an omission, if this was a normal step in the particular activity. 
 
In an example involving a failure costing “millions of dollars,” a modification to 
a gas turbine bearing meant that a hole in an oil gallery should have been 
plugged, but this step was omitted.  (Interview GPP9) 
 
#5) Decision-making.  Reported in 55% of cases.  This item concerned any 
decision that was made, which subsequent events showed to be a flawed 
decision.  This included incorrect and inappropriate solutions to problems, or 
failure to consider relevant factors during the decision-making process. 
 
In an example of poor decision-making, the seal on a pump caught fire.  A 
decision was made to replace the seal without investigating the cause of the 
failure.  The seal was replaced twice at a cost of $20,000 per seal, before it was 
realised that flow in the cooling lines was insufficient.  Warning signals had 
indicated that flow rates might have been inadequate, but this was not checked.  
(Interview GPP5) 
 
The relative occurrence of the codes demonstrated a high degree of consistency 
between the different types of production facility (Figure 4).  Notable exceptions to 
this were: 
• Competence & Training, Organisational Culture, and Supervision appeared 
to be proportionally higher at the Process Plant, which, according to the 
opinion of several interviewees, may have been due to the less-experienced 
workforce there. 
• Work Preparation and Policies & Standards, which refers to the availability 
of standards and technical drawings, were reported more frequently on the 
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gas platforms and FPSOs.  This may relate to the constraints of working off-
shore, including greater difficulty in accessing information and 
communicating with other personnel. 
• Decision-making was reported less frequently in failures on gas platforms, 
while Omissions were less of an issue on FPSOs.  Typically, gas platforms 
are larger scale operations with more personnel present on-board compared to 
FPSOs. 
 
5.3.2 Statistical analysis of interview data 
Statistical analyses were conducted on the interview data to determine if the 
observed differences in occurrence of codes were statistically significant or no better 
than randomly distributed.  As the data were not normally distributed, and the factors 
were not independent of each other, non-parametric methods for related variables 
were used.  For dichotomous responses with k-related factors, Cochran’s Q Test can 
be used to determine if observed occurrences are randomly distributed (Siegel, 
1956).  In this study, codes (k=27) were tested for each of the incidents examined 
(N=38).  For this dataset, Q =126.13, df=26, p<.001, α=.05, indicating that a 
significant difference in the frequency of reported factors exists in the interview data. 
 
The Cochran’s Q Test however does not indicate where the significant difference 
occurs (Allen & Bennett, 2008).  To determine if significant differences existed 
between reported factors, pair-wise McNemar Tests were conducted.  The McNemar 
Test of Change is a non-parametric test for significance in the case of two related 
samples consisting of dichotomous data (Siegel, 1956).  A discontinuity in the slope 
of the code histogram (Figure 4) was observed between the 5th and 6th most frequent 
codes, and so the six most-frequently occurring codes were subjected to McNemar 
Tests.  The test results (Table 9) indicated that differences in reported frequency 
between adjacent codes (e.g. Assumption and Design & Maintenance, or Design & 
Maintenance and Communication) codes were not significant, though a trend was 
observed between Assumptions and Information. 
 
Chi-squared Tests of Contingency were evaluated for each of the HFIT codes against 
Work category, Incident severity, and Facility type.  For Work category (Mechanical 
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vs. Instrumentation/Electrical), only Human-machine interfacing returned a 
significant difference (χ2=5.74, df=1, p=.017).  Among Facility types, Supervision 
(χ2=11.61, df=2 p=.003) and Competency & Training (χ2=14.19, df=2, p=.001) 
showed significant differences.  Across Severity level, only Violation (χ2=6.34, df=2 
p=.042) and Procedures (χ2=6.03, df=2 p=.049) showed significant differences. 
 






Assumption(#1) vs. D & M (#2) 1.00 Not significant 
D & M (#2) vs. Communication (#3) .629 Not significant 
Communication (#3) vs. Omission (#4) .629 Not significant 
Omission (#4) vs. Decision-making (#5) 1.00 Not significant 
Assumption(#1) vs. Information (#6) .096 Trend 
 
 
5.3.3 Sub-factors for the most frequent codes 
The three most frequent HFIT codes were examined in detail to identify the most 
frequent sub-factors contributing to these codes (Table 10). 
 
5.4 Discussion 
5.4.1 Human factors in maintenance-related failures 
The main objective of Study 2 was to develop a more detailed understanding of the 
human factors that most-frequently contributed to maintenance-related failures in 
petroleum operations by using structured interviews with maintenance personnel.  
Analysis of the ranking of reported codes, using a Cochran’s Q Test, demonstrated 
that the frequencies of the 27 codes did not occur randomly.  The five most 
frequently reported codes were: 
#1 Assumption  
#2 Design & Maintenance  
#3 Communication  
#4 Omission  
#5 Decision-making 
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Table 10.  Frequency of sub-factors of the three most-frequent codes, and their 
occurrence as a percentage of the number of times that the code was reported. 




Assumption Assumption that correct procedures were being used  11 37 
 Assumption that correct parts or systems were being 
fixed   
6 20 
 Assumption that equipment and location were correct  5 17 
 Assumption that previous tasks were carried out 4 13 
The design or structure was inadequate 10 37 Design & 
Maintenance Components or materials were inadequate  8 30 
 Insufficient physical or visual access 7 26 
 Equipment was overdue for maintenance or CM 6 22 
 Design or modification not carried out as intended. 4 15 
 Components can be installed in the wrong orientation. 4 15 
 Incident was related to use of non-standard equipment 4 15 
 Equipment in the incident was not adequately labelled. 3 11 
Communication There was a lack of communication     10 40 
 Poor communication between companies  8 32 
 Poor communication between or within 
teams/departments 
8 32 
 Communication failure between offshore and on-




5.4.2 Assumption  
Assumption was the most frequently mentioned factor, reported in 30 of the 38 
interviews.  A positive response to Assumption was often associated with solving 
maintenance problems without obtaining sufficient information, or without checking 
the accuracy of presumptions.  Tucker and Edmondson (2003) described this process 
as first-order problem-solving in their analysis of the work of hospital nurses and 
other front-line workers.  They described two heuristics that operate in first-order 
learning, namely 1) securing just the information or materials needed to continue the 
work process,  and 2) asking for assistance, such as information, from other workers 
who are socially close rather than those more able to assist.  Assumptions in turn 
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preclude second-order problem solving; that is the process of probing into underlying 
factors that are required for complete and long-term corrections of problems. 
 
Assumptions in solving maintenance problems were reported in several forms, 
including the assumptions that: 
• supplied replacement parts were correct for the application 
• previous tasks had been done 
• the unit being maintained was similar to units previously worked on 
• work on an electrical system would not cause production units to switch off 
and 
• the cause of failure resided in a particular area of a system when in fact the 
fault was situated elsewhere. 
   
Closely related, was the application of assumed knowledge to decision-making.  
Faulty assumptions were found to be a factor in most of the cases (81%) associated 
with flawed decisions.  In a number of incidents, this was based on an assumption 
that the job was less complicated than it proved to be.  In others there was an 
assumption that the planned action would improve the situation rather than make it 
worse, as in the incident where a full overhaul was planned based on the assumption 
that spare parts were available.  Often these assumptions were based on past 
experience alone.  In discussing a Recognition-Primed Decision model (Lipshitz, 
Klein, Orasanu, & Salas, 2001), a facet of Naturalistic Decision-making, Caravlaho, 
dos Santos and Vidal (2005) described the way in which NPP shift supervisors 
tended to decide on a course of action based on the similarity of the current situation 
to previous situations.  These supervisors did not attempt to identify the most 
appropriate solution, but rather one which sufficiently accorded with their previous 
experience.  This process inevitably required assumptions concerning the similarity 
of the problem encountered to previous ones, and the applicability of previous 
solutions, processes considered typical of Naturalistic Decision-making (Lipshitz, 
Klein, Orasanu, & Salas, 2001). 
 
In the current study, despite using an interview method, there were difficulties in 
definitively identifying the cognitive processes that led to the failure in question.  In 
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most cases, problem-solving behaviours appeared to mediate between the initial 
assumptions and the subsequent adverse outcome.  For this reason, in a majority of 
incidents, assumptions could be considered a dimension of problem-solving 
behaviour, including decision-making, which is central to the problem-solving 
process.  Flawed decision-making was found to occur frequently with assumptions.  
Other important components of problem-solving also featured in the incidents 
examined.  For example, failure to detect warning signs (Detection [#11]) often 
occurred with Assumption, as in the failure of a Condensate Pump on an FPSO.  
Assumptions were made that vibrations heard originated from a bearing, despite the 
maintenance technician commenting in the interview, “When putting it [the 
condensate pump] in, there was that much tension; that should have been a warning 
sign.”   
 
Conversely, in many cases involving assumptions (43%), an intermediary decision-
making stage mediating between assumptions and failure did not seem to occur, i.e. 
the job in question was proceeding along an established path and due to the 
assumption made, no choice between options appeared to be necessary.  Examples 
included those in which a wrong procedure was specified or a wrong part was 
supplied, and no attempt was made to confirm its suitability.  In most of these cases, 
when Decision-making was not a factor, an Omission (of a check on suitability) or 
Violation (of a required checking procedure) was reported.  These incidents 
corresponded to situations which can occur in more regulated and proceduralised 
industries such as aviation and NPP maintenance.  Hobbs and Williamson (2003) 
found that memory lapses, which they defined as “the omission of an action that the 
person intended to perform” (p.191), was the greatest contributor (20.1% of 
occurrences) to adverse aircraft maintenance incidents, while violations were the 
second greatest contributor (17.2% of occurrences).  Pyy (2001) similarly identified 
omissions in 23.8 % of maintenance failures involving a human action resulting in a 
fault. 
 
In addition to reflecting problem-solving behaviours, the prevalence of assumptions 
may also be an emergent property representing underlying organisational factors, 
such as: 
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• the difficulty of obtaining information, as demonstrated by the frequent 
reporting of Communication (#3) and Information (#7) 
• real or perceived time pressures to complete jobs quickly (Job Factors #9) 
• the increasing technical complexity of maintaining plant and equipment, as 
evidenced by the prominence of Design & Maintenance (#2) issues in failures 
• the lack of Procedures (#6) for many tasks and the reported difficulties of 
finding procedures, or the tendency of work orders not to contain procedures, 
as is the practice in other operations. 
 
The human factors literature tended to examine the role of assumptions in relation to 
other cognitive processes in the workplace, such as decision-making (Lipshitz, Klein, 
Orasanu, & Salas, 2001), error-making (Reason & Hobbs, 2003), and problem-
solving (Edmondson, 1996), rather than as a distinct construct (e.g. ‘assumption-
making’).  Most literature was concerned with either the observable phenomena on 
which assumptions impact (e.g., information flow and decision-making) or the 
outcomes of these processes (e.g., generation of observable solutions to problems).  
Vogus and Welbourne (2003) commented, in relation to information flow and 
problem-solving, that high-reliability organisations tend to avoid making 
assumptions or over-simplifying the situations in which they operate.  Reiman, 
Oedewald and Rollenhagen (2005) considered methodicalness, the inverse of making 
assumptions, as an important component of their Maintenance Core Task model 
(Section 2.11.2).  They describe methodicalness as a process whereby the 
maintenance technician can justify the reasons for undertaking a particular 
maintenance activity.  Their model highlights the importance of “knowledge creation 
and problem-solving as being inherent in the maintenance task” (p. 334).  Ultimately, 
the relationship of assumptions to the solution of maintenance problems was 
demonstrated by their predominance in the interview reports of the current study.   
 
5.4.3 Plant design and maintenance 
Design & Maintenance was the second most-frequent code associated with failures, 
both in the interviews and in incidents reported in First Priority.  This item has a 
strong relationship to engineering, but in turn relates to difficulties encountered by 
maintenance technicians in conducting their work.  This code was reported in 71% of 
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the interviews, of which the majority were inadequacies in the components, design, 
or materials utilised.  The remainder of this category included failures due to: 
• inadequate labelling of equipment units or controls 
• use of non-standardised equipment 
• inadequate maintenance or condition-monitoring. 
 
Attribution of failures to the original design or a lack of on-going maintenance is to 
be expected in a technically-advanced operation.  Taylor (2007) quotes two studies 
concerning the influence of design on incidents in process plants.  In one relating to 
nuclear reactors, design errors were named as a ‘primary cause’ in 46% of incidents.  
In a study of chemical industry incidents, 55% involved design errors.  A higher 
overall result (71%) was obtained in the current study, though no attempt was made 
to identify a primary cause, as was done in the study quoted by Taylor.  Maintenance 
technicians may also be expected to attribute a greater influence to design than 
incident investigators, as their tasks require dealing directly with the impact of design 
flaws on maintenance work.   
 
While some elements of plant design are principally engineering issues, the ability of 
maintenance technicians to interact easily and dependably with the equipment on 
which they work is an important dimension of a human factors approach to 
improving overall plant performance.  Therefore, some elements of this factor bear 
on technical issues, such as the adequacy of components or materials, while others 
such as labelling, access, and use of non-standardised equipment impact directly on 
maintenance technicians’ ability to complete their tasks.  In the opinion of Reason 
and Hobbs (2003), many maintenance errors are related to design of equipment and 
often are due to a lack of concern for the work of maintainers.  They suggest a focus 
on six design principles: 
1. “Components should be easily accessible. 
2. Components that function together should be grouped together. 
3. Labelling should be clear and informative. 
4. The need for specialised tools should be avoided. 
5. Fine adjustments should be able to be made in the workshop and not in the field. 
6. The design should assist maintainers to identify the location of faults.”  
(p. 122) 
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These design principles accord closely with many of the problems reported by 
maintenance technicians in response to the Design & Maintenance questions in 
HFIT, demonstrating their role in maintenance failures. 
 
5.4.4 Communication 
The third most-frequently reported code in the interviews was Communication.  In 
many of the interviews it was apparent that participants in the work process (e.g. 
maintenance technicians, engineers, suppliers, and planners) had failed to 
communicate needed information to other personnel.  Not surprisingly, Information 
(#6) was also frequently reported as a contributor to these failures.  The HFIT factor 
Communication consists of a number of items (Table 10) relating to lack of 
communication in the workplace, for example, communication that was relevant to 
the maintenance task that did not occur to the extent necessary to complete the task 
successfully.  The second and third most common sub-factors were specific to the 
locus of this lack of communication, i.e.: 
• between the target company and another organisation involved in the 
maintenance activity, such as a contractor, supplier, or agent 
• between on-shore and offshore personnel, typically between maintenance 
technicians, and either engineers or planners.   
 
The communication failures ranged from the most basic (e.g. from the supply of the 
wrong parts), through to the highest level of required information, (e.g., failure to 
advise about changing work procedures and major engineering changes).  
“Procedures and rules change all the time, but no-one feeds it back to us,” said one 
fitter at his interview.  Maintenance workers in other industries experience the same 
poor communication and lack of information, as Holmgren (2005) observed among 
railway maintenance workers.  He found that deficient communication not only 
contributed directly to collisions and derailments, but also resulted in an under-
utilisation of maintenance workers’ skills. 
 
The sub-factor Lack of communication represented a general failure to communicate, 
such as when changes to equipment, stock levels, procedures, or work plans had been 
made and the relevant personnel had not been advised.  This has been explicitly 
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described by interviewees in their own words as a “breakdown of communication.”  
Lack of communication also concerns systemic failures in communication, either 
because too many disparate parties are involved, or because ‘political issues’ have 
created impediments to communication.  According to Sagan (1994), “organisational 
blind spots can hide failure modes” (p.234), particularly when subjects are not 
discussed because they reflect badly on an organisation’s self-image. 
 
These organisation-wide problems with communication were clearly recognised by 
maintenance technicians.  They indicated that there was often a general lack of 
communication with maintenance personnel, particularly mentioning engineers.  As 
one mechanical fitter said, “Communication between the shop floor and the 
engineers is zip.”  Another person commented that, “The system did not promote 
communication between parts inspectors and the [off-shore] end-user.”  Interestingly, 
this mirrors the findings of studies in the medical industry (Alvarez & Coiera, 2006) 
which found that, despite occurring infrequently (i.e., 2% of recorded 
communications), communication between doctors and nurses was still responsible 
for 37% of the errors.  As with nurses and doctors, status differences between 
maintenance technicians and engineers may similarly be one impediment to adequate 
communication. 
 
Weak communication links between on-shore and off-shore parties were often 
mentioned in the interviews; for example, the difficulties with communicating the 
nature of problems to engineers on-shore.  Similarly, personnel charged with 
effecting solutions had failed to inform others of critical aspects of the situation.  
This included not communicating observations that would have changed the 
assessment of the corrective maintenance work required, and vendors dispatching 
equipment without advising of important changes made to the equipment.  “There 
was bad communication all around,” was the assessment of an example given by an 
interviewee.  This has been described in examples from the medical industry 
(Horwitz et al., 2009) in which messages relating to hand-overs were not 
communicated properly, particularly when different disciplines were involved.  In a 
similar way, flaws in communicating critical information may occur when ‘handing 
over’ projects from on-shore personnel to off-shore personnel. 
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There was also a reluctance to take the time to record or pass on useful information.  
One maintenance coordinator remarked, “A lot of guys don’t like sitting down and 
writing a 2 or 3 page procedure…the only good practice not being followed is 
passing on information.”  This was particularly true in relation to any required up-
dating of the on-line Information Management (IM) systems where work orders, 
procedures, and maintenance history are stored.  There were many perceived 
difficulties with entering information into the databases in the IM systems.  These 
included the difficulty of accessing the personnel who authorise the up-dating of 
information, and the length of the approval process.  As with the medical industry, 
issues of status and authority appear to hinder efficient communication processes 
(Roberts & Tadmor, 2002).  A maintenance coordinator said that gathering 
information and feeding it back into the system was “one of the biggest things I see 
as a problem.”  This was similar to the situation for the nurses in a study (Tucker, 
Edmondson, & Spear, 2002) of the difficulties they face in finding time to correct 
deficient communication.  As a result, information within IM systems remained 
inaccurate, impeding a critical organisational learning process.   
 
In a number of incidents, computer-meditated communication, such as the SAP 
database used to create and transmit work orders, was considered the source of 
ineffective communication.  Critical details required from notifications in the SAP 
database were reported as being missed due to information being inserted in the 
wrong place or being badly located (e.g. text at the bottom of the screen).  
Information communicated via the SAP database also did not allow for necessary 
clarification and discussion, as the electronic format does not tend to encourage a 
two-way exchange between people.  Research on the quality of group decision-
making using computer meditated-communication (Baltes, Dickson, Sherman, 
Bauer, & LaGanke, 2002) has shown that across numerous studies, significant 
differences have been found in the effectiveness of computer-meditated 
communication compared to face-to-face communication.  Baltes et al identified a 
negative effect of computer-meditated communication on decision-making 
effectiveness in 15 studies, compared to nine showing a positive effect.  Furthermore, 
in 13 studies the effect of computer-meditated communication on Time to Decide 
was negative, and no studies showed a reduction in the time needed to produce a 
decision. 
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From descriptions of the communication processes involved, it did not appear that 
technology was the limiting factor.  Communication between on-shore and off-shore 
personnel is supported by a wide range of synchronous communication technologies, 
such as e-mail.  Video-conferencing, which is known to improve the outcomes from 
decision-making of virtual teams (Baker, 2002), is available in the Perth office and 
the Process Plant.  Rather, the workplace culture appeared to work against requests 
for either clarification or further information.  An off-shore maintenance technician 
said, in relation to spares that had not been sent by the shutdown crew arriving from 
on-shore, “We thought shutdown was dealing with it and shutdown says, ‘It’s not 
really our job because you guys know the isolations.’”  In several of the failures 
discussed it was clear that even basic information from easily accessible sources was 
not obtained at times.  The inevitable result, as described above, was the need to rely 
on assumptions, ultimately leading to poorly-informed decisions and flawed 
solutions to maintenance problems.  This is significantly different to the description 
of the use of meta-scripts in effective communication among military units (Zohar & 
Luria, 2003a).  In Zohar and Luria’s study, shared mental models contributed to the 
development of brief and meaningful communication, known as meta-scripts, which 
were readily understood by all participants.  Processes aiding the development of 
better shared mental models between maintainers and on-shore planners, engineers 
and vendors would greatly reduce the mis-communication that appeared to occur 
between personnel having different conceptualisations of the tasks and requirements 
in off-shore maintenance. 
 
The relationship of communication to the other human factors explored was 
instructive.  Communication often occurred with Assumption in many of the failures.  
The frequent recurrence of Decision-making as a factor, with low reporting of 
Competence and Supervision, indicated that insufficient knowledge, training, or 
direction was not generally blamed by maintenance technicians for the failures.  
Instead, it appeared that deficient communication was frequently part of the 
mechanism through which assumptions were allowed to compromise the entire 
maintenance problem-solving process.  
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Finally, the results of Study 2 agree with Muchinsky’s (2003) comments referring to 
a Systems Theory approach to organisations: 
With all these parts making up the system it is necessary to have a means to 
provide coordination and linkage among them.  Such functions are 
accomplished through communication and decision-making [italics added]; 
they permit the various parts of the system to ‘talk to each other’.  (p. 250) 
 
5.4.5 Other considerations evident in the failure data 
Omission was the fourth most frequently reported contributor to failure.  As well as 
instances in which critical steps were omitted from a work procedure, this category 
also included failures due to: 
• Neglecting to up-date procedures.  This impacted on Procedures and 
Information. 
• Neglecting to check the suitability of a part or procedure about to be used.  
This is closely related to cases involving assumptions concerning the 
suitability of spare parts. 
• Final checks not being done on equipment after maintenance, which was also 
an issue of Teamwork and Supervision.   
 
Omissions are a category of human error frequently examined in the study of NPP 
maintenance failures mentioned previously (Pyy, 2001).  Along with errors of 
commission they form one basis for analysing the cognitive causes of human error.  
In terms of the human errors reported in the Study 2 interviews, the total for errors of 
commission (reported in the  HFIT model as Timing, Selection, Execution, and Work 
Quality) was cumulatively higher (74% of cases) than for Omissions (58% of cases).  
This represents a ratio of errors of commission to omission of 1.3:1, whereas in 
Pyy’s incident report data, the ratio is ~3:1.  In the interviews, opinions regarding the 
non-performance of tasks, such as checking for errors and obtaining additional 
information were often reported.  This resulted in almost equal numbers of errors of 
commission and omission, compared to the written reports in Pyy’s study, in which 
errors of commission were reported preferentially. 
 
Difficulties encountered with Procedures (#6) contributed to a frequent lack of 
information.  When required task procedures were either not available or provided 
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incomplete information, finding information became a necessary step in completing 
the job.  However, developing shared mental models depends on having information 
in common (Mathieu, Goodwin, Heffner, Salas, Cannon-Bowers, 2000), which is 
one of the functions of a procedure.  In several cases it was found that barriers to 
team members’ communication, coupled with poor procedures, increased the 
potential for faulty problem-solving, and ultimately increased the potential for 
failure.  The comments from several maintenance technicians concerning failure to 
pass on information indicated an awareness of effective team processes.  However, 
the discrepancy between understanding good team processes and the difficulties of 
implementing these processes was a situation also observed among hospital teams 
(Flin, Fletcher, McGeorge, Sutherland, & Patey, 2003).  
 
Many of the comments indicated that Information (#7) tended to flow in a single 
direction only.  Information was provided to maintenance technicians via procedures 
and work orders, but often did not allow for the feedback needed to clarify 
ambiguities, obtain further information (e.g. to correct procedures), or resolve 
conflicting information (e.g. confusion concerning part or unit numbers).  Effective 
feedback loops, such as those between maintenance technicians, engineers, vendors, 
and the company’s Information Management systems were required to reduce the 
risks of mis-information.  From the interview comments, the failure to request 
clarification or provide feedback did not seem to represent a lack of interest on the 
part of maintenance technicians, or the absence of needed technologies within the 
company.  It appeared to relate to the difficulty experienced by maintenance 
technicians in using these systems, both in accessing information, and in the 
restrictions on entering information into them.  The origin of this appeared to be 
threefold: 
 
1) Procedures were reported as rarely available for maintenance tasks, in 
contrast to the activities of Operations personnel, which are heavily 
proceduralised.  The procedures that do exist were reported as often being 
out-dated (particularly for older installations), not reflecting changes to plant, 
or not providing enough critical information for less-experienced 
maintenance technicians.   
                                                     Human Factors and Plant Maintenance Reliability 123
2) Engineers, rather than on-site maintenance technicians, are considered 
knowledgeable about maintenance procedures.  The current process requiring 
engineering authorisation for amending procedures, while justifiable in terms 
of authenticating information, has created a situation in which the knowledge 
held by maintenance technicians is not captured in the Information 
Management systems.  One person reported that maintenance technicians 
were not allowed to print procedures, in case they annotate them and work 
from annotated copies.  This runs contrary to Hughes’ comment (1951) that 
the ‘colleague-group’ should have the ultimate say over what constitutes good 
practice, because they “alone fully understand the technical contingencies” 
(p. 323). 
3) There is a multiplicity of IM systems, including Virtual Bookshelf, MCP, 
SAP, First Priority, ALIS, the engineering drawing database, and electronic 
versions of vendor manuals.  In regard to one failure at the Process Plant 
resulting from an incorrect Bill of Materials (i.e. spare parts list), the person 
involved reported that the data in SAP was not reliable, and therefore it was 
necessary to check several sources of information before starting a 
maintenance job.  Quoting one maintenance technician from the Process Plant 
concerning access to needed information: 
“I would never trust the data in SAP…Information is not easily at 
hand, ever!  If we get a work order to go out to calibrate something, 
we might have a third of the information we need to really, properly 
carry out the job.  You go to a different system to look for the data 
sheets, another system to find out what happens if we trip a 
transmitter.” 
 
Another maintenance technician reported spending six hours trying to source 
information for a job.  In a time-constrained environment, most maintenance 
technicians would not have this much spare time, let alone patience.   
 
Importantly, there were a number of factors reported less-frequently in the interviews 
than was expected based on their prominence in the organisational psychology and 
management literature.  Of factors expected to play a greater role in failures, 
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Competence & Training was ranked 8th, Supervision was 17th, Work Quality was 
19th, Teamwork was 20th, and Violation was 22nd out of the 27 possible HFIT factors.  
The literature on maintenance error in other industries (Reason & Hobbs, 2003) often 
attributed the cause of failure to various elements of human error, such as loss of 
situation awareness and incorrect selection.  These were also not reported frequently 
as factors in the interviews.  Given the willingness of interviewees to discuss even 
sensitive issues, and the high number of factors that were reported in each failure 
(M= 9.5 codes), it seems likely that the infrequently reported factors do not 
contribute significantly to the probability of failure.  For example, the competence of 
maintenance personnel rarely arose in the failures reported, as evidenced by the low 
number of incidents identifying Work Quality (#19) as a factor.  Maintenance 
technicians were closely questioned regarding work quality issues, if there was an 
indication that this might have been a contributing factor.  However, when it had 
been a factor, there was generally no reluctance to discuss the circumstances.  
 
One possibility is that a substantially different set of human factors are responsible 
for failures within the company’s operations compared to organisations studied in the 
past.  As mentioned, maintenance in petroleum industry operations tend to be less 
proceduralised than in equivalent aviation and NPP operations, resulting in fewer 
opportunities for procedural violations.  However, a more likely scenario is one in 
which, as Einstein (1926) contended, the model used determines what is seen.  As the 
human factors literature demonstrated, and First Priority data confirmed, most failure 
models focus on the role of human errors and rule violations, to the exclusion of 
group-level and organisational-level factors.  Contrasting this, the interview data 
demonstrated that other more fundamental organisational processes consistently 
influence organisational performance.      
 
Finally, in terms of facility type, the Process Plant demonstrated the effects of a less-
experienced workforce, as noted by several interviewees.  Competence & Training 
and Supervision were reported significantly more frequently there than off-shore.  
Conversely, the platforms and FPSOs demonstrated the constraints of off-shore 
facilities, in which human, technical and informational resources are more limited 
than on-shore.  As a result, work planning and the availability of documentation were 
more frequent contributors to failures off-shore than in the Process Plant.  Otherwise, 
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there were few distinct differences between facilities.  The conclusion to be drawn 
from this is that, aside from the exceptions mentioned, many of the factors revealed 
by HFIT are endemic to the organisation, and occur with all types of incidents and in 
all work areas.    
     
5.4.6 Comparison of interview data with First Priority data  
Studies 1 and 2 relied on the analysis of past adverse events to develop an 
understanding of the role of human factors in failures.  Analysis of incident reports in 
First Priority was exploratory due to concerns about the quality of the data collected 
in the company’s incident reports.  As a preliminary study it has served two 
worthwhile purposes, i.e., the First Priority data 1) provided an indication of the 
representativeness of the incident to be explored in the interviews, and 2) 
demonstrated the areas in which company failure investigations could be improved in 
order to more accurately identify the human factors contributing to failures.   
 
Examination of the demographics of staff (Table 5) indicated that the interviews 
conducted were approximately representative of the workforce in the company, 
though there were anomalies in the sample population due to the constraints on the 
availability of personnel for interviews.  The distributions for Work Category and 
Production Type formed a representative sample of the workforce, with a few 
exceptions.  The Major Maintenance team was over-represented compared to off-
shore Core Crew, due to easier access to personnel for interviews.  Similarly, 
supervisors and coordinator/planners were over-represented due to greater ease of 
contacting them for interviews.  Comparison of the incidents in Study 2 with those in 
Study 1 indicated that severe failures were over-represented, and minor incidents 
were under-represented, possibly due to the tendency for people to focus on incidents 
with more serious consequences (Glendon, Clarke, & McKenna, 2006).  Although a 
strictly representative sample of plant failures was not obtained, a bias among 
interviewees towards more severe incidents served to provide an emphasis on the 
factors that lead to failures with greater consequences. 
 
Regarding quality of data, the information reported in the incident database was rich 
in event descriptions, but poor in contextual and motivational analysis compared to 
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the interview data.  A mean of 2.3 codes (SD=1.48) was reported for the incidents 
entered in the First Priority database, whereas the interviews had a mean of 9.5 codes 
per incident (SD=2.25).  This demonstrated that a much broader understanding of the 
human factors in a failure is obtainable by appropriate use of a suitable investigation 
tool.  
 
The data obtained from the interviews was also different to that obtained from 
company incident reports.  The most-frequently reported factor in the First Priority 
data was that of procedural violations, with the quality of guidelines and procedures 
being a secondary factor.  This tended to agree with the finding of the National 
Transport Safety Board in the US (Collier, 2004) that 76.5% of adverse events in 
aviation related to maintenance involved ‘failure to follow procedures’, as well as 
Boeing’s estimate (Rankin, 2007) that ~40% of maintenance events are caused by 
violations.  However, the occurrence of violations was viewed differently in the 
interviews.  The occurrence of violations was a contributing factor in several of the 
interviews, particularly at the Process Plant, in which both insufficient supervision 
and the difficulty of accessing information on acceptable work practices were 
recognised as contributing to poor adherence to procedures.  Although procedures 
were not followed in the incidents examined, the secondary nature of procedural 
violations was apparent in the interviews.  Despite being closely questioned about 
whether or not procedures had been violated, maintenance technicians were of the 
opinion that few tasks were adequately proceduralised, and they often contended that 
greater attention to existing procedures would not have prevented the failure under 
discussion.   
 
The next most prominent factor, Design & Maintenance, was the second most 
frequent factor in both First Priority and in the interviews.  This reinforces the view 
that original designs greatly influence the ability to maintain plant.  It may also 
indicate that the technical component of failure is more readily recognised in 
investigations than most other human factors.  A focus on technical factors was 
discussed by Bea (1998) who considered that design engineers do not tend to concern 
themselves with the human support systems required for engineered systems, and 
similarly tend to recognise mainly the technical aspects of failures. 
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Finally, Detection and Decision-making were the third and fourth most frequent 
factors respectively in the First Priority data, while 11th and 5th, respectively in the 
interview data.  The reporting of various forms of human error might be expected 
where third parties, such as supervisors, are responsible for attributing the causes of 
failure, as often occurred with First Priority incident reporting.  As Dekker (2006) 
commented in his description of Hindsight Bias, ‘failure to detect’ (i.e. loss of 
situation awareness) and ‘poor decision-making’ are forms of human error that are 
attributed in hindsight when determining ‘what people should have noticed’ and 
‘what people should have done’.  As expected with Hindsight Bias, the incident 
reports tended to over-report human faults, i.e. errors and violations, while neglecting 
to analyse more deeply performance shaping factors in the organisation.  This in 
itself was an important finding of Studies 1 and 2.   
 
The differences between the factors reported in First Priority and the detailed 
descriptions of incidents obtained in interviews highlighted the need to investigate 
beyond ‘violations and errors.’  The interviews revealed the role of communication 
and assumptions, often the result of difficult access to information, as among the 
mechanisms frequently provoking erroneous decisions and actions.  In addition, the 
poor quality of and lack of access to procedures was considered a contributing factor 
more than twice as often as violations of procedures, indicating the organisation’s 
role in the occurrence of violations.  In their analysis of the typology of violations, 
Reason, Parker and Lawton (1998) considered that certain types of violations were 
caused by the actions (and inaction) of organisations.  Study 2 demonstrated that by 
using an appropriate method, these actions and inactions of organisations that 
provoke errors and violations might be identified. 
 
5.4.7 Evaluation of methodology 
In conducting the interviews in Study 2, the intention was to identify the 
predominant human factors contributing to failures in the target organisation in order 
to investigate underlying organisational weaknesses.  However, classifying human 
actions, and understanding how they relate to existing organisational systems are two 
distinct processes.  In Dekker’s (2003b) treatise on the subject, he enumerated the 
pitfalls of taking one for the other.  “Relabelling error rather than explaining 
it…Mistaking classification for understanding”(pp. 95-6), and ‘disembodying data’ 
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by classifying it into error categories, are all potentially valid criticisms of the 
attempt in Study 2 to reduce the complexity of 38 past events to 27 ‘causal’ codes.    
   
In particular, Dekker (2007) levelled his harshest criticism at the process of counting 
errors in many of the schemes for failure investigation.  He decried this form of 
human behaviour analysis as both obscuring the difference between causes and 
effects, as well as supporting the conceptual status quo.  In counting numbers of 
errors, they are removed from their context and in so doing, decrease any 
understanding that could otherwise have been gained.  Dekker (2003b) instead 
advocated a move to understand “how universal patterns of breakdown occur 
repeatedly across operational particulars” (p. 104).   
 
Bearing in mind Dekker’s caveats, the intention of Study 2 was not to tally the 
number of mistakes made by maintenance technicians or ascribe causal relationships 
between their actions and the breakdowns in the incidents analysed.  For this reason, 
all contributors to a failure were recorded with their supporting discourse, not only 
the root cause or primary causes, in order to retain the richness of the less prominent 
contributors to each incident.  Although the methodology of Studies 2 and 3 did rely 
on quantitative analysis of the most frequent factors, examination of the qualitative 
discourse from the interviews was one step taken to avoid what Dekker referred to as 
‘digitising the data.’  The aim of Study 2 was to identify patterns of breakdown in the 
maintenance process in order to provide the context required to investigate the 
relationship between human factors and reliability in Study 3.  A pattern of incorrect 
assumptions, flawed communication, and problems encountered with plant design 
was identified as recurring in failed maintenance activities in the target organisation.   
 
HFIT was found to be a suitable tool for obtaining this information on the recurring 
contributors to failures from maintenance personnel.  It allowed for examination of a 
broad cross-section of factors that were recognised in the literature as being 
responsible for failures and poor performance.  With the reformatting and 
modifications described in Section 4.2.2.2, HFIT provided a basis for obtaining 
quantitative data, as well as supporting comments concerning the incidents that could 
be subjected to qualitative content analysis.  A content analysis was not undertaken 
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in Study 2, as the quantitative data provided sufficient information to fulfil the 
objectives of this study.   
 
From the interview results, direct discussions with maintenance personnel was found 
to be a suitable means for obtaining information, regarding the role of human factors, 
as maintenance personnel: 
• are directly responsible for outcomes and, compared to engineering and 
maintenance planning staff, their work places them in close proximity to the 
effects of failure 
• have a better understanding of the historical and current factors impacting on 
the reliability of equipment, in contrast to operations staff who often do not 
have the opportunity to observe the causes of, or solutions to, equipment 
faults 
• often acquire an analytical perspective on archetypical and repeating systemic 
failures, and, being embedded in the production systems, often understand the 
systemic nature of failures better than managers do. 
     
Obtaining failure data by the interview methodology also had several potential 
drawbacks, namely: 
• Inaccuracies often occur in the recall of events.  A failure investigation 
conducted at the time of the event, with an appropriate level of human factors 
expertise, would provide more accurate information. 
• The interviewee’s interpretation of events, as well as the interviewer’s 
interpretation of the responses to questions and identification of the human 
factors involved, could bias the results obtained. 
• Interviews were time-consuming relative to the quantity of data obtained.  In 
theory, considerably more data could be obtained more quickly from a 
database designed for logging investigations of failures recorded at the time 
of the event.  Collection of data on minor incidents and near misses has been 
shown to improve the ability to estimate the risks of major failures (Jones, 
Kirchsteiger, & Bjerke, 1999).  However, investigators with human factors 
expertise would be required to provide the quality of analysis needed.  The 
First Priority database, described above, was found to lack the required level 
                                                     Human Factors and Plant Maintenance Reliability 130 
of human factors analysis, and instead, reports were overly focussed on 
human errors and violations in many of the incidents, which Rasmussen 
(1990) considered to be ‘fragments of behaviour’. 
• The interview study sample size was small, reducing the statistical power of 
the study.  Accessing information on failures in company records provided a 
larger sample population, but at the expense of quality in the data. 
• Obtaining cross-sectional data required a broad cohort of interviewees.  
Accessing maintenance personnel working off-shore was found to be difficult 
and therefore this group tended to be under-represented in the study 
population. 
 
Attributional differences in the rater’s interpretation of the interviewee’s responses 
also complicate interpretations.  Even with a clear ‘Yes/No’ response to the 
interviewer’s prompting question, the interviewer as human factors expert may need 
to re-assign the response to a more theoretically appropriate category, based on an 
understanding of the issues under discussion.  This too will introduce biases in 
categorising responses.  Some areas of questioning require added sensitivity to both 
obtain an objective response and to avoid antagonising the interviewee (Patton, 
2002).  For example, questions concerning violations of procedures or inadequate 
supervision might imply blame of the interviewee or someone close to the 
interviewee.  Modifying the questions during the interview and probing for 
additional detail was sometimes needed to explore sensitive aspects of several of the 
incidents. 
 
Finally, as a consequence of the above, considerable care in interviewing and 
analysing responses was required to avoid the pitfalls of either under- or over- 
interpreting the interviewee’s responses.  It was clear from the evaluation of HFIT, 
and Wallace and Ross’ (2006) discussion of the main causes of variability in inter-
rater reliability, that failure investigators need to have an understanding of the human 
factors issues, as well as a clear understanding of contextual issues in the failure 
domain.  Further research is required to refine HFIT for a specific domain, which 
could include removing overlaps between codes, clarifying the terminology used, 
and restructuring the sequence of questions.  These refinements will then need to be 
subjected to further testing for construct validity and inter-rater reliability to ensure 
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that the questions and codes adequately describe the human factors existing in the 
particular context.   
     
5.5 Summary and Conclusions   
Study 2 demonstrated that interviews with maintenance personnel provided a better 
means of identifying contributing factors in maintenance failures than the company 
incident reports examined in Study 1.  Using the taxonomy in HFIT, structured 
interviews (N=38) were conducted to determine the human factors which recur most 
frequently in maintenance failures in the petroleum industry.  Interviews conducted 
with maintenance personnel identified Assumption, Design & Maintenance, and 
Communication as the three most-frequent contributors to failures.  Assumptions 
were most often made concerning the correctness of procedures being used, and that 
the correct parts and systems were being repaired.  Designs and inadequate 
maintenance were most frequently recognised as a problem when original designs 
made maintenance difficult or created confusion which ultimately led to the wrong 
maintenance activities being conducted.  Lack of communication most often caused 
failures when various parts of the organisation failed to provide required information, 
or maintenance personnel failed to contact other participants in maintenance 
activities to clarify information.    
 
These results agreed with many previous studies of the impact of human factors on 
performance.  Consistent communication and a focus on methodical problem-solving 
represent fundamental organisational processes that have been identified in the HRO 
literature (see Section 2.11.3) as requirements for high reliability.  In addition, CRM 
in the petroleum industry (see Section 2.9.1) focuses on communication, situation 
awareness, and decision-making as important to reliable and safe operations.  The 
complexity of petroleum production systems requires situation awareness and 
attention to methodicalness, as the high rate of assumptions demonstrated.  Similarly, 
plant design and maintainability, the second most-frequent contributor to failures, 
have been identified in the engineering and human factors literature (see Section 
2.6.1) as important determinants of the ease of maintaining plant, and in turn, the 
performance of maintenance groups.  These three factors were often found to occur 
in association with related contributing factors.  Thus, a mean of 9.5 codes were 
identified for the failures examined.  Faulty decision-making, lack of task-related 
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information, and poor quality and limited availability of procedures, all were 
frequent secondary contributors to the ‘pattern of breakdown’ that frequently 
involved flawed assumptions, plant designs, and communication.        
 
The less frequent contributors to failure also provided valuable information about the 
performance of maintenance groups.  Supervision (#17) was rarely a factor, 
reflecting the high degree of autonomy and wide geographic distribution of 
maintenance personnel that distinguishes the petroleum industry from the aviation 
and nuclear power industries.  Similarly, Teamwork (#20) as a factor was rare, as the 
interviews revealed a high degree of cohesiveness between team members, and 
between teams and their supervisors.  Despite the attention given to rule violations in 
the human factors literature, Violation (#22) rarely contributed to failures.  
Maintainers queried about possible procedure violations reported that relatively few 
maintenance tasks, compared to control room operations, were specified in 
procedures.  These results demonstrated that a number of human factors that are 
prominent in many research studies, particularly in the aviation and NPP domains, 
appear not to be as relevant in the context of petroleum production. 
 
5.5.1 Application of the results to Study 3  
   Study 2 provided an indication of the influence of specific human factors on past 
failures of reliability in petroleum operations.  This study indicated which human 
factors recur in individual failures.  Study 3 will be conducted to characterise the 
relationship between human factors and the outcomes of maintenance activities, in 
terms of the day-to-day reliability of petroleum operations.  This will involve a 
comparison of the three most-frequently occurring factors identified in Study 2 
against group differences in reliability level.  To accomplish this, a measure for 
ranking the reliability level of different company work areas will be required 
(Chapter 6).  In addition, measures will be needed for assessing work area 
differences in these three recurring human factors (Chapter 7). 
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6.0 Identifying a Reliability Measure of Maintenance Work Areas 
6.1 Introduction 
6.1.1 Linking failures to reliability 
In order to link the results of the previous study to Study 3, a conceptual connection 
between failures and reliability is required.  According to Dhillon’s (2002) definition, 
“reliability is the probability that an item will perform its stated mission satisfactorily 
for the given time period when used under the specified conditions” (p.183).  When 
the item no longer does this, it is said to have failed.  Thus reliability and failure 
might be considered opposite poles of the same dimension.  In addition, reliability is 
often compromised by minor adverse events.  Research into accidents has 
demonstrated a model of organisational safety, in which minor events are closely 
linked to serious accidents (Wallace, Ross, Davies, Wright, & White, 2002).  
Wallace et al believed that many of the serious failures over the past 20 years had 
been “preceded by relevant near misses” (p. 1).  Other researchers have supported the 
concept of near-miss/minor events as an indicator or predictor of the risk of major 
accidents.  Jones, Kirchsteiger, and Bjerke (1999) cited the commonly-accepted 
safety triangle, in which near misses provide a pool of events from which minor 
injuries and in turn major accidents are drawn.  They quoted ratios of near misses to 
minor injuries to major accidents (i.e., 600:10:1) derived from accident data.  In a 
similar way, the minor events that impact on reliability statistics provide the pool of 
events from which failures may eventuate.   
 
Based on a relationship between minor events and failures, Study 3 will test if the 
same factors that contributed to the range of failures discussed in the interviews in 
Study 2 also influence the occurrence of minor events that determine the day-to-day 
reliability of plant and equipment.  In Study 2, retrospective investigations of failures 
conducted with maintenance personnel demonstrated that the most-frequent 
contributors to failure in a petroleum operation were Assumptions, Design & 
Maintenance, and Communication.  These dimensions will then to be used in Study 3 
as the basis for quantifying the influence of human factors on the reliability of 
workplaces. 
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6.1.2 Review of reliability measures 
In reviewing the literature on reliability, it was apparent that different measures were 
in use in industrial organisations.  Lofsten (2000) surveyed eight major Swedish 
manufacturers and energy producers, and found a wide range of reliability and 
efficiency measures had been adopted to quantify maintenance performance.  Most 
concepts of reliability focused on production outcomes, but others were indications 
of actual maintenance performance.  Even the International Standards Organization 
(2006b) commented that “No single KPI [Key Performance Indicator] provides the 
complete picture and it is, therefore, necessary to define a basket of KPIs that 
together indicate progress and trends in reliable operation of plant and equipment” 
(p.160).  Furthermore,  as Todinov (2004) commented, reliability measures will 
depend on the use the measures will be put to, such as “minimising the financial risks 
associated with loss of production” (p.273) and that different reliability measures 
will be needed in different industries, as they are expected to experience different 
failure modes.  Despite the perception of engineering measures as universal, an 
engineering concept such as reliability may still manifest itself in different emergent 
properties of a technological workplace.  Therefore, a quantitative measure specific 
to the research context is required.  Consequently, selection of a suitable reliability 
measure is an important component in the ranking of work areas for Study 3, and 
requires as much consideration as selecting the measures for assessing group 
differences in human factors. 
 
6.2 Measures 
6.2.1 Engineering theories of reliability 
Considerable research has been devoted in the engineering literature to theoretical 
considerations of equipment reliability.  In studies such as Zequeira and Berenguer’s 
(2006) these considerations have consisted mainly of academic analyses of the 
failure rates of hypothetical components, functioning as a part of a system model, 
and operating under idealised conditions.  In other research (Saleh & Marais, 2006), 
the objective has been more empirical in nature; that is, consideration of operational 
reliability has been based on either critical safety criteria or critical production 
criteria. 
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Sharma and Kumar (2008) offered a theoretical definition of reliability as “a measure 
of the probability of failure-free operation during a given interval” (p.893), which 
Sharma and Kumar represented mathematically as the probability (R) at time (t) for a 
failure rate (λ):  
tetR λ−=)(  
As the failure rate (λ) approaches 0, the probability of failure-free operation 
approaches 1.  Integrating this quantity over time provides a closely-related 
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Analysis of Mean Time to Failure in its simplest form can be an analysis of a single 
component operating independently, and subject to a constant failure rate.  This will 
then become a more complex situation if the component: 
• has a non-constant or unknown failure rate (Todinov, 2004) 
• is part of a serial network, in which the loss of any component compromises an 
entire system (Dhillon, 2002), or  
• is part of a parallel network, in which  redundancy reduces the probability that a 
single failure will compromise the whole system (Dhillon, 2002). 
 
As the system becomes more involved, it becomes more difficult to represent 
systems mathematically, particularly when actual failure rates are not known.  
Bayesian approaches (Antelman, 1997) have been developed for these more 
complicated situations, in which the expected failure rates are estimated from 
accumulated empirical data, rather than from theoretical principles.   
 
Ultimately, rather than pursue mathematical representations of reliability, many 
industrial organisations have been concerned with empirical measures of operational 
reliability, which represent the actual performance of units of production, or the 
probabilities that a production loss will occur.  These measures then provide a basis 
for identifying problem areas, assessing the efficacy of interventions, benchmarking 
against similar operations, and translating operational measures into economic 
measures (Saleh & Marais, 2006).  
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6.2.2 Measures of reliability in industry 
In order to accommodate a broad variety of industrial systems and potential failure 
modes, a range of empirical measures have been adopted to quantify plant and 
equipment performance.  These are sometimes defined as the organisation’s ‘key 
performance indicators’, which indicate the measures that the organisation believes 
best represent its performance, both in relation to its own past performance and to the 
performance of other similar operations.  Given that the objective of production-
critical operations, such as in the petroleum industry, is to maintain production 
output to a required level, an ability to monitor problems that may be developing in 
sub-systems and individual components is an important reliability function. 
 
The following are measures for monitoring performance that are currently employed 
in production-critical industries, several of which are commonly-used reliability 
measures, and others that are more specialised in their application: 
• Mean Time To Failure (MTTF), which was presented in the previous section 
as a mathematical function, is also evaluated from failure history.  It is 
derived by averaging the occurrences of failure of a component or system 
over a period of time to determine the mean operating time without a failure.  
This can also be expressed, for components that are repaired, as Mean Time 
Between Failures (MTBF), which takes into account the Mean Time to 
Repair (MTTR) as follows: 
MTBF = MTTF + MTTR   (Dhillon, 2002) 
 
• Minimum Failure-Free Operating Period (MFFOP): the time interval during 
which a failure will not occur to a given probability.  This is an important 
statistic for aircraft in flight and other time-based operations (Todinov, 2004). 
• Availability: percentage of time equipment is available to carry out its 
function.  All maintenance activities are included in the downtime.  
Availability can be considered as an operational measure or an intrinsic 
measure depending on whether it is calculated from actual uptime or actual 
repair times, respectively (International Standards Organization, 2006b).  
These can be expressed as: 
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• Unplanned Downtime (UDT): the total out-of-service time, from the time an 
item fails to the time it is restored to service (International Standards 
Organization, 2006b).  The ratio of unplanned downtime to total downtime 
provides an indication of the effectiveness of maintenance, as ideally all 
downtime should be planned preventative maintenance, with little or no 
unplanned breakdown maintenance.  As Aoudia, Belmokhar and 
Zwingelstein (2008) found in their study of the maintenance of a petroleum 
company, planned downtime was responsible for 2% of unproductive plant 
time, while unplanned downtime contributed 66% of unproductive time. 
• Overall Equipment Effectiveness (OEE) is a measure of all the losses in 
productivity attributable to particular machines or systems, and provides a 
basis for comparing different production systems (Bamber, Castka, Sharp, & 
Motara, 2003).  The expression for Overall Equipment Effectiveness is: 
 
OEE = Availability (%) x Performance rate (%) x Quality rate (%) 
 
Availability refers to Operational Availability as defined above, Performance 
is a measure of speed or capacity relative to ideal rates, and Quality is a 
measure of losses due to quality defects.  While OEE is generally more 
applicable to manufacturing operations, Bamber et al. considered that OEE 
was “appropriate to all operations containing plant and machinery” (p. 223). 
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6.2.3 Reliability measures used by the target company  
6.2.3.1 Key Performance Indicators 
The target company for this research collects empirical data concerning a range of 
key performance indicators to monitor the performance and reliability of 
maintenance work across entire facilities.  Among these are indicators of engineering 
integrity - the reliability of safety-critical components and systems, and maintenance 
integrity and effectiveness - the ability of maintenance teams to complete critical 
maintenance tasks effectively.  Most of the indicators record the completion or non-
completion of tasks that are considered critical to technical integrity, that is, safe 
operation.  These tend not to reflect either the quality of work done or the long-term 
outcomes.  As was demonstrated in the cases investigated in Study 2, faults may 
arise in the course of completing maintenance tasks, which then result in problems at 
a later stage.  Pyy (2001) in his research on NPP shutdowns found that 49% of 
failures originated from completed shutdown activities.  In a study by Svenson and 
Salo (2001), 40% of the errors made in nuclear reactor maintenance had not been 
detected within 10 weeks of the work being completed. 
 
Availability is one of the company’s maintenance integrity measures that does reflect 
long-term outcomes from maintenance.  It is a facility-wide statistic recording 
equipment availability as a percentage of the production plan.  As indicated in the 
literature (International Standards Organization, 2006b), Availability would generally 
be a useful basis for comparing maintenance workgroups, as the ability to utilise 
equipment when it is required for production indicates a successful maintenance 
program.  However, examination of the Availability data for the Year 2009 indicated 
a large variance in monthly data.  In addition, a proportion of the assessments 
indicated “100% availability,” which were questionable and did not provide a basis 
for comparison between facilities. 
 
Another item, named the Fail-to Danger (FTD) Ratio indicated the number of 
maintenance notifications that were considered to have involved a component failing 
and creating a hazardous condition.  It is a measure of the ability to intercept 
hazardous failures before they occur, reflecting on the effectiveness of the 
maintenance strategy.  While this is conceptually an important dimension, the 
numbers of these occurrences was low, for example, typically less than four per 
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month per facility, with a large monthly deviation.  Zohar (2002a) commented that 
low frequency events do not provide a statistically useful basis for distinguishing 
performance differences.  He cautioned that obtaining accurate group-level data is 
often difficult due to small sample population sizes.  His views apply equally well to 
measuring the effects of human factors on industrial reliability, as in the current 
research.  His solution was to analyse the frequencies of minor injuries, rather than 
the more commonly used Lost-Time Injury (LTI) rate.  An equivalent approach in 
reliability would be to monitor the frequency of trips or plant stoppages, rather than 
major breakdowns.  This is the methodology that has been adopted for Study 3 of 
this research. 
 
6.2.3.2 Data in the maintenance history database 
A Systems Application and Products (SAP) database is used by many industrial 
companies, including the target company, to record ongoing financial, maintenance 
history, supply chain, and operational data.  This includes detailed information 
pertaining to the request for, generation of, and completion of maintenance work 
orders.  Work orders are daily events including routine maintenance tasks, and as 
such tend to include large amounts of data.  The following maintenance effectiveness 
data is recorded by the target company in the maintenance area of their SAP 
database: 
• Number of maintenance tasks flagged as breakdowns 
• Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) for individual components 
• Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) for individual components 
• Production-critical unplanned downtime. 
 
All of these reflect, with varying degrees of accuracy, the effectiveness of various 
maintenance processes within a company work area.  The accuracy of data however 
depends on a subjective assessment of the maintenance task by the maintenance 
technicians involved.  The actual time devoted to a task is often not reported 
accurately and other characteristics of the job (e.g. flagging breakdowns and 
production-critical jobs) are also routinely not entered into the database upon 
completion of work orders.  Hence, in Comerford’s (2009a) opinion, confidence in 
the accuracy of this data is not high among the company’s reliability engineers, and 
its usefulness for comparing work areas is limited.   
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Each of the key performance indicators collected by the company indicates a 
different aspect of maintenance planning, efficiency and effectiveness.  A 
comparison was made between two of these performance indicators in SAP, namely 
the Mean Time to Repair and the Mean Time Between Failures as an average of all 
components across an entire facility (Figure 5).  MTBF and MTTR are derived from 
the repair history of each piece of equipment, and are calculated from the number of 
times an item is out-of service for repairs in a set period of time.  Data was extracted 
from SAP for 12 months during the period April 2008 to March 2009.  As Figure 5 
indicates, aside from the outlier Gas Platform 3 there is relatively little difference 
between facilities in Mean Time Between Failures.  As these measures are calculated 
across all components regardless of the size or criticality of equipment, there is an 

















Figure 5.  MTBF and MTTR recorded in a 12-month period (April 2008-March 
2009) for each off-shore facility or operating area of the Process Plant.  
 
Another measure that was examined for use in comparing work areas was the 
Number of Flagged Breakdowns.  This involves absolute numbers of breakdowns, 
and so comparing facilities of different sizes requires the number of breakdowns to 
be normalised in order to account for the characteristics of the facilities, such as the 
size (number of operating components), complexity, age, and magnitude of the 
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maintenance effort.  Each of these factors will impact on the comparability of one 
facility with another in order to rank them according to reliability level.  Thus, two 
facilities may be inherently equal in reliability.  However, the facility with more 
items of equipment, more complex control systems, and fewer resources devoted to 
maintenance work will be expected to experience more breakdowns, more unplanned 
downtime, and will require more time to repair and maintain.  For this reason, 
Number of Flagged Breakdowns was judged to be unsuitable for comparing 
reliability levels between work areas. 
 
6.2.3.3 Production deferment data 
Reliability Engineers at the company collect monthly data concerning a number of 
indicators of performance, particularly unwanted events and conditions that cause 
production losses, deferments, and downtime (Comerford, 2009b).  Monthly data is 
analysed by a Facility Reliability Engineer as part of a process called the Operational 
Reliability Improvement Process (ORIP), which is reported in monthly reports.  The 
data is reported both as a cumulative monthly trip rate as well as a Mean Time 
Between Deferments (MTBD) based on a 6-month running average. 
 
A production deferment event was defined by the company (Comerford, 2009b) as,  
Any event that results in unplanned production loss or deferment which may 
include, but is not limited to: 
• Trips (ESD [Emergency Shutdown], PSD [Process Shutdown] ) 
• Unplanned Shut Down / Stop 
• Shutdown Overruns 
• Reduced output / Capacity 
• Delayed start-ups / restart    (p.6) 
 
For comparison, production trips were also defined in the relevant International 
Standards Organization standard (2006b) as, “the situation when machinery is shut 
down from normal operating condition to full stop” (p. 133), and can either be due to 
1) exceeding control system limits, 2) a failure in an essential piece of equipment, or 
3) an operator deciding to stop machinery due to concerns about the way that it is 
operating.  
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6.2.4 Selection of a reliability measure for Study 3 
As the literature quoted in Section 6.2 indicated, various forms of Mean Time 
Between Failures are considered a standard measure of reliability.  This type of 
measure is theoretically consistent with the definition of reliability provided in 
Section 2.3.  Unlike absolute measures, such as the number of breakdowns per month 
or the total unplanned maintenance time per month, mean time between failures is a 
relative measure.  For example, if two plants are operating to the same level of 
reliability, and the production rate of one is increased, the mean time between 
failures should remain the same for both.  Similarly, if two compressors are being 
compared for reliability, despite one being older and one being more complex, 
equivalent reliability will mean that the mean time between breakdowns will be the 
same.  The older compressors may have more parts needing replacement at each 
breakdown, and the more complex compressors may require more time to repair, and 
so will have lower available up-time, but this should not affect the reliability statistic.  
Therefore, a relative measure that allows for comparison of work areas within the 
company irrespective of size, complexity, or age of the facility, is likely to provide a 
better basis for assessing relative performance. 
 
Although measures such as MTBF and MTTR for individual items of equipment 
were indicators of the effectiveness of maintenance tasks within the company, the 
data collected by the company did not provide stable and meaningful measures for 
comparison.  The data collected concerning breakdown of individual machines, 
although indicative of maintenance effectiveness, was not assessed and recorded 
uniformly across the different work areas.  In the case of MTBF of components, the 
long times between failures of some components tended to over-inflate the mean 
component lifetimes.  Similarly, the MTTR data was thought to be over-inflated by 
components that were not critical to production and those that were redundant.  In the 
case of non-critical equipment, repairs often take a long time from start to 
completion only because there is no urgency to completing the repair. 
 
Plant production deferments are the performance failures of concern to the company 
as they represent a loss of production, which in turn equates to a financial cost to the 
company.  Ultimately, the production deferment data is both directly relevant to the 
company’s objectives, and also provides a holistic measure of how well a work area 
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is able to regulate the processes that are required to achieve consistent performance 
of the plant.  Unlike Availability (see Section 6.2.2), which is subject to 
interpretation as to whether equipment failed when it was required or failed when it 
was not required, deferments represents a production loss and lack of reliability.  In 
addition, deferments occur sufficiently frequently to provide a useful statistical basis 
for analysis, unlike events which occur only rarely.  For these reasons, production 
deferment data was selected as the measure for ranking the relative reliability levels 
of the work areas analysed in Study 3. 
 
6.3 Analysis 
6.3.1 Company work areas 
As discussed in Section 4.1.4, within the company’s operational facilities there are 
three different types of facilities, namely, off-shore gas platforms, off-shore FPSOs, 
and the distinct process areas within the Process Plant.  Each of these types of 
facilities and the work areas within the Process Plant handles different products and 
utilises different processes.  For example FPSOs mainly handle oil, and their 
operational processes involve separating oil from water and storing the oil in tanks 
on-board the vessel.  Gas platforms extract, compress, and pump gas to the on-shore 
gas processing plant.  The maintenance processes involved are therefore different 
and comparisons could only be made between work areas within a facility type.  
Within the company, three FPSOs and three gas platforms were identified.  
Additionally, three work areas within the Process Plant were identified.  These nine 
distinct work areas constitute a 3 x 3 experimental design of facility types and work 
areas.  The following review of production deferment data provides a comparison of 
the differences in reliability data collected for these nine work areas. 
 
6.3.2 Analysis of production deferment data 
Monitoring of production deferment data is now a routine monitoring task within the 
company, though complete collection of this data was only available from 2008 
onwards.  For the purposes of this research, production deferment statistics were 
extracted from data collected by Reliability Engineers as part of their reporting for 
the Reliability Improvement Process (Comerford, 2009b).  Figure 6 displays data 
collected for a period of 12 months; higher values correspond to longer mean times 
between production deferments and therefore represent more reliable performance.     



































Figure 6.  Mean time between production deferments for work areas. 
 
In addition to assessing the mean time between deferments for a 12 month period, the 
rate of change in monthly mean value (∆ MTBD) was calculated in order to 
determine whether values were improving or becoming worse (Figure 7).  
Comparing Figures 6 and 7, it can be seen that among the off-shore facilities with 
better monthly mean times (i.e., Gas Platform 1 and FPSO 1), ∆ MTBD was positive.  
For the work areas with lower monthly means (i.e. FPSO 3 and Gas Platform 2), 
∆ MTBD was negative.  Thus the rate of change (∆ MTBD) often agreed with the 
absolute differences in MTBD between work areas.  A different effect appears to be 
occurring in the Process Plant, which may be due to changes in local conditions.  Gas 
Platform 3 is a new facility having started production the previous year (2007), and 
therefore improvements appeared to be occurring from a relatively low baseline.   
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Rate of Change (% per Month)











Figure 7.  Rate of change of Mean Time Between Deferments (∆ MTBD).   
 
Reliability rankings were assigned in Table 11 based on the deferment data presented 
in Figure 6. 
 
Table 11.  Reliability ranking of work areas based on mean time between deferments. 
Reliability 
Ranking FPSO Gas Platform Process Plant Area 
Higher FP1 GP1 PP1 
Middle FP2 GP2 PP2 




6.4.1 Relevance of the production deferment data 
The production deferment data (MTBD) is a measure generated and accepted by the 
company as a measure of reliability with regard to the maintenance of critical 
equipment and achievement of company objectives.  It has validity to the 
organisation because it captures the mean time between production failures, which 
agrees with Dhillon’s (2002) definition of a reliability measure.  Unlike the MTBF 
data for individual items of equipment extracted from the SAP maintenance history 
database, which include all components irrespective of degrees of importance, 
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production deferments represent significant impacts on company performance 
(Comerford, 2009b).  Furthermore, as a key performance indicator, the collection and 
analysis of this data was considered by Comerford (2009a) to be conducted more 
consistently across all of the facilities within the company, than for data that is 
analysed less routinely.  The deferment data was the statistic that provided the most 
stable indication over time of the differences between facilities.  In addition, it was 
based on sufficiently frequent events to allow for meaningful differentiation between 
work areas, and was therefore selected for assigning reliability rankings. 
 
6.4.2 Ranking of company workplaces 
The data in Figures 6 and 7 were based on the number of times production was 
deferred or stopped outside of planned stoppages in a 12-month period.  They 
represent a range of unwanted events, which Aoudia, Belmokhtar, and Zwingelstein 
(2008) argued relate to the ability to effectively plan and conduct maintenance work 
on equipment.  On the basis of mean monthly deferment data (Figure 6), a ranking of 
work areas within each facility type into lower, middle, and higher reliability was 
assigned (Table 11).  Due to the differences in equipment, workplace structure, and 
task organisation, it was important to compare reliability among equivalent work 
areas so that facility type was not a confounding variable. 
 
Further support for the rankings was obtained from calculations (Figure 7) of the rate 
of change of the monthly Mean Time Between Deferments (∆ MTBD).  The rate of 
change indicated which facilities were experiencing improving reliability over the 
time of the research (i.e., longer mean times between deferments).  It was found that 
the off-shore facilities that had the highest MTBD, namely FPSO 1 and Gas Platform 
1, also often demonstrated the best improvement (i.e. higher rate of change in a 
positive direction).  Having established a basis for ranking the relative reliability of 
the different work areas, it will now be possible to investigate the statistical 
relationship between human factors and reliability level in Study 3. 
 
6.4.3 Implications for Study 3 
In order to conduct Study 3, a measure of the maintenance reliability of each facility 
will be required.  Lofsten (2000) found that such a measure could be elusive due to 
the different quantities measured as part of monitoring plant performance, as well as 
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variations in the quality of the data collected.  For this reason, rather than treat the 
MTBD data as scalar data, only ordinal rankings were assigned to the different 
facilities.  For the purposes of Study 3, these rankings based on the MTBD data 
presented in this chapter are sufficient to analyse group differences in human factors.   
 
6.4.4 Improvements to the methodology 
Bamber, Castka, Sharp, and Motara, (2003) considered that improvement in an 
industrial organisation involves refinements to the monitoring of processes and 
outputs.  Through theoretical and practical developments, this monitoring becomes 
more sensitive over time to actual differences, as well as more accurate with regard 
to obtaining consistent and reproducible measurements.  Improving the collection of 
baseline reliability data should be an objective of further research into the impact of 
human factors on outcomes in petroleum operations.   
 
The data was considered to have validity in capturing the construct of reliability, as 
the concept of reliability relies on the probability of operating without a failure.  
However, other confounding factors are also responsible for the occurrence of 
deferments, including natural variations in well production, faults caused by 
operators, or problems with other facilities impacting on local production.  In terms 
of construct validity, monitoring breakdowns of specific production-critical 
equipment would provide a better indication of true maintenance-related reliability, 
as failure rates would be specific to distinct pieces of machinery rather that entire 
plant systems.  However, this would require more systematic and uniform collection 
and analysis of data entered into the maintenance history database than currently 
occurs.  This process could be started by monitoring specific classes of critical 
equipment (e.g. compressors, pumps, or process control units) and expanded to 
include most production-critical equipment. 
 
Another advantage of monitoring individual items of equipment would be the 
increase in the quantity of data obtained for each work area.  In his studies on the 
effects of leadership type on safety climate, Zohar (2002a) concluded that the size of 
population samples and low variance between groups is a difficulty with group-level 
research.  He favoured basing assessments on measures which provided larger 
sample sizes, for example minor injury rates, rather than lost-time accidents that 
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were relatively infrequent.  As researchers have noted (Jones, Kirchsteiger, & 
Bjerke, 1999; Wallace, Ross, Davies, Wright, & White, 2002) minor event reporting 
provides a better statistical basis for characterising the safety of systems than small 
numbers of major accidents and events.  Again, Mean Time Between Failure of a 
large number of production-critical items of equipment would provide better 
statistical information than fewer major events across an entire plant.  Efforts to 
improve the methodical recording of MTBF data for items of equipment could 
provide a basis for improving the assignment of overall reliability levels to 
individual work areas.  Further analysis would be needed to confirm the accuracy of 
MTBF data in defining quantitative differences between work areas. 
 
6.5 Summary and Conclusions 
Reliability is defined as the probability of failure, and can be calculated on the basis 
of the Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF).  Although this class of data was 
collected by the company for individual items of equipment, it was not collected 
sufficiently methodically to be considered an accurate representation of differences 
between work areas.  As a consequence, facility-wide Mean Time Between 
Production Deferments (MTBD) data based on trips and other plant downtime 
caused by a range of maintenance-related contributors, was considered the best 
available measure for ranking the reliability of facilities for Study 3.  Although the 
use of MTBD was judged to be a sufficiently valid measure of ordinal ranking, 
further research will be required to confirm the validity of MTBD as a scalar 
measure of the maintenance-related reliability of an entire work area. 
 
Based on the information supplied by Reliability Engineers as part of their 
Reliability Improvement Process reports, rankings were assigned to three gas 
platforms, three FPSOs, and three work areas in the Process Plant.  The rankings 
assigned to off-shore facilities were generally supported by analysis of the rate of 
change of the MTBD.  These rankings will be used in Study 3 as a basis for 
distinguishing the role of human factors between higher and lower reliability work 
areas.  
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7.0 Study 3 – Measuring the Influence of Human Factors on Reliability  
 
7.1 Introduction 
7.1.1 Review of Studies 1 and 2 
Based on Rasmussen’ s (1982) Model of Human Malfunction, HFIT has provided a 
suitable framework for analysing and understanding the human factors that 
contributed to failures within a petroleum processing operation.  Study 1 (Chapter 4) 
has shown that the target organisation’s incident reports most-frequently attributed 
maintenance failures to Violations of procedures and human error (i.e., errors of 
Detection and Decision-making).  However, Study 2 (Chapter 5) demonstrated, 
through retrospective interviews with maintenance personnel that although violations 
and errors had occurred, the three most frequent contributors to maintenance failures 
were: 1) Assumption, 2) Design & Maintenance, and 3) Communication.   
 
The aim of Study 3 is to measure whether the levels of the factors identified most-
frequently in Study 2 differ between work areas with different day-to-day reliability 
of plant and equipment.  The intention is not to generalise the findings concerning 
specific incidents, but rather use the results of Study 2 as an indicator of the most 
promising dimensions for a study of the role of human factors in reliability.  In 
Chapter 6, it was argued that the Mean Time between Deferments (MTBD) is the 
most meaningful way to rank facilities with different reliability levels.  Study 3 
therefore uses this measure to determine the influence of the human factors of 
interest in lower, middle, and higher reliability work areas across each of the three 
facility types.   
 
7.1.2 Selection of human factors measures for Study 3 
7.1.2.1 Assumption 
Assumption, the most-frequently reported HFIT code, was primarily related to a 
failure to investigate carefully the elements of the task at hand and obtain sufficient 
information (see Section 5.3).  Thus there were essentially two dimensions of failures 
associated with the construct of Assumption, namely, decision-making and problem-
solving.  Faulty assumptions were found in most of the cases (57%) to be associated 
with cognitive processes leading to poor decisions in the reported failure.  Often 
assumption-making was aggravated by a real or perceived shortage of time.  
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Insufficient information contributed to this process, as it led to applying assumed 
knowledge and past experience to decision-making.  However, almost half (43%) of 
cases involving Assumption related to flaws in problem-solving, and were not found 
to involve an identifiable decision-making stage.  In these cases, when Decision-
making was not a factor, other aspects of problem-solving, such as failing to check 
the suitability of procedures or parts (Omission), were also reported.  Failure to 
investigate the task methodically involved assumptions concerning the procedures 
and parts to be used, the condition of equipment to be repaired, or the potential 
response of the equipment to actions taken.  In a number of cases, the problem 
solution was based on an assumption that the job was less complicated than it was, or 
that the planned action would improve the situation rather than make it worse.   
 
Scales are required for Study 3 in order to measure the two constructs of Problem-
solving and Decision-making.  Only the Problem-solving scale in Morgeson and 
Humphrey’s (2006) Work Design Questionnaire were found to contain items that 
would relate to problem-solving in industrial maintenance activities.  As the authors 
explained, “Although there are thousands of studies investigating work and job 
design, existing measures are incomplete” (p. 1321), and consequently, they 
developed measures which could be used by practitioners investigating aspects of 
work design, including the requirements for problem-solving.  The questions in the 
Problem-solving scale of the Work Design Questionnaire were previously included 
as the Problem-solving demand scale in Wall, Jackson and Mullarkey’s (1995) 
reliability and validity testing of measures for job characteristics and cognitive 
demand in the workplace.  The scale was intended to test the need for “the more 
active cognitive processing requirements of a job” (p.433) and for ‘problem 
analysability.’  This is consistent with the frequent requirement for maintenance 
technician to diagnose problems outside of their routine maintenance activities and 
develop appropriate solutions.  The Problem-solving scale is able to assess the 
perception of maintainers that jobs arise that do not have a unique or obvious 
solution.  A lack of obvious or routine solution is the type of situation in which 
assumptions are more likely to be made in order to proceed with a task.  From the 
structured interviews, it emerged that tasks with characteristics that were unusual or 
outside expected routines were more likely to lead to faulty assumptions, as solutions 
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were often identified based solely on past experiences.  For these reasons, the 
Problem-solving scale was included in Study 3. 
 
The second dimension of Assumption relates to the person’s inclination to obtain 
systematically any needed information, as opposed to relying on assumptions when 
deciding how to proceed.  Work motivation theory (Latham & Pinder, 2005) 
attributed this partly to personality traits, particularly conscientiousness, and partly to 
other considerations, including job design and learning context, which influenced the 
effort applied to solving complex tasks.  Janis and Mann (1977) developed the 
Conflict Theory of Decision-making, a model of several psychological dimensions of 
decision-making, including conscientiousness in decision-making, which they termed 
‘vigilance’.  These aspects of vigilance in decision-making were incorporated into 
the Melbourne Decision-Making Questionnaire by Mann, Burnett, Radford, and Ford 
(1997).  Their Vigilance scale captures the traits of a person in terms of how 
methodical they perceive themselves to be when proceeding with solving job-related 
problems and making required decisions.  In their description of Vigilance, they 
explained that: 
The decision-maker clarifies objectives to be achieved by the decision, 
canvasses an array of alternatives, searches painstakingly for relevant 
information, assimilates information in an unbiased manner, and evaluates 
alternatives carefully before making a choice...According to the conflict 
model, vigilance is the only coping pattern that allows sound and rational 
decision-making.  (p.2) 
The Vigilance scale is therefore also relevant to the cases relating to Assumption 
reported in the interviews in Study 2 and was selected as a measure for Study 3.  The 
other scales in the Melbourne Decision-Making Questionnaire, such as Buck-passing 
and Procrastination, as well as measures in other studies relating to decision-making 
(see Section 2.9.4) did not appear to measure the constructs implicit in Assumption.   
 
7.1.2.2 Design & Maintenance 
The HFIT code Design & Maintenance included issues relating to adequate 
engineering of equipment and parts, problems encountered with modifications, and a 
lack of maintenance of equipment (see Section 5.3).  Responses in the interviews in 
Study 2 relating to Maintainability of equipment included the difficulty of accessing 
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components for maintenance due to space limitations or location height, and 
unfamiliarity with equipment due to a lack of standardisation in the design of units in 
the plant.  Poor labelling of units was particularly an issue for Instrumentation/ 
Electricians (Inlecs), when unexpected interconnections resulted in shutdown of the 
plant.   
 
The review of published literature indicated that a number of constructs are in use to 
define the relationship between maintainers’ tasks and equipment design.  The 
constructs commonly discussed in relation to engineering design included 
Maintainability and Usability.  Both of these constructs offered only a limited basis 
for measuring the dimensions that were identified in Study 2.   
 
Maintainability, as discussed in engineering literature (e.g., Wani & Gandhi, 1999) 
refers to the ease with which maintenance tasks can be carried out on a specific piece 
of equipment.  The relevant International Standards Organization standard (2006a) 
defined Maintainability as “the ability of an item under given conditions of use, to be 
retained in, or restored to, a state in which it can perform a required function, when 
maintenance is performed under given conditions and using stated procedures and 
resources” (p.15).  A commonly accepted measure of Maintainability (Mason, 1990) 
is the Bretby Maintainability Index.  The Bretby Maintainability Index considers 
parameters such as the weight of machines, how easily cover plates can be removed, 
and how difficult it is to access internal components.  This measure is intended to 
quantify the ease with which a specific item of machinery can be maintained.  It does 
not elicit the perceptions of maintainers with regard to their daily interaction with an 
entire plant.  As the Bretby Maintainability Index was designed as an assessment 
guideline for maintenance engineers and not as a means of surveying maintenance 
technicians, it was considered unsuitable for use in Study 3. 
 
Alternatively, various measures of Usability consider the impact of system design on 
ease of use (International Standards Organization, 1998).  The measures available are 
typically intended for assessing computer-based systems such as the System Usability 
Scale (Brooke, 1996).  The System Usability Scale considers such factors as 
consistency of a system, whether a system is unnecessarily complex, and whether the 
support of a technical person is required to deal with problems encountered.  ‘Ease of 
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use’ is an important concept in conducting maintenance tasks.  However, because of 
the specificity of the scale to using a specific device such as a computer, it did not 
appear to be suitable for assessing the ease of maintaining a complex process plant.  
Investigation of other literature discussing usability did not reveal an alternative scale 
that was suitable for measuring the ease of maintaining plant and equipment. 
 
The intent, based on the results of Study 2 and the objective of Study 3, was to select 
an appropriate instrument to measure the perceived suitability of equipment and 
components for their function, and the influence of plant design on ease of 
conducting maintenance activities.  Given the apparent lack of a suitable measure in 
the published literature, a scale was constructed for Study 3 based on the most-
frequent Design & Maintenance sub-factors from Study 2 (see Section 5.3.3, Table 
10).  Scale items were constructed from the questions in HFIT, with re-wording to 
reflect the intent to measure perceptions relating to the plant in general, and not a 
specific part or failure.  For example, the question in HFIT (Gordon, 2001) relating 
to equipment labelling asks, “Is the equipment involved in this incident labelled 
adequately” (p.53).  This question was revised for the survey to, “Do you find that 
equipment is accurately labelled for maintenance work?”  (Question 8). 
 
7.1.2.3 Communication 
The code in HFIT named Communication consisted of a number of questions relating 
to job-related and organisational communication.  The most frequently-reported sub-
factor of Communication in Study 2 was Lack of Communication, i.e. that the failure 
occurred in part because communication that was relevant to the maintenance job did 
not occur (see Section 5.3).  The second and third most common sub-factors referred 
to the locus of the communication lapses, for example if there was insufficient 
communication between on-shore and offshore personnel (typically between 
maintenance technicians and engineers or planners) or between the company and a 
contractor, vendor, or agent involved in the work.   
 
The organisational impediments to communication identified in Study 2 and 
discussed in Section 5.4.4 included: 
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• A general reluctance to communicate with maintenance personnel, often on 
the part of on-shore engineers.  One interviewee commented that the “System 
did not promote communication between parts inspectors and the [off-shore] 
end-user.”   
• A reluctance to take the time to record or pass on useful information, 
particularly when this required up-dating electronic IM systems.   
• Weak communication links between involved parties, as in the case of 
vendors suppling equipment without advising of important changes made to 
equipment, or difficulties of communicating the nature of problems to 
engineers on-shore. 
• Information entered into work order notifications and other databases not 
being seen due to poor placement on computer screens (e.g., important text 
located at the bottom of a screen).   
• The large proportion of task-related information being supplied from 
electronic databases, which tended to inhibit any required clarification and 
discussion. 
 
Based on these dysfunctions, the scale selected to measure organisational 
communication was required to capture perceptions about the flow of information 
through the organisation, the ease of using existing communication channels to 
obtain information, and the effectiveness of obtaining information from relevant 
parties to a maintenance task, including engineers, supervisors, planners, and 
vendors.  
 
Several organisational communication questionnaires were examined to determine if 
they offered a suitable measurement scale to test for the impediments to job-related 
communication as outlined above.  After reviewing a number of communication 
measures (Greenbaum, Clampitt, & Willihnganz, 1988; Rubin, Palmgreen, & 
Sypher, 2004) three measures were found to be of particular relevance:    
 
• Organizational Communication Development Audit Questionnaire (OCD) 
developed by Wiio (1978a; 1978b).  
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• Organizational Communication Scale (OCS) developed by Roberts and 
O’Reilly  (1974) 
• Communication Satisfaction Questionnaire (CSQ) developed by Downs and 
Hazen (1977). 
 
The main focus of the Organizational Communication Scale is on the quality of 
communication between the employee and the supervisor.  This includes many 
aspects of employment unrelated to the performance of required work, such as trust 
in the supervisor, career prospects, and reluctance to communicate information to 
others.  Similarly, the Communication Satisfaction Questionnaire is mainly 
concerned with examining inter-personal communication in the workplace, including 
such issues as trust, conflict, and motivation.  From the interviews, there was no 
indication that impediments to obtaining information originated from any of these 
dimensions of personal interactions.  While these are important issues in 
organisational communication, the difficulties for maintenance technicians appeared 
to stem from a variety of obstacles to information transfer from the various sources 
from which work-related information was generally acquired.  In contrast to the other 
instruments, the Organizational Communication Development Audit Questionnaire 
has items relating to overall satisfaction with the availability of information, as well 
as how much information is obtained from specific sources and the amount of work-
related information received.  Downs (2004) commented, “The OCD Audit 
Questionnaire is one of the most thoroughly worked out instruments for 
organizations” (p. 248).  Therefore, the OCD was deemed able to measure the 
characteristics of organisational communication alluded to in the interviews, and 
therefore the most suitable source for a communication scale for the Study 3 survey.     
 
The OCD was developed at the Research Institute for Business Economics (LTT) in 
Helsinki based on the original LTT Communication Audit (Wiio and Helsila, 1974).  
Wiio (1978a) then incorporated his Workshop Delphi procedure for auditing 
organisational communication, thereby creating two versions of the OCD, named 
OCD/1 and OCD/2.  In OCD/1, the Workshop Delphi auditing approach involves 
holding discussions with workgroups to identify organisational problems, and then 
developing a survey questionnaire based on the issues arising from these discussions 
(Greenbaum, Clampitt, & Willihnganz, 1988).  Study 3 in the current research used a 
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similar approach to OCD/1, in which interviews were used to identify the main 
problem areas, followed by a survey to obtain a more detailed understanding of the 
perceptions of participants.  Wiio (1978b) later refined and standardised the 
questionnaire to produce OCD/2, which uses 12 scales and 76 items to examine 
organisational communication.  Also included is a matrix of Topics of Information 
and Sources of Information with a request for the participant to nominate his or her 
preferred source for each topic.  The questionnaire results are presented to the 
organisation, and in turn provide the basis for conducting an OCD/1 Workshop 
Delphi audit (Greenbaum, Clampitt, & Willihnganz, 1988).  The standardised OCD/2 
audit questionnaire was used for the Organisational Communication scales in the 
Study 3 survey. 
 
7.1.3 Objective and hypotheses of Study 3 
The objective of Study 3 was to determine if higher and lower reliability work areas 
in the target organisation could be differentiated on the basis of perceptions of 
maintenance personnel concerning the human factors identified in Study 2.  The 
organisation has three types of facility (Gas Platforms, FPSOs, and the Gas Process 
Plant), and has access to personnel in three sites for each facility type.   
 
The specific hypotheses tested were:  
• H1: There is a significant difference in the perception of Problem-solving 
between higher, middle, and lower reliability work areas, across all facility 
types, with more reliable work areas showing higher scores on Problem-
solving.  
• H2: There is a significant difference in the perception of Vigilance between 
higher, middle, and lower reliability work areas across all facility types, 
with more reliable work areas showing higher scores on Vigilance. 
• H3:  There is a significant difference in the perception of Design & 
Maintenance between higher, middle, and lower reliability work areas, 
across all facility types, with more reliable work areas showing higher 
scores on Design & Maintenance. 
• H4: There is a significant difference in the perception of Organisational 
Communication between higher, middle, and lower reliability work areas, 
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across all facility types, with more reliable work areas showing higher 
scores on Organisational Communication. 
 
7.2 Method 
7.2.1 Experimental design 
The study utilised a 3x3 independent group design with Reliability (higher, middle, 
and lower) and Facility Type (FPSO, Gas Platform, and Process Plant) as 
independent variables (IVs), and Problem-solving, Vigilance, Design & 
Maintenance, and Organisational Communication as the dependent variables (DVs).   
 
7.2.2 Participants 
Participants were recruited from the following nine work locations: 
• The three existing Floating Production, Storage and Offloading (FPSO) facilities; 
• The three off-shore gas platforms that were operating at the start of the research. 
• Three distinct maintenance areas identified in the Gas Process Plant; 
 
All maintenance personnel (N=428), including maintenance technicians, 
coordinator/planners, and supervisors from the nine identified work areas were 
invited to participate.  At the request of the organisation, age and gender data was not 
collected, but organisational records showed that 97.0% of the production workforce 
was male, the range of ages was 22 to 66 years with a mean age of 42.3 years, and 
the mean time with the company was 6.6 years.  From the questionnaires distributed, 
178 completed forms were received, a response rate of 41.6%. 
 
7.2.3 Measures  
7.2.3.1 Problem-solving 
Problem-solving was measured using the Problem-solving scale in Morgeson and 
Humphrey’s (2006) Work Design Questionnaire (see Appendix E for a copy of this 
and other scales used in the study).  An example of an item in the scale is, “The job 
involves solving problems that have no obvious correct answer” (p.1338).  The 
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Convergent validity was demonstrated by Morgeson and Humphrey (2006) through 
convergence of their data with previously gathered information relating to job 
characteristics in the Occupational Information Network (O*NET) job database 
created by the U.S. Department of Labor (Peterson et al., 2001).  Discriminant 
validity of the WDQ was demonstrated by the ability to discriminate between 
occupational categories in O*NET on the basis of the scales in the WDQ.  They 
considered that construct validity was justified on the basis that the job 
characteristics expected in professional and non-professional job categories were 
differentiated by the data obtained using the WDQ.  The internal reliability 




Vigilance was measured using the Vigilance scale in the Melbourne Decision-
Making Questionnaire (Mann, Burnett, Radford, & Ford, 1997).  An example of an 
item in the Vigilance scale (Appendix E) is, “When making decisions I like to collect 
a lot of information.”  The response scale for the statements in the scale is:  0) 
Strongly Disagree 1) Disagree 2) Hard to Say 3) Agree 4) Strongly Agree. 
 
Mann et al considered that testing of the original Flinders DMQ confirmed the 
validity of Vigilance as one of the mechanisms of decision-making in their model 
based on Conflict Theory.  They conducted Confirmatory Factor Analysis on the 
scale items in order to revise the original Flinders Decision-Making Questionnaire.  
In a large study using the Melbourne Decision-Making Questionnaire (n=2018) the 
internal reliability for the Vigilance scale was found to be α= 0.80.  
 
7.2.3.3 Design & Maintenance 
Scale items for Design & Maintenance were constructed by re-wording the questions 
in HFIT to assess perceptions of maintenance personnel concerning the design and 
maintainability of their work area in general.  HFIT was validated in the context of a 
procedure for investigating incidents, as outlined in Section 4.2.2.  The inter-rater 
reliability (rwg =1) of the original factor in HFIT was based on all of the raters 
agreeing that the factor was not present in the accidents that they reviewed (Gordon, 
Flin, & Mearns, 2005).  Given that the Design & Maintenance scale has been 
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constructed for Study 3, its construct validity was assessed through an Exploratory 
Factor Analysis prior to its use in testing group differences.  The response scale for 
the questions regarding the Design & Maintenance scale were:  0) Never 1) Hardly 
Ever 2) Sometimes 3) Often 4) Always.  Questions 4-6 in this scale were reverse-
coded. 
 
7.2.3.4 Organisational communication 
The OCD/2 questionnaire was designed to measure the quality of work-related 
information from specific sources and on specific subjects.  The OCD/2 consists of 
12 scales concerning aspects of organisational communication and job satisfaction.  
Two scales were selected (Appendix E) from the OCD/2: 1) Amount of information 
from different sources and 2) Amount of information about different subjects (Wiio, 
1978a, p. 116).   
 
The OCD/2 scale concerning sources of information was selected because reports in 
Study 2 frequently mentioned poor communication from specific sources (e.g. 
engineers, vendors, procedures, and computer based sources).  This scale of the 
OCD/2 allows for one organisation-specific source, and this was assigned to 
‘vendors’ as they were specifically mentioned in the interviews as not providing 
sufficient information at times.  Four of the six items from the scale Amount of 
information from different sources refer to feed-back required for the person’s job.  
For example, one question asks, “How much information about your work do you get 
now from: Your Supervisor?”  The remaining items refer to sources of task-related 
information. 
 
The OCD/2 scale concerning subjects of information was selected as a number of 
failures in Study 2 related to information about workplace and task-related changes 
that were not communicated to the person, such as changes to equipment, 
connections, and procedures.  As an example, one of the five questions asks, “What 
is the amount of information you receive now about the following job items: 
Changes in procedures/New procedures.”  These two communication scales 
concerning sources of information and subjects of information had the response 
scale: 0) Very Little 1) Little 2) Hard to Say 3) Much 4) Very Much. 
 
  
                                                       Human Factors and Plant Maintenance Reliability 160 
In addition to the 12 scales mentioned, the OCD/2 also has a ‘global question’ for 
testing overall satisfaction with communication and information availability.  This 
item from the OCD that asks, “Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with communication 
and the availability of information in your organization?” was also included in the 
survey.  The response scale for this question was: 0) Very Dissatisfied 1) Dissatisfied 
2) Hard to Say 3) Satisfied 4) Very Satisfied. 
 
Validity and reliability assessments for the OCD/2 were included in the reviews 
mentioned above.  Greenbaum, Clampitt, and Willihnganz (1988) reported that 
reliability levels were determined for the LTT Organisational Communication Audit 
Questionnaire, the original version of the OCD/2.  Cronbach’s alpha was very high 
(α=0.97) across 58 items in the LTT.  Test-retest reliability was not measured.  
However, Aberg (1986) used the Source-to-Item Matrix of the OCD/2 to measure 
information seeking and communication structure patterns across 18 organisations in 
Finland.  He concluded that the significant correlations between OCD/2 measures of 
frequency of use of a particular information source and the perceived 
informativeness within the data from two companies, confirmed the criterion validity 
of the OCD/2.   
 
Greenbaum, Clampitt, and Willihnganz (1988) report that, as well as having high 
face validity, Wiio has used a number of methods to prove the construct validity of 
the questionnaire.  These included Factor Analysis (four factors accounted for 28% 
of the variance) and regression analysis (25 variables in the survey accounted for 
38% of the variance).  They also reported that while only Wiio’s research using the 
OCD/2 has been published in English, the OCD/2 has been used by other researchers 
in the United States and Australia.  
 
Downs (2004) also reviewed the OCD/2 and concluded that available reliability and 
validity data applied mainly to the LTT Communication Audit.  He also commented 
that “What is not clear, however, is how the OCD version was generated from the 
LTT” (p.248).  However, despite the uncertainty concerning validity of the scale 
structure, he considered that due to its thorough development, extensive use across 
different organisations, and the refinements applied based on experience, the OCD/2 
provided a “simple way of obtaining a lot of data about the organization” (p. 249).  
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As the reviews above indicated a degree of ambiguity in the scale structure of the 
OCD/2, an Exploratory Factor Analysis was conducted to test the structure of the 




The following demographic information was also measured: 
• Usual workplace (facility and work area) 
• Workgroup type (Core Crew, Shutdown Crew, or Major Maintenance) 
• Work category (Inlec/electrical or mechanical) 
• Length of time at their facility 
• Total time in the resource industry 
• Employing company (target company or contractor). 
 
In addition, space was provided for a response to an open-ended request for further 
information, “Please write any comments you have on what helps or gets in the way 
of maintenance work at [the company].”  An open-ended question was included to 
elicit the respondent’s perceptions of either the topics covered in the questionnaire, 
or topics that were not anticipated in the design of the questionnaire, but were 
considered by the participant to be relevant to his or her work (Chalton & O'Brien, 
2002).  A copy of the final form of the survey can be found in Appendix F. 
 
7.2.4 Procedure 
Ethical approval for the project was obtained (Appendix B) from the Human 
Research Ethics Committee of Curtin University of Technology (Approval number 
HR 147/2007).  Surveys and addressed reply-paid envelopes were sent to 
maintenance coordinators at each of the surveyed work areas.  A total of 373 surveys 
were sent by internal mail to maintenance coordinators for distribution.  An 
additional 55 surveys were printed and distributed on one of the FPSOs.  As a 
follow-up to the initial mail-out, an email message was sent to all identifiable 
maintenance personnel.  Respondents placed completed survey forms into individual 
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envelopes and returned them to the researcher via the company’s internal mail 
system.   
 
7.3 Results  
7.3.1 Data screening 
SPSS Version 17.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, USA) was used to analyse the data 
collected.  The numeric values of the Likert scales on the questionnaire ranged from 
0 to 4 and these were recoded into the dataset in the range 1 to 5, in keeping with 
SPSS convention.  The data from the comments sections were entered into a 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet for qualitative analysis in order to triangulate the data 
obtained from the quantitative analysis of item responses.  The qualitative analyses 
will be presented in Chapter 8. 
 
Of the 178 returned surveys, six were eliminated on the basis of having more than 
10% missing values.  Of the remaining surveys, three had two missing data points 
(6.6% missing values), and six had one missing data point (3.3% missing).  No 
particular pattern was apparent in the missing data, and so the missing values were 
determined to be ‘missing at random’ (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  The missing 
values were replaced by the series mean for that question (Allen & Bennett, 2008).  
A total of 172 valid surveys were retained for analysis. 
 
The maximum number of missing data points for a particular question was five 
(2.9% missing) for Question 22 (“How much information do you now get from staff 
meetings”), which was not sufficient to justify eliminating it from the analysis as a 
variable.   
 
On five surveys there were multiple responses to at least one of the questions.  All 
five were examined and showed a clear intention (e.g., one response was only half 
circled, or one response was an outlier in a series of similar responses) and therefore 
these values were entered.  The returned surveys were then examined for response 
sets.  Many of the surveys contained a series of similar responses, particularly in the 
Vigilance scale and the OCD-Sources of Information scale.  However, after 
examining the remaining scales, a diversity of answers to other questions was taken 
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as an indication that the respondent had considered the questions, and had arrived at 
the same response for these particular questions.   
 
7.3.2 Descriptive statistics 
7.3.2.1 Demographics of respondents 
Table 12 shows the frequency of responses across the nine work areas and the 
response rate by facility.  The Process Plant and gas platforms were equally 
represented, while the FPSOs were slightly under-represented.  A number of 
respondents indicated that they worked in more than one work area.  Thirty-nine 
respondents indicated that they worked across all areas of the Process Plant, and five 
respondents marked two of the gas platforms as their work areas.  These 44 
respondents were included in the scale validity tests, but omitted from the between-
groups analyses.  Due to the high number of personnel working across all areas of 
the Process Plant, only the overall response rate for the plant could be estimated.  In 
addition, the number of responses specifically from Process Plant 1 and Process Plant 
2 was low due the number of respondents from these areas who work in other areas 
as well.   
 
Table 12.  Frequency of survey responses and response rate for off-shore facilities 
and Process Plant work areas.  
Facility/Work Area Number of Responses Received 
Response Rate 
(%) 
Gas Platform 1 (GP1) 23 57.5 
Gas Platform 2 (GP2) 22 36.7 
Gas Platform 3 (GP3) 3 15.0 
Gas Platform 1 and 2 (GP1+2) 5  
   
FPSO 1 (FP1) 12 22.9 
FPSO 2 (FP2) 21 38.2 
FPSO 3 (FP3) 21 52.2 
   
Process Plant (Overall) 70 46.7 
Process Plant 1 (PP1) 8 N/A 
Process Plant 2 (PP2) 6 N/A 
Process Plant 3 (PP3) 17 N/A 
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The distribution of respondents by work category (Figure 8) indicated a higher 
proportion of mechanical maintenance personnel than Inlec/electrical, reflecting the 
greater numbers of mechanical maintainers employed by the company.  The response 
from the different work areas was relatively consistent, with the exception of 






























Figure 8.  Frequency distribution of respondents by work category. 
 
The distribution of respondents by work group type (Figure 9) indicated that most 
respondents (68.6%) worked in the Core Crews based at the facilities, rather than in 
the Major Maintenance (16.3%) and Shutdown Crews (6.4%) that are based at head 
office and sent to the facilities as required.  A high proportion of the Major 


































Figure 9.  Distribution of respondents by work group type.  
 
The frequency of responses by employer (Figure 10) indicated that 65.7% of 
respondents were employed by the target company, and 34.3% of were employed by 
outside contractors.  Of the contractors, most were working in Gas Platform 2 (19%) 
and Process Plant-All Areas (60.3%).  Of the respondents from Process Plant-All 





























Figure 10.  Frequency of responses by employer. 
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Figure 11 shows the distribution of respondents’ time worked at their current facility.  
Most respondents (36.0%) had worked at their facility for 3-10 years, with 17.6% 
working there for over 10 years and 2.9% under 3 months. 
 
Similarly, the frequency of responses by tenure in the resource industry (Figure 12) 
indicated long service times in the industry.  Most respondents (61%) had worked in 
the industry for over 10 years, with 28.5% working there for 3- 10 years and 
relatively few (0.6%) under 3 months. 
 
Apart from the exceptions noted above, the respondents to the survey generally 
formed a representative sample of the population of maintenance personnel across 
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Figure 12.  Frequency of respondents’ time in the resource industry.  
 
7.3.3 Factor validity 
The Design & Maintenance section had been developed from HFIT and therefore the 
factor structure needed testing to ensure that the scale was uni-dimensional and 
internally consistent.  An Exploratory Factor Analysis was conducted on the dataset 
of responses to identify the underlying factor structure.  The Organisational 
Communication scales of the survey were constructed from the previously developed 
and validated scales of the OCD/2.  However, due to ambiguity described in the 
literature relating to the factor structure of the OCD/2, relative to the earlier LTT 
Communication Audit, it was considered that an Exploratory Factor Analysis of the 
OCD/2 was also advisable. 
 
The Design & Maintenance and Organisational Communication items in the 
screened dataset were subjected to two separate Factor Analyses.  Principal Axis 
Factoring (PAF) was applied as there were expected to be theoretical as well as 
empirical associations between variables.  Although a sample size of 300 is 
considered “comforting” by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007, p.613), they advised that a 
sample of 150 would be sufficient if loadings were high (>.80), particularly on so-
called ‘marker variables’.  The sample size (N= 172) met their criterion for 
factorability, though the occurrence of many cross-factor loadings meant that most 
loadings did not satisfy their recommendation.  Another requirement for Factor 
Analysis is independence of measurements.  Questionnaires were completed 
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independently and therefore fulfil this requirement.  Testing of the assumptions of 
normality, linearity and multicollinearity, and assessment of factorability criteria, are 
provided for the Design & Maintenance scale in Appendix G, and for the 
Organisational Communication scales in Appendix H.  As indicated, several 
violations of these assumptions were encountered in the dataset, but Factor Analysis 
is considered robust with regard to violations of these assumptions (Allen & Bennett, 
2008).   
 
The results of the respective Exploratory Factor Analyses are also provided in these 
appendices.  Appendix G provides the results of PAF with Varimax Rotation 
conducted on the Design & Maintenance items.  The analysis showed that two 
factors had Eigenvalues above 1.0, but that there were significant cross-loadings of 
items onto both factors.  A one-factor solution provided the best internal reliability 
(Cronbach’s α=.729), as reliability decreased with the removal of any item.  
Therefore, a decision was made to treat the Design & Maintenance scale as 
measuring a single variable for the purposes of further analyses.  The total variance 
explained by this variable was 34.8%.   
 
Appendix H provides the results of PAF with Varimax Rotation conducted on the 
items in the communication section of the survey.  Factor Analysis revealed a four-
factor solution; however some items loaded onto multiple factors or none of the 
factors.  Removal of these items suggested a two-factor solution.  The first factor 
(Items 19, 20, 22 and 26) pertained to information from either the organisation or the 
person’s supervisor about his or her work, and was named Job-related feedback.  The 
total variance explained by this variable was 15.3%.  The second factor was derived 
from items 27-30.  As these items pertained to the amount of information received 
concerning organisational changes, it was named Information about change.  The 
total variance explained by this variable was 14.5%.   
 
7.3.3.1 Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables 
Descriptive statistics were derived from the recoded dataset of 172 valid 
questionnaires.  Statistical values were calculated for each scale (Table 13).  The 
scoring range for all items was from 1 (most negative) to 5 (most positive).  Values 
for mean and skewness were highest for items in the Vigilance scale, indicating a 
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tendency to more positive self-reports regarding the person’s approach to analysing 
tasks.  Means were lowest, with relatively high standard deviations, for Information 
about change and Problem-solving.    
 
Table 13.  Descriptive Statistics for variable means from the survey resultsa.   
Variable Name Min. Max. Mean S.D. Skewness Kurtosis 
Problem-solving 1.50 4.75 3.04 .63 .10 -.56 
Vigilance 3.17 5.00 4.15 .38 .43 .15 
Design & Maintenanceb 1.88 4.50 3.38 .42 -.11 .77 
Job-related feedback 1.00 5.00 3.24 .74 -.27 .05 
Information about change 1.25 5.00 3.03 .75 .17 -.31 
a Possible range for all scales = 1 to 5 
b Scale for this variable includes reverse-coded items. 
 
Table 14 shows the means and standard deviations for each scale in each of the nine 
work areas.  Vigilance was found to be consistently high among all work areas, while 
the Organisational Communication scales (Information about change and Job-
related feedback) were lower in the Process Plant. 
Table 14.  Variable means (standard deviations) arranged by facility.  
 Problem-
solving  
  M      SD 
Vigilance 
  
  M SD 
Design & 
Maintenance 
  M  SD 
Job-related 
feedback 
 M  SD 
Information 
about change 
 M  SD 
GP1 3.06  (.61) 4.23    (.45) 3.34 (.51) 3.26 (.67) 3.12     (.66) 
GP2 3.10  (.58) 4.10    (.40) 3.39 (.39) 3.44 (.63) 3.00     (.58) 
GP3 3.08  (.63) 4.22    (.69) 3.25 (.38) 3.00 (.66) 3.42   (1.23) 
FP1 3.09  (.70) 4.30    (.45) 3.70 (.32) 3.34 (.53) 3.23    (.68) 
FP2 2.87  (.54) 4.19    (.42) 3.58 (.33) 3.17 (.99) 3.29    (.96) 
FP3 3.40  (.64) 4.18    (.42) 3.17 (.51) 3.18 (.82) 3.12    (.58) 
PP1 2.91  (.76) 4.15    (.38) 3.31 (.31) 3.00 (.85) 2.75    (.64) 
PP2 2.90  (.34) 4.17    (.37) 3.30 (.26) 2.95 (.60) 2.85    (.58) 
PP3 3.13  (.67) 4.14    (.32) 3.34 (.26) 2.75 (.80) 2.66    (.83) 
PP-All 
Areas 2.94  (.60) 4.07  (.29) 3.41 (.45) 3.52     (.59) 2.96    (.81) 
 
Table 15 shows the correlation matrix for the five dependent variables derived from 
the survey data, and the demographic variables Time at Facility, Time in Industry, 
and Employer.  Time at Facility showed a significant negative correlation with 
Design & Maintenance.  Employer showed a positive correlation with Job-related 
  
                                                       Human Factors and Plant Maintenance Reliability 170 
feedback.  These significant correlations between demographic variables and the 
independent variables in the study indicate that the demographic variables should be 
treated as covariates in the relevant analyses. 
 
Table 15.  Correlation matrix for the five dependent variables and three demographic 
variables in the final factor structure. 
 PS V  D&M JRF IAC TaF TiI Emp 
Problem-solving  .675 -  - - - - - 
Vigilance  .044 .785  - - - - - 
Design & Maintenance -.358** .159* .729      
Job-related feedback  .013 .176* .327** .742 - - - - 
Information about change -.089 .192* .344** .500** .724 - - - 
Time at Facility -.056 -.022 -.199** -.092 .007  - - 
Time in Industry -.038 .017 -.084 -.125 .015 .404**  - 
Employer -.056 -.076 .166 .371** .096 -.155* -.231**  
Cronbach’s α for each scale are shown on the diagonal 
** Correlation was significant at the 0.01 level  
*   Correlation was significant at the 0.05 level   
 
7.3.4 Hypothesis testing 
Between-group analyses were conducted to determine if significant differences 
existed between work areas.  The planned analyses were a series of 3 x 3 (two-way) 
analyses of variance (ANOVA) with the independent variables based on a three-level 
ranking of reliability (lowest, middle, and highest) across three different facility 
types (FPSO, Gas Platform, and the Process Plant) using the dependent variables 
(DVs) derived from the survey measures.  However, an insufficient or unequal 
number of returned questionnaires from several work areas (Table 12) meant that one 
of the gas platforms, and the Process Plant work areas could not be used for this 
analysis.  The facilities with suitable numbers of completed questionnaires allowed 2 
x 2 two-way ANOVAs (i.e., two reliability levels in FPSOs and gas platforms), and 1 
x 3 one-way ANOVAs (i.e., three reliability levels across FPSOs), using each of the 
five measures as DVs.   
 
In the two-way ANOVAs, the gas platforms Gas Platform 1 and Gas Platform 2 were 
used, as the number of responses from Gas Platform 3 was low (n=3).  The FPSOs 
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FPSO 2 and FPSO 3 were selected for the two-way ANOVAs, as the numbers of 
responses were similar (n=21 for both), and higher than FPSO 1 (n=12).  However, 
this meant that the medium and high reliability gas platforms were compared to the 
low and medium FPSOs.  As the rankings were relative, and the facilities sufficiently 




A two-way Between-Groups ANOVA was used to compare the responses to the 
items in the problem-solving scale at two reliability levels (termed Lower and Higher 
Reliability) and for two facility types (FPSOs and gas platforms).  A Shapiro-Wilk 
Test for normality and Levene’s Test for the homogeneity of variance were 
conducted (Appendix I).  The assumptions of normality and homogeneity were not 
violated. 
 
The main effect of Reliability Level on Problem-solving was found to be significant 
F(1,82)= 5.17, p=.026, partial η2=.059.  Respondents from the lower reliability 
facilities expressed more agreement with items referring to requirements for 
Problem-solving than from higher reliability facilities (Figure 13).  Partial η2 
indicated that Reliability Level accounted for 5.9% of variance, considered a medium 
effect size.  The main effect of Facility Type was not significant, F (1,82) = 3.194, 
p=.660, partial η2 = .002.  The interaction between Reliability Level and Facility 

































Figure 13. The effect of Reliability Level on scores for Problem-solving. 
 
A one-way Between-Groups ANOVA was used to compare the responses to the 
items in the Problem-solving scale in FPSOs at three reliability levels.  The 
assumptions of normality and homogeneity were not violated (Appendix I).  A 
significant main effect from the ANOVA indicated that the three FPSOs differed on 
the Problem-solving scale, F (2,50) = 3.98, p=.025.  Partial η2 = .137 indicated that 
13.7% of the variance in Problem-solving scores was due to Reliability Level.  Post-
hoc analyses using Tukey’s Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) at α=.05 showed 
that the FPSO with the middle reliability level had significantly lower scores than the 
FPSO with the lowest reliability level (p=.019), but that with the highest reliability 
was not significantly different to either of the other facilities. 
 
7.3.4.2 Vigilance 
A two-way Between-Groups ANOVA was conducted to compare the responses to 
the items in the Vigilance scale at two reliability levels and for two facility types 
(FPSOs and gas platforms).  The assumption of normality appeared to be violated 
(Appendix I) for the items in the Vigilance scale, as the Shapiro-Wilk Test returned a 
significant statistic (p<.05) for data from both lower and higher reliability facilities.  
Due to the sensitivity of the Shapiro-Wilk Test, a further test of normality was 
recommended (Allen & Bennett, 2008), which requires examining the skewness and 
kurtosis of the distribution.  For all of the scale items, the skewness and kurtosis 
statistics were acceptable, i.e., between -1 and +1.  A Levene’s Test on the data 
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returned a non-significant value, demonstrating that the assumption of homogeneity 
of variance was not violated. 
 
The results of the two-way ANOVA showed no significant effect of Reliability Level 
on Vigilance, F (1,82) = .56, p=.457, partial η2 = .007, and no significant effect of 
Facility Type on Vigilance, F (1,82) = .065, p=.799, partial η2 = .001.  In addition, no 
interaction effect between Reliability Level and Facility Type was observed, F (1,82) 
= .45, p=.504, partial η2 = .005. 
 
A one-way Between-Groups ANOVA was used to compare the responses to the 
items in the Vigilance scale in FPSOs at three reliability levels.  The assumptions of 
normality and homogeneity were not violated (Appendix I).  A non-significant result 
from the ANOVA indicated that there was no significant effect of Reliability Level 
on Vigilance in FPSOs, F (2,50) = .34, p=.717, partial η2 = .013. 
 
7.3.4.3 Design & Maintenance 
A significant correlation was found (Table 15) between Design & Maintenance and 
Time at Facility.  Between-groups Analyses of Covariance (ANCOVA) were 
therefore conducted using Time at Facility as a covariate to compare groups based on 
Reliability Level and Facility Type.  Shapiro-Wilk Tests were conducted and found to 
support the assumption of normality, with the exception of data from FP1.  However 
skewness and kurtosis data confirmed an approximately normal distribution, i.e., 
within the range -1 to +1.  Levene’s Tests confirmed that the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance was not violated.  In addition, the assumption of linearity 
between the covariate and the dependent variable was tested using a graphical 
analysis technique recommended by Allen and Bennett (2008, pp. 130-132).  
Linearity was observed between Design & Maintenance and Time at Facility in a 
scatterplot (Figure 24).  Testing for homogeneity of regression slopes (Appendix I) is 
an additional assumption test for ANCOVAs.  The results of the test showed a non-
significant interaction between Reliability Level (IV) and Time at Facility (covariate) 
in the two-way data, indicating that this assumption was not violated.  However, the 
assumption was violated in the one-way data.  Care is therefore recommended (Allen 
and Bennett, 2008) when interpreting the results of the one-way ANCOVA. 
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A two-way ANCOVA was conducted to compare the effect of Reliability Level and 
Facility Type on Design & Maintenance scores.  Time at Facility was included as the 
covariate to control for the effect of the length of time that the respondent spent at his 
or her facility.  The ANCOVA indicated that Reliability Level was not found to have 
a significant main effect on Design & Maintenance, F(1, 80)=2.371 p=.128, partial 
η2=.029.  Time at Facility was also not found to be significantly related to Design & 
Maintenance, F(1, 80)=.578, p=.449, partial η2=.007.  However, there was a 
significant interaction between Reliability Level and Facility Type, F(1, 80)=4.973 
p=.029, partial η2=.059, a medium effect size.  Consequently, simple effects analyses 
were conducted to investigate this interaction.  The analyses showed that 
respondent’s agreement with Design & Maintenance items increased significantly 
with higher Reliability Level on FPSOs, F(1, 80)=48.11 p<.01, but not on gas 
platforms, F(1, 80)=.116, ns. 
 
A one-way ANCOVA was conducted to compare the effect of Reliability Level 
among FPSOs on Design & Maintenance scores, with Time at Facility as a covariate.  
After controlling for the Time at Facility, Reliability Level for FPSOs was found to 
have a significant effect on perceptions of Design & Maintenance, F(2, 49)=6.71, 
p=.003, partial η2=.215.  Reliability Level accounted for 21.5% of the variance, a 
large effect size.  Post hoc analyses conducted on pairs of FPSO work areas indicated 
that the scores for Design & Maintenance from the lowest and highest reliability 
work areas were significantly different, and from the lowest and middle reliability 
work areas were just out of the 95% confidence interval (Figure 14).  The difference 
in scores between middle and highest reliability FPSO work areas was not 
significant. 
 
Despite the violation of the assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes, the 
results for the one-way ANCOVA were supported by the two-way ANCOVA, 
namely that there is a significant effect of Reliability Level on Design & 
Maintenance for the FPSOs. 
 
  







































Figure 14. Effect of FPSO reliability level on reliability work areas Design & 
Maintenance.  ANCOVA was evaluated at Time at Facility= .49. 
 
7.3.4.4 Job-related feedback 
A significant correlation was found (Table 15) between Job-related Feedback and 
Employer.  Figure 15 shows the relationship between Employer and Job-related 
feedback for facilities in the analysis.  Between-groups Analyses of Covariance 
(ANCOVA) were therefore conducted using Employer as a covariate to compare 
groups based on Reliability Level and Facility Type.  Shapiro-Wilk Tests were 
conducted and found to support the assumption of normality.  Levene’s Tests 
confirmed that the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not violated.  In 
addition, the assumption of linearity between the covariate and the dependent 
variable was tested using a graphical analysis technique recommended by Allen and 
Bennett (2008, pp. 130-132).  Linearity was assessed based on a scatterplot of Job-
related Feedback and Employer in (Figure 25).  The assumption of homogeneity of 
regression slopes was also tested (Appendix I).  The results of the test showed a non-
significant interaction between Reliability Level (IV) and Employer (covariate) in the 
one-way and two-way data, indicating that this assumption was not violated. 
 
  


































Figure 15.  Mean differences between company and contractor on Job-related 
feedback. 
 
A two-way ANCOVA was conducted to compare the effect of Reliability Level and 
Facility Type on Job-related feedback scores.  Employer was included as the 
covariate to control for differences between company employees and contractors.  
The ANCOVA indicated that Reliability Level was not found to have a significant 
main effect on respondent’s perceptions of Job-related feedback, F(1, 78)=.106, 
p=.746, partial η2=.001.  No significant interaction was observed between Reliability 
Level and Facility Type, F(1, 78)=.002, p=.965, partial η2=.000.   
 
A one-way ANCOVA was conducted to compare the effect of Reliability Level on 
Job-related feedback scores in FPSOs.  Employer was included as the covariate to 
control for differences between company employees and contractors.  The ANCOVA 
indicated that Reliability Level was not found to have a significant effect on Job-
related feedback, F(2,46)=.626, p=.539, partial η2=.026.  
 
7.3.4.5 Information about change  
A two-way Between-groups ANOVA was conducted to compare the responses to the 
Information about change scale at two reliability levels and for two facility types.  
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To determine the suitability of the data for analysis of variance, a Shapiro-Wilk Test 
for normality and Levene’s Test for the homogeneity of variance were conducted 
(Appendix I).  The assumption of normality was not violated, but the assumption of 
homogeneity was violated for the two-way data.  Allen and Bennett (Allen & 
Bennett, 2008) do not consider this a concern when groups are equal in size and are 
moderately large. 
 
The results of the two-way ANOVA showed no significant main effect of Reliability 
Level on perceptions of Information about change, F (1,82) = .860, p=.356, partial η2 
= .010.  No interaction effect between Reliability Level and Facility Type was 
observed, F (1,82) = .026, p=.873, partial η2 = .000. 
 
A one-way Between-groups ANOVA was used to compare the responses to the items 
in the Information about change scale across FPSOs at three reliability levels.  The 
result of the ANOVA indicated that there was no significant main effect of 
Reliability Level on perceptions of Information about change, F (2,50) = .249, 
p=.780, partial η2 = .010. 
 
7.4 Discussion  
Study 3 was designed to test the hypotheses that there are significant differences in 
the perceptions of Problem-solving, Vigilance, Design & Maintenance, and 
Organisational Communication between lower, middle, and higher reliability work 
areas, across all facility types.  The results of the Study 3 survey demonstrated that 
significant group differences between work areas existed in the responses to 
Problem-solving and Design & Maintenance items, but not the other variables.  H3 
was supported, and H1 was partially supported, but the direction was reversed from 
that which was expected.  H2 and H4 were not supported. 
 
7.4.1 Validity of the dependent variables 
Reliability testing confirmed acceptable (α>.72) internal reliability levels (Table 15) 
for all variables except Problem-solving (α=.675).  An Exploratory Factor Analysis 
of Design & Maintenance items found that the highest internal reliability (α=.729) 
was obtained when all items from the original scale were included in a single 
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variable.  This supported the contention that a single construct was being measured.  
A Factor Analysis of the communication items from the OCD/2 indicated that most 
of these items loaded onto two factors, which were named Job-related feedback 
(JRF) and Information about change (IAC) based on commonalities between the 
items in each scale.  JRF concerned individual-level information specific to the 
person’s own work, originating from supervisor’s and staff meetings, as well as a 
general level of satisfaction with information availability.  Information about change 
concerned information about workgroup and organisational level changes, as well as 
training.  The items in these two variables were similar to those in the OCD/2 scales, 
providing confidence in the consistency of the original scales.   
 
Overall, the variances accounted for in the factor structure were low, particularly for 
the communication variables, Job-related feedback (15.3%) and Information about 
change (14.5%).  This was partly due to a complicated factor structure, consisting of 
a number of cross-loadings.  Further research is needed to design an instrument for 
organisational communication which measures the quality of communication and 
information flow that is specific to heavy industry and off-shore environments, as 
distinct from office and factory environments.  Some understanding of these different 




Based on the recurrence of assumptions identified in Study 2 failures, Problem-
solving was a construct that was expected to differentiate groups based on relative 
reliability.  The four items used to measure Problem-solving were taken from the 
Work Design Questionnaire (Morgeson & Humphrey, 2006).  The intent was to 
measure the underlying contributors to assumptions made in the course of finding 
solutions to equipment requiring repairs.  The items in this scale measure perceptions 
of the tasks that are typically confronted in maintenance work; namely, task 
situations that are likely to lead to reliance on assumptions rather than accurate 
information.  For example, questions enquire whether the person’s job involves 
problems not encountered before, problems with no obvious correct answer, or 
problems requiring unique ideas or solutions.  Additionally there is an item asking 
whether the job requires creativity.  Agreement does not automatically imply that 
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assumptions will be made, but that tasks may entail additional problem-solving 
behaviours and skills on the part of the respondent.  
 
A significant relationship between Problem-solving and reliability level was 
observed in both the one-way and two-way (Figure 13) ANOVAs.  In the one-way 
ANOVA, a large effect (14% of variance) was attributable to Problem-solving, with 
a Post-hoc analysis indicating that the difference between the lowest and middle 
reliability work areas was significant.  In both the one-way (FPSOs) and two-way 
analyses (FPSOs and gas platforms), the slopes were negative, demonstrating that 
lower reliability was associated with agreement with statements about dealing with 
problems not encountered before or having no obvious answer, and the need for 
unique ideas and creativity.  Based on human factors literature (Section 2.9.5), it was 
expected that personnel in higher reliability work areas would be more cognisant of 
acquiring and utilising problem-solving skills; that is, awareness of problem-solving 
requirements would be predictive of better outcomes from maintenance activities.   
 
The significant results from the ANOVAs for the FPSOs partially supported 
Hypothesis H1, that is, that there are differences in perceptions of Problem-solving 
between work areas, based on reliability level.  However, the Problem-solving 
measure was found to be negatively related to reliability performance as experienced 
by maintenance personnel.  This finding demonstrated that there is, in fact, a greater 
perceived requirement for problem-solving skills in a lower reliability work area.  
With increased reliability, the experience of no obvious solutions to problems, a need 
for unique solutions, and dealing with problems not encountered previously was 
observed to decrease.  While it is difficult to assign causality from the results of the 
ANOVA, it might be inferred from the analysis results that lower work area 
reliability is predictive of a requirement for more frequent problem-solving 
behaviours.  This contention is supported by the significant negative correlation of 
Problem-solving with Design & Maintenance (Table 15).  An association between 
the need for problem-solving skills and an awareness of the inadequacies of technical 
designs and maintainability is logical.  These findings might indicate a moderating 
role for problem-solving skills in the relationship between reliability, and design and 
maintainability.  If this is the case, the Problem-solving variable might provide a 
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measure of the importance of this moderating function.  Further research would be 
required to test for such a moderating role. 
 
7.4.3 Vigilance 
The Vigilance scale from the Melbourne Decision-making Questionnaire (Mann, 
Burnett, Radford, & Ford, 1997) was also used to measure contributors to 
assumptions.  It contained items such as “I like to consider all of the alternatives.”  
The Vigilance scale was selected to test the characteristics of the workplace climate 
that promote methodicalness, or conversely could potentially provoke assumptions.  
Overall, the responses (Table 13) to the items in the Vigilance scale, were more 
positive (M=4.15) and uniform (SD=.38) than the other variables, indicating that 
most maintenance personnel generally consider themselves vigilant in the decision-
making related to their tasks.  This appeared to be relatively consistent across all 
work areas (Table 14), which may be the reason that no significant group differences 
based on reliability level were observed in the ANOVA.  Hypothesis H2 was 
therefore not supported.  This may indicate that Vigilance is not a group-level 
dimension; rather that it is more characteristic of organisational-level climate in a 
company (Reiman, Oedewald & Rollenhagen, 2005), or individual-level personality 
trait (Mann et al, 1997), than an indicator of workgroup performance.  Alternatively, 
the challenges of problem-solving may be more closely associated with reliability 
than vigilance in decision-making, as appears to be the case among service 
workgroups, such as nurses (Edmondson, 1996; Tucker, Edmondson, & Spear, 2002) 
and factory workers (MacDuffie, 1997).  The relative importance of decision-making 
and problem-solving to maintenance personnel will be further explored in Chapter 8. 
 
7.4.4 Design & Maintenance  
The investigation questions for the Design & Maintenance code in HFIT were not 
designed as a survey scale and hence their use in this study required validating.  
However, the internal consistency (α=.729) of the loadings onto this variable support 
the contention that a single construct was being measured.  Construct validity of the 
Design & Maintenance scale items was derived from the responses arising in the 
interviews in Study 2, which related to perceptions about the role of plant design and 
lack of maintenance in failures experienced.  Plant design related to the 
maintainability of equipment, such as the adequacy of the structure, parts, and 
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labelling, as well as the ease of installing parts, all of which would be expected to 
influence reliability (Wani & Gandhi, 1999). 
 
In the one-way analysis of covariance of scores from FPSOs (Section 7.3.4.3), work 
areas could be significantly differentiated on the basis of Design & Maintenance.  In 
this analysis, after controlling for the effect of Time at Facility, a large effect 
accounting for 21.5% of variance was observed with significant differences between 
the lowest and highest reliability work areas, and differences just outside the 95% 
confidence limit between the lowest and middle reliability work areas (Figure 14).  
These results indicated that the respondents from higher reliability work areas 
expressed greater agreement with items relating to the design and maintenance of 
their work areas, supporting Hypothesis H3.  In the two-way ANCOVA, a significant 
interaction effect was found between facility type and reliability level.  Simple 
effects analyses indicated a significant relationship between reliability level and 
Design & Maintenance scores for the FPSOs, but not the gas platforms.       
 
An association between plant design and reliability is well-accepted in engineering 
literature (Bea, 1998; Taylor, 2007).  As well, the concept of maintainability based 
on objective measures of the ease of maintaining equipment has often been 
acknowledged in the engineering domain (Mason, 1990; Sharma & Kumar, 2008; 
Tjiparuro & Thompson, 2004; Wani & Gandhi, 1999).  The results of this study 
demonstrated that a measure of the respondents’ perceptions could distinguish 
between work areas on the basis of reliability level.  In reviewing the literature, the 
issue of perceptions of plant maintainability and condition are given less prominence 
than engineering measures of maintenance productivity (Lofsten, 2000).  In 
Lofsten’s review, assessments of plant maintenance needs were almost universally 
based on productivity and cost considerations.  However, the innate understanding of 
maintenance technicians of the condition of their workplace was borne out by the 
significant association between responses to the Design & Maintenance scale and 
reliability level in data from both the one-way and two-way analyses.  As Cooke 
(2002) contends, maintenance technicians working with, and in physical proximity 
to, equipment “may be able to contribute far more to the success of the business than 
they are currently doing” (p. 968).  This would certainly be the case if, as the analysis 
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indicates, maintenance technicians can assess the state of their plant and its 
requirements with a degree of accuracy. 
 
The importance of experience in comprehending plant maintenance condition was 
further supported by the significant effect of Time at Facility on scores for Design & 
Maintenance.  Understanding of the correct operation of processes in the workplace 
would be expected to develop over time and with experience, though this is not often 
recognised by organisations (Cooke, 2002).  Time in one’s facility would influence 
perceptions of most human factors relating to a person’s workplace, but particularly 
issues of maintainability for maintenance personal whose principal task is to ensure 
that equipment operates as required.  Recognising the deficiencies in the 
maintainability of equipment is a factor that would be more apparent as workplace 
knowledge increases over time (Pettersen & Aase, 2007), as demonstrated by the 
negative relationship found between Design & Maintenance and Time at Facility 
(Table 15).  Responses to this variable therefore appeared to be sensitive to an 
increased awareness among participants developed through their experience over 
time.  The average age of the workforce was relatively high (M= 42.3 years) and so 
this effect may not be as apparent in a younger, less-experienced workforce. 
 
In addition to Time at Facility, as discussed above, significant correlations were 
observed (Table 15) between responses to the Design & Maintenance items and 
several other variables.  The correlation with Problem-solving was negative, 
indicating that negative perceptions of plant design and maintainability were 
associated with a greater requirement for problem-solving, such as when facing new 
problems and problems with no obvious answer.  Correlations with Vigilance, Job-
related feedback, and Information about change were significant, demonstrating the 
influence of workplace design on various dimensions of the maintenance workplace, 
such as Methodicalness described by Oedewald and Reiman (2002) and 
Organisational Communication (Bourrier, 2005). 
 
7.4.5 Organisational communication  
Job-related feedback and Information about change contained items extracted 
through a Factor Analysis of the scales in the OCD/2 instrument (Wiio, 1978a).  The 
four items that loaded onto Job-related feedback concerned the respondents’ 
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perception of the overall level of communication in the organisation, as well as 
specific job-related information from supervisors and staff meetings.  The four items 
that loaded onto Information about change concerned the respondent’s perception of 
the amount of communication received relating to changes in production, procedures, 
and the organisation itself.  An additional item, relating to information about training 
also loaded onto this factor.  There was a strong relationship between Job-related 
feedback and Information about change as shown by the significant correlation 
between them (Table 15).  A significant positive correlation was also noted between 
the two communication variables and Design & Maintenance.  In the case of Job-
related feedback, these attitudes were also found to be significantly correlated with 
Employer (company employee vs. contractor).  Information about change had the 
lowest mean for any variable (Table 13) and the second highest standard deviation of 
the variables, indicating a lower satisfaction with organisational information, 
accompanied by a broader range of views. 
 
The ANCOVA conducted on Job-related feedback and the ANOVA conducted on 
Information about change did not indicate significant group differences between 
high and low reliability work areas.  Therefore, Hypothesis H4 was not supported.  
From these results, despite the prominent role played by Communication as a 
contributor to Study 2 failures, it did not appear that organisational communication 
was directly related to reliability level as tested in Study 3.  The implication is that 
communication between individuals has a role in the avoidance of failures, but not a 
direct influence on reliability in terms of day-to-day activities.  The reason for the 
absence of an observed effect may lie in the nature of organisational communication.  
A lack of communication in the workplace can be expected to increase the potential 
for a system failure, and consequently teams in HROs were observed to rely on 
nearly-continuous communication (Rochlin, 1999).  However, from the findings of 
Study 3, the routine performance of maintenance tasks appeared to be hindered less 
by poor communication than by other factors, such as plant design and problem-
solving requirements.  Effective communication is known to reduce the level of 
uncertainty between team members (Sasou & Reason, 1999) and improve team 
efficiencies (Zohar & Luria, 2003a), but might not have a significant impact on 
overall group effectiveness.  From this point of view, poor communication is likely 
  
                                                       Human Factors and Plant Maintenance Reliability 184 
to increase the difficulty of tasks, but might not greatly influence outcomes, other 
than as a co-contributor to a multi-factor failure.   
 
An alternative explanation for the absence of a significant effect on reliability may be 
that the direct effect of communication on maintenance processes may not be 
detectable with the measures used.  In a study of military communication (O'Reilly & 
Roberts, 1977), communication variables (i.e. accuracy and openness) were not 
found to have a straightforward effect on organisational performance, but rather were 
part of a process that mediated between group structures and organisational 
effectiveness.  In that study, existing group structures were found to have a 
significant effect on communication measures, and in turn it was considered that 
performance affected communication.  Other factors may have an important 
influence on communication, as demonstrated by the significant correlations between 
Job-related feedback and Design & Maintenance, Vigilance, and Employer, and so 
might mask a direct relationship between communication and reliability.  As such, it 
may be difficult to measure directly the influence of communication on plant 
maintenance performance without controlling for a range of latent and demographic 
factors.  For example, a significant relationship was found between perceptions of 
Job-related Feedback and Employer as a covariate with Reliability Level (Figure 15), 
indicating that this influence on organisational communication can vary from 
company to company.  In the next chapter, the analysis of the comments section of 
the survey may assist in resolving the issues concerning the role of communication in 
the effectiveness of maintenance activities. 
 
7.4.6 Limitations of the study 
The lack of significant results supporting H2 and H4 may have been due to the 
absence of group level effects, as described above, or due to the presence of 
confounding effects that mask direct relationships between reliability level and the 
dependant variables.  Other reasons for the absence of significant relationships 
between reliability level and the dependant variables are also considered below, 
including the properties of the measures and the samples used in Study 3. 
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7.4.6.1 Measures 
The measures used were selected to test the factors identified in Study 2.  Where 
possible, they were selected from those available in the literature that were validated 
and tested for internal consistency.  The measures for Problem-solving and Vigilance 
had undergone extensive testing (Mann, Burnett, Radford, & Ford, 1997; Morgeson 
& Humphrey, 2006).  Problem-solving showed a significant relationship to reliability 
level, but Vigilance scores did not differentiate lower and higher reliability work 
areas.  The wording of items in the Vigilance scale could be improved to be more 
sensitive to group differences.  For example, the items in the scale produced a 
uniformly positive response (M=4.15, SD =.382), offering little basis for between-
group differentiation.  An approach that might generate a greater diversity of 
responses would require re-phrasing the items from individual-level statements to 
workgroup-level statements.  As an example, Item 18 would become, “Members of 
my workgroup take a lot of care before choosing how to do a job (Agree/Disagree).”  
In addition to realigning these items with the workgroup level, respondents may be 
better able to assess their team’s shared mental models more accurately than their 
own behaviour (Mathieu, Goodwin, Heffner, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000).  Re-
phrasing the wording of items to match the descriptions of assumptions in Study 2 
may also improve the sensitivity of the measure.  
  
Confounding effects may also have been a factor in the lack of significant results for 
Vigilance.  Vigilance, which is similar to Methodicalness in the Maintenance Core 
Task model (Oedewald & Reiman, 2002), is one of several dimensions that 
contribute to the quality of decision-making in maintenance activities.  It is possible 
that Vigilance is moderated by these other dimensions of the maintenance task, and 
that the selected measure was therefore not sensitive enough to differentiate between 
groups without controlling for these complex interactions in decision-making. 
 
Construct validity was a concern with the Design & Maintenance scale.  No 
validated instrument for perceptions of plant maintainability and maintenance 
condition could be identified in the literature.  The questions in HFIT were intended 
for incident investigation and so validation would need to be done to increase 
confidence that the constructs of plant maintainability and maintenance condition 
were being measured.  The relatively high loadings for individual items and the 
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internal reliability (α=.729) obtained from Factor Analysis indicated the potential to 
use this scale as a measure of maintainability, and so further testing of construct 
validity is warranted. 
 
Finally, uncertainty about the factor structure of the Organisational Communication 
scales required a factor analysis to confirm the constructs in the original scales 
(Wiio, 1978b).  Job-related feedback and Information about change appeared to be 
unable to significantly discriminate work areas based on reliability level, despite 
communication being a frequent contributor to maintenance failures.  In addition, the 
overall variance explained by these factors was relatively low (15% each for Job-
related feedback and Information about change).  Information about change mainly 
reflects organisation-wide information exchange, and may therefore not be 
sufficiently sensitive to group-level differences, upon which Study 3 was based.  
Job-related feedback could be considered a group-level process, as it focuses on 
perceptions about interactions with others in the immediate work environment (i.e. 
supervisors and other team members), but may also be sensitive to organisation-level 
phenomena, as the relationship to Employer demonstrated.  Again, better scale 
selection and refinement of questionnaire items may be required in order to ensure 
that the nature of group-level communication, as experienced in specific work areas, 
is being measured.  Specific themes relating to group- and organisation-level 
communication will be examined through the comments provided by the 
respondents. 
 
7.4.6.2 Sample size 
Although the overall number of valid responses (n=172) was sufficient for Factor 
Analysis and ANOVAs, 39 responses were eliminated from the ANOVAs because 
the respondents indicated that they worked across all areas of the Process Plant, and 
five respondents marked both Gas Platform 1 and Gas Platform 2 as their work areas.  
This was unexpected as maintenance personnel are generally affiliated with a 
particular facility or Process Plant work area.  However, a relatively high percentage 
of respondents were contractors (34%) and they tend to be assigned to different work 
areas as required.  Nearly all (95%) of the respondents who noted that they worked in 
all areas of the Process Plant were contractors.  In addition, the differences in 
response rate between facilities (Table 12) and the low number of responses from 
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smaller facilities, such as Gas Platform 3 and FPSO 1, compromised several of the 
planned comparisons.  Notably, the original 3x3 design was reconfigured to 2x2 and 
1x3 designs, to accommodate the data obtained.  These sampling flaws could have 
been rectified by requesting that respondents only nominate their most frequent 
workplace and by greater canvassing of smaller facilities, respectively.  However, 
these interventions could also introduce other biases into the data.   
 
Alternatively, the effect size may have been too small to detect a significant effect 
for the size of sample available from the population of maintenance personnel.  In 
much of the data, the differences in means were as predicted by the hypotheses, but 
were not found to be statistically significant.  For example, in Figure 14, the 
relationship Lowest-to-Highest reliability is significant, and Lowest-to-Middle 
reliability is close to significant, but not Middle-to-Highest reliability.  A larger 
sample size, obtainable through a higher response rate, would provide more 
statistical power, though the effect size may still be too small to be of practical 
significance.  Finally, the differences in reliability level between groups (the 
Independent Variable) may not have been sufficiently large to produce significant 
differences between the factors being analysed (the Dependent Variables).  A 
comparison with reliability levels in other organisations may indicate the relative 
magnitude of the differences between the groups in Study 3. 
 
7.5 Summary and Conclusions  
The results of Study 3 partially supported hypotheses H1 and H3, namely that 
significant group differences in perceptions existed in the variables Problem-solving 
and Design & Maintenance based on reliability level, but not for all facility types.  
Higher reliability was associated with perceptions of better maintainability and plant 
designs.  Lower reliability was associated with a greater perceived requirement for 
problem-solving behaviours, as defined by the survey items.  Hypotheses H2 and H4 
were not supported; it was found that perceptions of Vigilance and Organisational 
Communication, as measured in this study, were not sensitive to the differences in 
reliability level of work areas.  One implication was that behaviours involving 
vigilance and communication within the organisation were significant factors in 
failures related to maintenance activities, but not significant factors in day-to-day 
reliability.  An alternative explanation was that the particular measures selected for 
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testing Vigilance and Organisational Communication were not sensitive to group-
level differences, either due to individual- and organisation-level phenomena that 
moderate the relationship of these factors to reliability, or due to confounding 
interactions between variables.  The comments made by respondents reviewed in the 
next chapter may assist in resolving which alternative is more likely. 
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8.0 Examining Human Factors in Comments from the Study 3 Survey  
8.1 Introduction 
8.1.1 Objective and rationale for the analysis of survey comments 
The quantitative survey results reported in Chapter 7 showed significant group 
differences in Design & Maintenance and Problem-solving, related to work area 
reliability level.  Job-related Feedback showed significant group differences related 
to Employer.  No significant statistical differences were observed in the other two 
variables, Vigilance and Information about change.  This chapter provides an 
examination of the open-ended comments made at the end of the survey described in 
Chapter 7.  The objective of the analysis of the comments section was to use 
qualitative data to triangulate the quantitative data from the survey in Study 3, in 
order to aid in the interpretation of the inferential analyses discussed in Section 7.4.  
The comments section of the survey was also intended to accord maintenance 
personnel an opportunity to express their opinions concerning the factors that they 
believe to impact on their tasks and workplace.  In this way, the comments section 
was intended to clarify the interpretation of the quantitative data.   
 
Todd, Nerlich, McKeown, and Clarke (2004) described between-methods 
triangulation as the use of a second method to obtain data in order to confirm or 
refute the findings from a previously used method.  For example, in their assessment 
of the cultural dimensions of maintenance reliability in NPPs, Reiman and Oedewald 
(2006a) used semi-structured interviews and group sessions to support the results of 
their CULTURE questionnaire.  Robert, Rousseau, and La Porte (1994) used focus 
groups and reviews with officers to triangulate the results from a cultural assessment 
questionnaire in their study of aircraft carriers as HROs.  In another example, Todd 
and Lobeck (2004) described the combination of questionnaire and group interview 
methods to clarify and explain issues arising from their survey of the attitudes of 
English and German language learners towards the respective countries and people.  
Resolving apparent contradictions between their survey and interview results led to a 
refinement of the explanation of their survey results and reconsideration of the 
importance of personal experience in explaining attitudes.  Similarly, applying an 
alternative method of obtaining data from respondents in Study 3 provided a means 
of testing the results obtained from the quantitative analysis of the questionnaire data, 
and resolving any ambiguity in the analysis of the data.   
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Ambiguities did arise in interpreting the data relating to several variables in Study 3 
(see Section 7.4 and 7.5).  For example, questions remained from the quantitative 
analysis in Study 3 as to why, despite the frequency of communication problems 
contributing to failures reported in Study 2, the two communication variables Job-
related Feedback and Information about change were not associated with significant 
group differences in reliability level.  The comment section thus provided an 
opportunity to resolve some of these anomalies and improve the theoretical 
understanding derived from the survey.   
 
To clarify the meaning of anomalies may require, as Todd et al (2004) argued, an 
understanding of the subjective realities of the people researched, which they termed 
‘repopulating psychology.’  For example, the analysis of comments was intended to 
determine whether the five survey variables derived from responses are related to 
dimensions of the workplace recognised by maintenance personnel.  Although the 
methodology of Study 2 narrowed the range of human factors that would be tested in 
Study 3 to the three most-frequent contributors to past failures, these factors may not 
necessarily be the ones of greatest concern to maintenance personnel.  The use of an 
open-ended question in the survey, concerning hindrances and aids to maintenance 
work, was intended to determine if factors other than the three most-frequent factors 
in failures were considered by maintenance personnel as affecting their work.      
   
Finally, another aspect of mixing methods that Todd et al. (2004) advocated was 
improving the mutual understanding between practitioners in psychology and the 
people that are ‘consumers’ of this knowledge.  The expected users of the knowledge 
gained from Study 3, namely maintenance supervisors and managers, will be better 
able to understand its implications by referring to the explanatory material in the 
comments.  Making this connection between the theoretical implications of data and 
a practical understanding of it was described by Reason and Hobbs (2003) as ‘theory 
in use.’  The ability of maintenance personnel to explain workplace phenomena 
derives from their understanding of the local workplace, particularly the informal 
structures and relationships.  Dekker (2006) called this understanding, the Local 
Rationality Principle.  He argued that workers would interpret their role in an 
organisation based on “their knowledge of the situation, their objectives, and the 
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objectives of the larger organisation they work for” (p.13).  Based on this interpretive 
ability, it was intended that the comments section of the survey would clarify the 
perceptions of maintenance personnel as ‘voiced’ in the survey, and accord them an 
opportunity to express ‘in their own words’ their opinions concerning the factors that 
impacted on their tasks and workplace. 
 
Lyons and Coyle (2007) described several approaches for obtaining and analysing 
the opinions of people ‘in their own words’ in qualitative data.  Storey (2007) 
explained one method that has been developed to interpret themes within a body of 
text data, named Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA).  An IPA approach 
was adopted in this study in order to extract themes from the text provided by 
respondents.  IPA, as the name implies, is a form of content analysis that deals with 
empirical phenomena requiring interpretation to extract meaning and understanding.  
Smith (2004) described IPA as a phenomenological approach to exploring the 
experience of an individual in a context, such as a maintenance technician in a 
petroleum industry workplace.  In addition, he explains that there are two levels of 
interpretation involved in IPA, namely 1) the sense that the participant makes of his 
or her world, and 2) the understanding that the researcher is trying to obtain from the 
participant’s words.  In Study 3, by asking what hinders and helps maintenance, the 
participant was being asked about the factors he or she believed influences the 
performance of maintenance and ultimately reliability, which was also the objective 
of the 30 questionnaire items in the survey.  However, in regard to the comments, it 
was more the personal experience of organisational factors, in the participant’s own 
words, which was being analysed, rather than a multiple-choice response to specific 
questions chosen for the survey.  In this chapter, the findings of a content analysis of 
these comments are presented, along with an examination of their relationship to the 




Participants surveyed in Study 3 included maintenance technicians, maintenance 
supervisors and maintenance coordinator/planners as described in Section 7.2.2.  Of 
the 178 participants who returned a completed questionnaire, 101 (55.6%) included a 
written comment.  Among these participants, 58.5% of company personnel offered 
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comments, while 56.9% of contractors commented.  Regarding facility type, 
comments were received from gas platforms (63.4%), FPSOs (47.2%) and the 
Process Plant (59.7%). 
 
8.2.2 Measure 
The source of data for the qualitative analysis was the fourth and final section of the 
survey (Appendix F) sent to maintenance personnel across the target company.  The 
procedure for supplying survey forms was described in Section 7.2.4.  This section of 
the survey was an open-ended request for the participant to, “Please write any 
comments you have on what helps or gets in the way of maintenance work at [the 
company].”  Five blank lines were then provided for the insertion of a response.   
 
8.2.3 Data processing 
The comments supplied were entered verbatim into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet 
with the ID code of the respondent.  Analysis of the comments commenced with a 
careful reading and re-reading of the text provided by respondents in order to analyse 
their thematic content.  Next, a listing of sub-themes was extracted from the 
individual comments.  The framework adopted for themes and sub-themes was 
consistent with the HFIT taxonomy of human factors in operational failures, but 
derived from the respondent’s own words.  Based on this framework, sub-themes 
were extracted from the comments.  Constructs common to these sub-themes were 
then the basis for grouping sub-themes into a smaller number of shared themes.  
 
The conceptual and empirical implications of the themes were then considered to 
determine if a still smaller set of over-arching themes, termed ‘super-ordinate 
themes’ in IPA, could be discerned.  After assigning sub-themes, themes and super-
ordinate themes, the comments were then re-assessed to determine if sub-theme and 
super-ordinate theme categories were appropriate.  The frequencies of themes and 
super-ordinate themes were then determined and associations with demographic 
variables were investigated. 
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8.3 Results 
8.3.1 Demographic data 
The respondents’ comments ranged from short statements of a single word (e.g. 
“Politics” and “SAP”) through to longer assessments (i.e., a maximum of 131 words) 
of multiple factors that impact on their workplace.  The majority of comments 
(79.8%) identified hindrances, rather than aids, to conducting maintenance work.  
The number of responses with comments and no comments made, arranged by 
facility and reliability level, is shown in Figure 16.  The proportion of respondents 
making comments did not appear to be related to reliability level.  For example, even 
in several higher reliability facilities (e.g. Gas Platform 1 and Process Plant 1) there 
were more participants making comments than not, with proportions similar to 
middle reliability facilities, such as Gas Platform 2 and FPSO 2. 
 
igure 16.  Frequency of comments and no comments supplied, arranged by facility 

































and reliability level. 
 
8.3.2 Sub-themes, themes and overarching themes 
Content Analysis of the 101 comments resulted in the extra
The 57 sub-themes were grouped into 12 themes by conceptually linking the ideas 
expressed by the participants.  Table 16 shows the 12 themes and the sub-themes 
related to each theme, and the number of participants who made a comment 
concerning each theme.  Examples of comments for each of the 12 themes ar
provided in Table 17. 
  
                                                       Human Factors and Plant Maintenance Reliability 194 
Table 16.  Twelve themes derived from 57 sub-themes extracted from the survey 
respondents’ comments, and the number of respondents mentioning each theme. 
  Themes   Sub-Themes Freq. 
Communication processes Lack of communication between departments 
Information from supervisor not consistent. 
Little contact with production 
8 
Planning and work scopes Planning scopes of work 
Poor planning. 
11 
Workloads and time pressures Many jobs on the go.  High work load.  No job 
levelling. 
Not enough time. 
7 
Poor decision-making Decision-making too fast, inconsistent; no 
understanding of issues. 
Operations not allowing work to be completed 
Repeating maintenance errors-not documenting 
lessons learned 
Not prepared to shutdown equipment for  
maintenance . 'Breakdown' approach 
Inflexibility in changing Operations model 
16 
Better work systems-
workplace efficiency Need for proactivity; not doing things smarter 
Long lead times. 
Maintainers bogged down with SAP, computer work 
QA needs improvement; KEQ causes unnecessary 
hold-ups. 
Confusing permit system; hard to implement 
Permit system delays work 
Changes not fully rolled out 
Lack of transport to job-site. Too many private 
vehicles. 
Too much administration/paperwork 
Management of change takes too long. Limited 
resources for new systems. 
Delays to work that reduce efficiency 
57 
Shortage of personnel & 
Support staff/Teamwork On-board planner/activity coordinator needed 
Need to be team players/assist one another. 
Insufficient personnel; more people needed 
Slow engineering dept. On-board engineer needed 
24 
Training needs & Competency Training opportunities inadequate. 
Competency, e.g. in plant operations; more reliance 
on experienced staff. 
13 
Procedures & work direction Few procedures 
Procedures not up-to-date or incorrect 
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es   Sub-Themes Freq. 
Lack of information 
Information hard to find, e.g. how the plant works 
Lack of drawings and technical data 
Job-related knowledge is word-of-mouth from 
workmates 
Difficult to locate information in SAP. SAP needs 
improvement 
Poor BOMs.  BOMs behind the times, e.g., need 
pictures 
Information sessions to know the big picture 
Out of date information, e.g. maintenance orders, 
telephone lists 
SAP not set-up or used correctly; differences across 
facilities 
28 
Management & supervision 
Operators control maintainers work 
Lack of management participation at meetings 
Team leader supervision is good 
Not enough supervision 
Top heavy in staff who make excuses; seat polishers 
Focus on costs without understanding contributors 
to costs. 
Politics 
Lack of cohesion/cooperation between depts (e.g. 
MM & CC) 
H&S culture poor.  Production before safety 
21 
Workforce consistency Consistency of personnel, e.g. between shifts 
High staff turnover 
Changes not fully rolled out 
Too many contractors & different companies. 
7 
Equipment & spares 
Problems with ageing plant and machines 
Inadequate spares 
Lack of tools or equipment, e.g. two-way radios 
Problems with quality of vendor parts and repairs 
Involve maintainers in design. Standardise 
equipment designs. 
15 
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Table 17.  Themes and examples derived from comments written by participants.  (Participant identification number in parentheses) 
Code   Theme Example
A  Communication processes
“It seems to me that there is a distinct lack of communication between the offshore facility, [company headquarters] and 
outside contractors/vendors.“(#111).  Sub-theme: Delays to work (e.g. permit system).  Desire for better efficiency 
“There are a lot of delays when a problem is crossed on a job before getting an answer” (#106).  Sub-theme: Need for good 
planning (e.g. proactive approach) 
“Lack of communication between –[the company] & contractors 
-Management & workers (contractors)” (#44).  Sub-theme: Delays to work (e.g. permit system).  Desire for better efficiency. 
B Planning and work scopes 
“Activity Coordinator/Planner was a Godsend for day to day activities-maybe the role will come back one day to assist all 
work groups” (#10).  Sub-theme: Planning scopes of work 
“We are average at best when planning for major maintenance.  The great technical integrity results on NE are more a result 
of excellent personnel than good organization & planning” (#125).  Sub-theme: Poor planning. 
C Workloads and time pressures 
“Increasingly there is insufficient time for necessary planned work as breakdown maintenance consumes a considerable 
amount of my time.  Job satisfaction has diminished, as there is not enough time at the end of corrective work to document 
Lessons Learned and make some notes for 'similar' faults” (#149).  Sub-themes: Not enough time, Repeating maintenance 
errors-not documenting lessons learned. 
“Team leaders [are] massively overworked with their managers focusing on bullshit items” (#118).  Sub-theme: Many jobs 
on the go.  High work load.  No job levelling. 
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D  Poor decision-making
“Our decision making process is always too fast, I don't have enough time to think about decisions.  One day we will make the 
wrong move due to poor planning” (#8).  Sub-theme: Decision-making too fast, inconsistent; no understanding of issues. 
“Continually repeating maintenance errors.  Not prepared to shut down equipment until it breaks down.  Maintenance staff 
making decisions on equipment they have no knowledge or understanding of its function” (#119).  Sub-themes: Repeating 
maintenance errors-not documenting lessons learned, Not prepared to shut down equipment for maintenance.  Breakdown 
approach. 
E Better work systems-workplace efficiency 
“Getting changes/modifications through the system is very time consuming” (#108).  Sub-theme: Management of change 
takes too long.  Limited resources for new systems. 
 “At present -permit to work & operation planning is inefficient” (#80).  Sub-theme: Permit system delays work. 
“Having a planner on board the facility would be a more efficient way of resourcing work orders and parts in general”  
(#107).  Sub-theme: Delays to work that reduce efficiency 
F Shortage of personnel & Support staff/Teamwork 
“At the moment onboard the [FP3] the main thing that gets in the way of maintenance is the lack of personnel.  For the last 
few months there has been one fitter onboard as core crew to carry out maintenance” (#49).  Sub-theme: Insufficient 
personnel; more people needed. 
“Waiting for equipment to get to your work area, as we only have one (electrical?)  to look after work areas, e.g. 4-5 work 
areas may be open up anywhere on site” (#103).  Sub-theme: Insufficient personnel; more people needed. 
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G Training needs & Competency 
“Previous/ original employees of [the company] were given frequent training of equipment, ensuring competency.  This has 
been reduced significantly leaving reliance on older staff” (#11).  Sub-theme: Competency, e.g. in plant operations; more 
reliance on experienced staff. 
“Training opportunities have been restricted compared to early years.  Double standard” (#9).  Sub-theme: Training 
opportunities inadequate. 
“Training for both new starters and existing employees is also inadequate and can compromise plant integrity” (#166).  Sub-
theme: Training opportunities inadequate. 
H Procedures & work direction 
“The main problem retarding my way forward is two-fold, 1.lack of up-to-date procedures, 2…“(#22).  Sub-theme: 
Procedures not up-to-date or incorrect. 
“A good percentage of procedures are out of date/wrong and require updates.  Changes are slow & require validating” (#116).  
Sub-theme: Management of change takes too long.  Limited resources for new systems.  
“Existing and new procedures are inadequate and compromise safety” (#166).  Sub-theme: Few procedures. 
I  Lack of information
“95% of the site/plant/job knowledge is word of mouth from workmates experience on site.  I find the bulk of info is on the  
intranet, SAP, etc, however, I often give up as I cannot locate it in search fields, etc.” (#29).  Sub-theme: Job-related 
knowledge is word-of-mouth from workmates. 
“A fair bit of skill is involved in getting/ finding information on a certain piece of equipment (e.g. searching in CDD, library 
etc).  Could be made easier” (#131).  Sub-theme: Information hard to find, e.g. how the plant works. 
“Information transfer from supervisors, SAP group to maintenance personnel need to be improved” (#142).  Sub-theme: SAP 
not set-up or used correctly; differences across facilities. 
  




J Management & supervision 
“Very little to no supervision“(#29).  Sub-theme: Not enough supervision. 
“Far too much admin.  As a supervisor my day is spent accounting to bean counters and tracking paperwork rather than 
spending time on the job” (#38).  Sub-theme: Too much administration/paperwork. 
“Management focus on maintenance costs without any understanding of what contributes to these costs.  Many audits have 
been initiated whose only objective measure of success is to save money” (#70).  Sub-theme: Focus on costs without 
understanding contributors to costs. 
“Helps: Good supervision from our direct team leader [name deleted] and our resource estimators” (#17).  Sub-theme: Team 
leader supervision is good. 
K  Workforce consistency
“Operations have no consistency from shift to shift” (#23).  Sub-theme: Consistency of personnel, e.g. between shifts. 
“The permit system is very inconsistent.  Inconsistency between Operations shifts in decision making” (#42).  Sub-theme: 
Consistency of personnel, e.g. between shifts. 
L Equipment & spares 
“Materials /parts availability is a big issue on planned work.  Many jobs cannot be completed in time due to lack of materials” 
(#150).  Sub-theme: Inadequate spares. 
“Procurement times for parts/long lead times [is a] ‘very big issue’” (#9).  Sub-theme: Inadequate spares. 
“Stock level of parts [is] very poor, and takes too long to order and receive equipment” (#34).  Sub-theme: Inadequate spares. 
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Based on conceptual linkages between these 12 themes, four super-ordinate themes 
were identified: 
• Communication and access to information 
• Efficiency of current work systems 
• Need for more personnel and better workgroup support systems 
• Management & supervisory impacts on the workplace. 
 
 The relationship between themes and super-ordinate themes and the frequencies of 
the super-ordinate themes are shown in Table 18.  The super-ordinate theme 
Communication and access to information refers to comments made concerning 
faulty communication processes, specific needs for procedures and work direction, or 
the difficulty of obtaining information.  For example, a mechanical maintenance 
technician on an FPSO commented, “A fair bit of skill is involved in getting / finding 
information on a certain piece of equipment (e.g. searching in CDD, library etc).  
Could be made easier.”  (Response #131).  A mechanical maintenance technician in 
the Process Plant commented, “Very few procedures; permit system can be 
frustrating & confusing.  Little contact with production, i.e. how the plant works.  
Information is available but hard to find” (Response #13).   
 
Table 18.  Four super-ordinate themes derived from 12 themes listed in Tables 16 and 17. 
Super-Ordinate Themes Themes Frequency 
Communication and access to information A,H,I 45 
Efficiency of current work systems B,E,L 85 
Need for more personnel and better workgroup 
support systems C,F,G,K 
50 
Management & supervisory impacts on the workplace D,J 37 
 
Efficiency of current work systems refers to the need for better work systems and 
workplace efficiency due to insufficient planning and work scopes, or problems 
encountered with equipment and spares.  An Inlec on a gas platform blamed 
inefficiencies on “Material unavailability, hardly any spare parts on board, quality of 
returned items from vendor repairs is sometimes poor, [and] a lot of time wasted on 
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Need for more personnel and better workgroup support systems refers to perceptions 
of a mismatch between the tasks required and the personnel required to do these 
tasks.  This can include a mismatch due to workloads and pressures, shortage of 
support personnel, lack of teamwork, insufficient training, or inconsistency in the 
workforce.  A maintenance technician with more than 10 years experience on a gas 
platform commented that an “Activity coordinator/Planner was a godsend for day to 
day activities-maybe the role will come back one day to assist all work groups 
(Response #10).   
 
Management & supervisory impacts on the workplace refers to poor-decision making 
or problems associated with supervision and management.  A team leader from the 
Process Plant was concerned that, “Our decision-making process is always too fast, I 
don't have enough time to think about decisions.  One day we will make the wrong 
move due to poor planning” (Response #8). 
 
8.3.3 Super-ordinate themes and reliability 
The frequency of the four super-ordinate themes and 12 themes was compared across 
facility type (Tables 19-21).  Figure 17 represents the total distribution of super-
ordinate themes in comments offered across the nine work areas, arranged by 
reliability level.  The distribution of super-ordinate themes are indicated in the graph 
as percentages of the total number of comments made for the three facilities in each 
reliability level.  It was apparent that the lowest reliability work areas provided a 
greater proportion of comments relating to Management & supervisory impacts on 
the workplace than did middle and highest reliability work areas.  Similarly, one of 
the themes in Management & supervisory impacts, namely Poor decision-making, 
was more frequently mentioned in comments from lower reliability (13.2% of 
comments) compared to middle (5.2%) and higher (4.2%) reliability work areas.  
Conversely, the middle and highest reliability work areas provided a greater 
proportion of comments relating to Efficiency of current work systems.  The 
proportions of comments relating to Communication & access to information and to 
a Need for more personnel & better workgroup support systems was similar across 
the three reliability levels. 
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Table 19.  Frequency of comments expressed according to themes and super-ordinate themes for FPSOs, grouped by reliability level. 


















Communication and access to information Communication processes 2 0 10 1 2 0
 Procedures & work direction       
      
      
        
          
      
      
      
         
      
      
0 0 0
 Lack of information 
 
2 9 2
Efficiency of current work systems Planning and work scopes 4 1 5 1 2 1
Better work systems-workplace
efficiency 




Workloads and time pressures 5 1 12 3 1 0Need for more personnel and better 
workgroup support systems Shortage of personnel & Support 
staff/Teamwork 
2 6 0




Poor decision-making 9 6 2 1 0 0Management & supervisory impacts on the 
workplace Management & supervision 3 1 0
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Table 20.  Frequency of comments expressed according to themes and super-ordinate themes for gas platforms, grouped by reliability level. 
       Super-Ordinate Themes  Theme Lower Reliability 
Gas Platform 3 
Middle Reliability 
Gas Platform 2 
Higher Reliability 













Communication and access to information Communication processes 2 0 2 0 6 2
 Procedures & work direction       
      
      
        
      
      
      
      
      
      




Lack of information 2 2 3
Efficiency of current work systems Planning and work scopes 2 0 17 3 15 0
Better work systems-workplace
efficiency 
 1 12 13
 
 
Equipment & spares 1 2 2
Workloads and time pressures 1 0 2 0 9 0Need for more personnel and better 
workgroup support systems Shortage of personnel & Support 
staff/Teamwork 
1 2 5
 Training needs & Competency 0 0 3
 
 
Workforce consistency 0 0 1
Poor decision-making 1 0 2 2 2 0Management & supervisory impacts on the 
workplace Management & supervision 1 0 2
  
        
  




Table 21. Frequency of comments according to themes and super-ordinate themes, and grouped by Process Plant work area reliability level. 
 Super-ordinate themes  Theme Lower Reliability 
Process Plant 3 
Middle Reliability 
Process Plant 2 
Higher Reliability 
Process Plant 1 
  













Communication and access to information Communication processes 11 1 2 0 2 1
 Procedures & work direction       
      
      
        
      
      
      
      
      
      




Lack of information 3 2 0
Efficiency of current work systems Planning and work scopes 4 1 1 0 3 1
Better work systems-workplace
efficiency 
 3 1 2
 
 
Equipment & spares 0 0 0
Workloads and time pressures 7 2 0 0 4 1Need for more personnel and better 
workgroup support systems Shortage of personnel & Support 
staff/Teamwork 
0 0 1
 Training needs & Competency 3 0 1
 
 
Workforce consistency 1 0 1
Poor decision-making 6 1 1 0 2 2Management & supervisory impacts on the 
workplace Management & supervision 5 1 0





























Figure 17.  Distribution of super-ordinate themes in comments arranged by work area 
reliability level.  Frequencies are given as percentages of the total number of 
comments for each reliability level. 
 
8.4 Discussion 
8.4.1 General comments 
The objective in analysing the comments provided by respondents was to validate the 
quantitative results of the survey using a second method, as well as to interpret more 
accurately the reasoning behind participants’ responses to the questionnaire items.  In 
addition, the comments section was intended to provide an opportunity for 
maintenance personnel to express their concerns regarding their workplace and 
discuss topics that had not been covered by the questionnaire items in Study 3.     
 
Many of the sub-themes extracted from the comments and linked to form themes 
(Table 16) were similar to the most-frequently occurring factors from HFIT in 
Study 2.  Numerous comments related to the themes of Communication, Lack of 
information, Poor decision-making, and Equipment and spares.  As such, the 
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comments analysis provided continuity between the conceptual framework 
developed in Study 2 and the quantitative data obtained in Study 3.  In addition, 
despite consisting of only one open-ended question, the content analyses 
demonstrated that the comments provided a sufficiently rich source of data to test the 
conclusions from quantitative analysis of the questionnaire items and resolve 
ambiguous findings in the data.  The results of the content analysis of comments 
were derived from a different method to that of the multiple-choice questionnaire, 
and so the two sources of data could be triangulated to determine if the findings from 
the questionnaire were supported or not.  The following section explores the 
validation and interpretation of the quantitative results of Study 3 based on 
comments of maintenance personnel. 
 
8.4.2 Qualitative data 
The largest group of comments based on the four super-ordinate themes related to the 
Efficiency of current work systems (85 comments).  This is a logical outcome from a 
question regarding aids and hindrances to one’s work.  The other super-ordinate 
themes related directly to reliability in the workplace, namely, Communication and 
access to information (45 comments), the Need for more personnel and better 
workgroup support (50 comments) and Management and supervisory impacts on the 
workplace (37 comments).  These topics suggest that maintenance personnel are both 
aware of reliability-related factors in their workplaces, and able to articulate the way 
that human factors influence their assigned work. 
 
Distinct differences in the proportions of several of these super-ordinate themes were 
found across work areas with different reliability levels (Figure 17).  Maintenance 
personnel from middle and higher reliability work areas were more concerned about 
the current efficiency of their work systems, while the lowest reliability facilities 
were more concerned with the impacts on the workplace resulting from the decisions 
and actions of management and supervisors.  However, no distinct difference 
appeared in the data from the other two super-ordinate themes, namely 1) 
organisational communication and the ability to access information, and 2) the need 
for better support for workgroups, including a need for more personnel.  These 
results suggest that maintenance personnel working in the lower reliability work 
areas are concerned about decision-making imposed by management, while 
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personnel from higher reliability facilities are voicing the need for greater 
efficiencies in the workplace.  In contrast, the comments concerning information 
access, organisational communication, and better support systems were not 
necessarily associated with reliability level, but seemed to relate to endemic 
organisational phenomena which are experienced across all work areas.  This result 
supports the contention in the previous chapter, that problems of communication and 
access to information within the company are organisation-level phenomena, 
manifested as an absence of significant group-level differences in Job-related 
feedback and Information about change. 
 
As described in Chapter 7, two variables demonstrated significant group differences 
based on the reliability level of work areas.  The content analysis derived from the 
comment data provided several findings that supported and several that contradicted 
the quantitative analysis.  The following is a discussion of these two variables in 
relation to the comments analysis in order to extend the understanding of their 
association with reliability.  
 
8.4.2.1 Problem-solving  
The survey scale Problem-solving included items concerning task-related problems 
that had not been previously encountered, had no obvious answer, or required unique 
or creative solutions.  In the analysis of comments, these dimensions appeared to be 
closest to the theme of Poor decision-making.  One comment made was, “Our 
decision-making process is always too fast, I don't have enough time to think about 
decisions.  One day we will make the wrong move due to poor planning” (Response 
#8).  This relationship between perceptions of how problems are solved and decision-
making may relate to the use of Recognition Primed Decision-Making (Lipshitz, 
Klein, Orasanu, & Salas, 2001) by maintenance personnel.  Carvalho, dos Santos, 
and Vidal (2005) found that Recognition Primed Decision-Making underpinned 80% 
of the decisions made in an operational environment.  The implication of this and 
other comments from Study 3 was that decisions were made by identifying the first 
solution that met situational criteria and was consonant with past experience.  
However, with the complexity of the facilities and reported shortage of specific 
procedures and information, the comments indicated that more advanced problem-
solving skills would be required to support decision-making in maintenance 
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activities.  Thus, it is logical that more agreement with the requirements for Problem-
solving is predictive of lower reliability.  This interpretation was supported by the 
higher proportion of comments from low reliability facilities (Figure 17) in the 
super-ordinate theme Management & supervisory impacts on the workplace, which 
included the theme of Poor decision-making. 
 
The responses to Problem-solving in the quantitative data may also be closely related 
to the theme of Training needs & competency, in that more training in methods of 
identifying maintenance solutions was considered necessary by respondents.  A 
representative comment from a mechanical maintenance technician on a gas platform 
was that “Previous/ original employees of [the company] were given frequent 
training of equipment, ensuring competency.  This has been reduced significantly 
leaving reliance on older staff” (#11).  This demonstrated a focus on specific training 
and past experience, when better problem-solving strategies are needed to deal with 
complex maintenance tasks.  Training needs and competency referred to in the 
comments were not the skills needed to be a competent mechanical fitter or an 
electrician, but rather a matter of acquiring the cognitive techniques to solve complex 
problems encountered with a wide range of equipment types.  Supporting this, a 
contractor from the Process Plant with over ten years in the resource industry 
commented, “Information sessions before major shuts are handy.  It helps to know 
the big picture” (#38).  Although maintenance technicians are expected to acquire 
problem-solving and decision-making skills as part of their training, the diverse array 
of equipment which must be maintained in a typical petroleum installation means 
that specific experience, acquired over time, may not be sufficient for solving a wide 
range of potential problems.  As a result, a positive response to Dealing with 
problems not encountered before or having no correct answer may represent a sense 
of needing better diagnostic skills (Cooke, 2002).  Schaafstal, Schraagen, and van 
Berlo (2000) identified the lack of diagnostic skills as a deficiency in the training of 
technicians in the Royal Netherlands Navy.  They were concerned that engineering 
system knowledge and a case-based approach to solving problems were taught to 
technicians, but that general troubleshooting strategies were not.   
 
In terms of solving problems, a lack of training was compounded by the difficulty of 
obtaining information.  “A fair bit of skill is involved in getting/ finding information 
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on a certain piece of equipment …Could be made easier” (#131).  The perception of 
a shortage of information related to the suppliers of equipment as well.  “Better & 
more informative vendor manuals would be of great benefit,” said a mechanical 
maintenance technician on an FPSO (#121). 
 
Although much of the technical expertise and information required to repair 
numerous pieces of equipment would generally be managed through the supply of 
procedures, a number of respondents mentioned that more and better procedures 
were required.  In the experience of a maintenance technician in the Process Plant 
there are “Very few procedures ... Information is available but hard to find” (#13).  In 
addition, an Inlec on a gas platform with 10 years of industry experience said, “A 
good percentage of procedures are out of date/wrong and require updates.  Changes 
are slow & require validating” (#116).  The delays in up-dating procedures were 
regarded as a result of, “Poor management of change in regards to update of 
drawings, BOM's, procedures, etc. [making] simple tasks difficult.  Existing and new 
procedures are inadequate and compromise safety” (#166).  As identified in Study 2, 
lack of procedures and information contributed to assumptions and impeded 
problem-solving. 
 
The use of specialist teams also impeded the development of this expertise, affecting 
the ability to solve problems.  “With the use of Major Maintenance for a broad scope 
of work (and vendors) this impacts on the skill level of the Core Crew.  This lack of 
knowledge then impacts the ability of the Core Crew to troubleshoot when 
equipment breaks down” (#112).  In total, competency issues affected decision-
making, which was also a frequent theme in comments relating to Problem-solving.  
An example was a comment about “continually repeating maintenance errors…  
Maintenance staff making decisions on equipment [when] they have no knowledge 
or understanding of its function” (#119).  The relationship between problem-solving, 
decision-making and the development of competency was explained by Tucker, 
Edmondson and Spear (2002) in relation to nurses in the medical industry, working 
under similar constraints as maintenance technicians working in the petroleum 
industry.  Tucker, Edmondson, and Spear found that constraints on fully solving 
problems limits the levels of expertise developed.  The comments confirmed the 
quantitative findings of Study 3, namely that problem-solving was an important issue 
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in reliability.  In interpreting this, concerns about competency, access to information, 
and flawed decision-making were clearly among the main contributing factors 
according to maintenance personnel. 
 
8.4.2.2 Design & Maintenance 
The variable Design & Maintenance in Study 3 related to the original design of plant 
equipment, the adequacy of spare parts, and the current state of maintenance.  These 
items were intended to determine if the perceptions of maintenance personnel 
regarding maintainability and maintenance effort in the plant influence the reliability 
level achieved by the facility. 
 
Several concerns were raised in respondent’s comments in relation to the design of 
their facility and spares parts.  In terms of the original design, one maintenance 
technician considered that there had not been sufficient input from maintenance 
personnel, commenting, “We need to involve experienced maintenance people earlier 
in the design phase and equipment selection phase of new projects.  We need to 
standardise equipment & configurations of systems across all facilities in the design 
phase” (#177).  Cullen (2007) noted the lack of involvement in the design stage of 
maintenance personnel and other end users, resulting in “badly designed pieces of 
equipment [and] poor workplace or environments” (p.623).  Relating to improving 
designs, Management of change takes too long was a sub-theme in the comments 
concerning the difficulty of modifying systems and equipment when maintenance 
technicians thought that modifications were required.  This was included with the 
theme Better work systems-workforce efficiency.  One comment was that, “It would 
help to have an engineer on board so that simple modifications or changes could be 
progressed.  Getting changes/modifications through the system is very time 
consuming” (#108).  Another maintenance technician commented, “Change [was] 
not rolled-out fully, sometimes very high level-you [the maintainer] fill in the gaps” 
(#26).  Based on these opinions, it appeared that existing modifications were 
regarded by maintenance personnel as less of a problem than the inability to make 
changes when they are genuinely needed.  This is partly an efficiency issue, and 
partly an effectiveness issue, as reliability depends on sufficient organisational 
learning to incorporate changes recognised by site-based workers (Cannon & 
Edmondson, 2005; Edmondson, 1996).  That maintainability and the on-going 
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requirements of maintenance were often not considered was one reason given for the 
high proportion of design-related failures in industry (Kinnersley & Roelen, 2007; 
Taylor, 2007). 
 
In addition to the original design, the age of equipment also posed challenges as one 
maintenance technician commented, “Older machines and equipment [are] hard to 
find parts for” (#61).  Seemingly, a greater perceived problem than the plant design 
is the lack of availability of spare parts and materials.  Seven respondents offered 
comments such as, “Stock level of parts (are) very poor, and [it] takes too long to 
order and receive equipment” (#34).  A reason given for this was that, “Quite often 
parts are either not catalogued, or are not in store, or are supposed to be on the shelf 
but aren't.  Lead times on most components are excessive (>8 weeks)” (#129).  
Therefore, while design issues were more prominent in the interviews concerning 
failures, the availability of spares was a greater concern in relation to the impact of 
day-to-day maintenance tasks on reliability.  Other Design & Maintenance issues 
were perceived to impact on the maintenance component of this variable, including 
lack of proactively attending to maintenance needs and the quality of vendor repairs 
and spare parts.  Both of these are issues that arose in Study 2, and further link those 
findings to the findings in Study 3.  
 
Regarding overdue maintenance, this was often reflected in comments concerning 
the shortage of maintenance personnel and spares.  A maintenance technician on the 
least reliable FPSO wrote, “At the moment onboard [the FPSO] the main thing that 
gets in the way of maintenance is the lack of personnel.  For the last few months 
there has been one fitter onboard as core crew to carry out maintenance” (#49).  This 
and related comments indicate a tendency to operate in a breakdown mode of 
maintenance, which one maintenance technician identified as “Reactivity rather than 
proactivity” (#2).  The dichotomy between the needs of production and maintenance 
requirements, in which management is “Not prepared to shut down equipment until it 
breaks down” (#119), is often an approach taken in manufacturing (Cooke, 2003).  
Even the potential for loss of production was considered grounds for delaying 
maintenance, as in the comment, “If there is any chance you may trip the process in 
order to do preventative maintenance then that maintenance may be delayed to a 
suitable day in the future” (#162).  One of the principal tenets of contemporary 
  
                                                       Human Factors and Plant Maintenance Reliability 212 
maintenance engineering is that a preventive maintenance approach produces a more 
reliable system (Moubray, 1997).  This was recognised by one maintenance 
technician: “Increasingly there is insufficient time for necessary planned work as 
breakdown maintenance consumes a considerable amount of my time.  Job 
satisfaction has diminished as there is not enough time at the end of corrective work 
to document Lessons Learned and make some notes for 'similar' faults” (#149).  
Thus, the connection between a consistent approach to maintenance and reliability 
was clearly recognisable in the comments of the respondents, with recognition of the 
role of the shortage of resources, including personnel, spares, and planned 
maintenance time.  This was captured by the super-ordinate theme of Need for More 
Personnel and Better Workgroup Support Systems. 
 
8.4.3 Additional issues raised in the comments 
In addition to the concerns of maintenance personnel which related to the items in 
the Study 3 scales described above, respondents also expressed opinions on 
additional themes.  The most common of these themes included Need For Better 
Work Systems-Workplace Efficiency, Management & Supervision, Lack of 
Information, and Procedures & Work Direction. 
 
8.4.3.1 Efficiency of current work systems 
While the comments section of the survey was intended to provide information on 
workplace influences on reliability, judging by the large number of comments, 
efficiency of work systems was also important to maintenance personnel.  Many of 
the comments related to the inefficiency of organisational systems, as in the 
comment, “Back log of permits that reduces the efficiencies of maintenance 
personnel to carry out work” (#86).  Similarly, while modern workplaces typically 
attempt to operate with minimal staffing levels, there were nine comments relating to 
the need for specific support staff to be accessible.  The most common expression of 
this was the need for planners and activity coordinators to be based in the off-shore 
work areas.  Of particular interest was the disproportionate concern for efficiency in 
the middle and high reliability facilities, compared to the lower reliability work areas 
(Figure 17).  One explanation is that maintenance personnel who can think in terms 
of more efficient methods may be better at solving reliability problems.  However, 
this explanation is unlikely, as it relies on individual traits to explain group-level 
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phenomena.  A more plausible explanation is that staff in low reliability work areas 
were less concerned with efficiency compared to the need for improving reliability.  
This supports the conclusions of the quantitative findings, namely that plant designs 
and problem-solving difficulties are hindering lower reliability work areas.  
Achieving efficiencies are less of a concern for maintenance personnel struggling to 
maintain inherently unreliable equipment.   
 
8.4.3.2 Management and supervisory impacts on the workplace  
In contrast to efficiency of current work systems, management and supervisory 
impacts on the workplace was of greater concern to staff in lower reliability work 
areas.  This super-ordinate theme included the theme of Poor decision-making, 
which was also disproportionately frequent in lower reliability work areas.  As such, 
similar between-groups differences in reliability level would have been expected in 
the Vigilance variable, as it concerns decision-making (Mann, Burnett, Radford, & 
Ford, 1997).  An explanation for the lack of significance in these results may relate to 
the differences in concepts between the items in the Vigilance scale and the concerns 
expressed in the comments.  While the items in the Vigilance scale generally 
pertained to individual-level traits (e.g. “I consider how best to carry out a 
decision”), the comments mainly concerned group-level flaws in decision-making, 
such as, “Maintenance staff making decisions on equipment [when] they have no 
knowledge or understanding of its function” (#119), and organisation-level flaws, 
such as, “Disagree with most decisions [the company] makes how to do my job” 
(#101).  As well as indicating that the measure selected was inappropriate, and that 
hypothesis H2 might still be valid, this finding also indicated the importance of 
considering level criteria (individual, group, or organisation) when selecting 
measures for human factors research. 
 
8.4.3.3 Communication and access to information 
The super-ordinate theme Communication and access to information was found to be 
relatively consistent across all reliability levels (Figure 17).  As such, the measures 
Job-related feedback and Information about change were unlikely to detect group-
level differences based on reliability.  Instead, the quantitative and qualitative data in 
Study 3 provided information concerning the communication climate across the 
organisation.  In addition to clarifying the reason for a lack of significance in the data 
  
                                                       Human Factors and Plant Maintenance Reliability 214 
from the Job-related feedback and Information about change scales, the comments 
provided a further link to the findings in Study 2.  Thus, organisational 
communication was reflected in the themes of Lack of information and Procedures & 
work direction.  
 
The theme Lack of information mainly concerned the principal source of information 
for maintenance technicians, namely the SAP database, which provides work orders, 
Bills of Materials (BOM), and maintenance history data.  Although many comments 
related to the need for more SAP training and a general dislike of using it, most 
comments related to the difficulty of locating required information.  In keeping with 
most modern operations, much information is provided electronically (Baltes, 
Dickson, Sherman, Bauer, & LaGanke, 2002).  However, this appeared to create 
difficulties for workers whose principal work is not computer-based, resulting in 
“Too much focus on SAP & not enough on the actual job” (#119).  As one 
maintenance technician noted, “I find the bulk of info is on the intranet, SAP, etc, 
however, I often give up as I cannot locate it in search fields, etc.”  (#29).  The 
software itself is partly blamed due to the “unnecessary complexity of SAP 
compared to other CMMS [Computerised Maintenance Management Systems] I've 
used previously” (#183). 
 
Partly this could be improved through improving systems and better training, that is, 
the “SAP system needs to be revised in regards to specific training in small groups 
for personnel who use SAP for maintenance.  Information transfer from supervisors, 
SAP group to maintenance personnel need to be improved” (#142).  The entry of 
more reliable data in SAP is also required, as several respondents observed that 
“SAP BOMs [are] not populated.  Critical spares for all equipment [are] not correctly 
catalogued and BOMed [sic]” (#180).  Difficulties in obtaining computer-based 
information were not limited to SAP, with vendors also not facilitating on-line access 
to critical supporting information, as indicated by the comment, “Better & more 
informative vendor manuals would be of great benefit (#121)”.  Even when it is 
available, accessing the information suffers from the same problems as SAP, in that 
“Vendor info not easy to find due to the way it's been loaded into DRIMS [the 
company’s document retrieval system], e.g. PDF docs of 100+ pages & no indexing 
function (#165).”   
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Another issue that arose in Study 2, and was reflected in the comments was the 
theme of Procedures & work direction.  Accurate procedures are regarded as critical 
to reliable maintenance work (Dekker, 2003a; McDonald, Corrigan, Daly, & Cromie, 
2000).  In the opinion of maintenance personnel, “More job procedures [are] 
required” (#15), and “A good percentage of procedures are out of date/wrong and 
require updates.  Changes are slow & require validating” (#116).  This appeared to 
be a systemic issue that was recognised by maintenance technicians as impacting on 
efficiency and reliability, and ultimately safety: “Poor management of change in 
regards to update of drawings, BOM's, procedures, etc. makes simple tasks difficult.  
Existing and new procedures are inadequate and compromise safety” (#166).  From 
the interviews in Study 2 it was reported that numerous procedures exist pertaining to 
Operations activities, but in contrast it was commented that, “Maintenance 
procedures are very poor” (#186).  It is unlikely that maintenance reliability can be 
supported without addressing the concerns and experience of maintenance 
technicians regarding access to adequate, accurate work-related information.  
However, this appears to be an issue that is not apparent in group-level differences, 
and therefore requires investigation at the organisation-level. 
 
8.5 Summary and Conclusions 
The data obtained through content analysis of respondents’ comments served to 
triangulate the quantitative data obtained in Study 3.  That is, it provided both 
support for the significant results of the quantitative findings, and possible 
explanations for the non-significant findings.  The two variables in Study 3 that 
significantly differentiated high and low reliability work areas were based on the 
perceptions of maintenance personnel regarding the design and maintenance of their 
workplace, and their ability to solve problems that arise.  In their comments, Design 
& Maintenance was perceived by maintenance personnel as influencing reliability 
principally through the quality and availability of spare parts, and the maintenance 
condition of their facility.  Little mention was made of the original design of 
equipment, other than one comment concerning the need to involve maintenance 
personnel in designing plants.  A concern with plant design may only arise when a 
failure occurs; otherwise maintenance technicians tend to ‘work with what they 
have.’  The role of the Overdue maintenance dimension in the Design & 
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Maintenance scale appeared to be supported by comments made concerning the 
shortages of time, personnel, and spares needed to manage maintenance 
requirements.  At the same time, there were a number of concerns with the 
effectiveness of maintenance planning, with a frequent request to have maintenance 
activity planners onboard off-shore facilities.   
 
Many comments concerning Problem-solving related to access to adequate technical 
information, including up-to-date procedures, often expressed as 1) the difficulty of 
obtaining information from electronic information systems such as the SAP database, 
and 2) the shortage of up-to-date procedures with required technical information.  
Similarly, sufficient technical training and the acquisition of experience were seen to 
be hampered by workplace systems.  These systems in turn impacted on decision-
making, which was also identified by maintenance personnel as flawed at times.  
They regarded these flaws as being due to organisational pressures such as time 
constraints, organisational culture, and problems with the information systems that 
were designed to ensure that learnings are fed back in order to assist in solving new 
problems.  Comments concerning decision-making related mainly to the group-level 
and organisation-level, rather than the individual-level.  As the items in the Vigilance 
scale were expressed in terms of individual-level traits, this may be an explanation 
for the absence of a significant between-groups difference.  This finding highlighted 
the importance of investigating level-specific phenomena in human factors research 
using measures that are appropriate to the level being investigated. 
 
The single largest group of comments discussed the efficiency of current work 
systems.  While these comments did not directly concern the reliability of equipment, 
they did indicate that maintenance personnel, particularly in the middle and highest 
reliability work areas, are concerned about inefficiency and have a negative 
perception of workplaces that are not structured in a way that facilitates their work.  
This implied that in work areas in which reliability was higher, maintenance 
personnel had a greater sense of motivation, and commitment to solving problems 
and improving their workplace systems.  In lower reliability work areas, maintenance 
personnel appeared to have less sense of control over their workplace, and 
consequently their focus was on management and supervisory impacts on workplace 
systems, including the effects of poor decision-making. 
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Finally, in keeping with the conclusions of Study 2, organisational communication 
was found to be a frequent concern to respondents.  Much of this concerned the 
difficulty of accessing information through the electronic information management 
systems, and the lack of, and inaccuracies in, procedures for maintenance activities.  
These concerns were expressed with relatively equal frequency across lower, middle 
and higher reliability work areas, indicating that inadequate information is an 
organisation-wide phenomenon.  The uniform concern across all reliability levels 
was therefore a possible explanation for the absence of significant group differences 
observed in the scores for Job-related Feedback and Information about change. 
 
Respondents used the opportunity of the survey to express their opinions concerning 
facets of the workplace that helped and hindered their work.  Thus, while not all 
comments were relevant to this research, judging by the large response received, 
maintenance personnel clearly appreciated the opportunity afforded by the survey to 
articulate their opinions concerning their workplace. 
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9.0 Overall Discussion 
9.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1, the concept of reliability as an important dimension of industrial 
activity was presented.  Although, reliability is generally conceptualised in terms of 
technical design and engineering failure analysis, the value of incorporating a human 
factors approach was proposed on the basis of advances in understanding the role of 
human factors in hazardous industries, such as petroleum production.  Chapter 2 
reviewed the literature relating to the fields of engineering reliability and human 
factors, with particular emphasis on: 
• the limitations of a solely engineering approach to reliability 
• the theoretical and empirical research that has been conducted into the 
relationship between human factors and maintenance performance in the 
petroleum industry 
• models of failure based on flaws in systems for organising maintenance 
activities   
• the importance to human factors theory of the concept of level-specific 
phenomena in organisational reliability. 
 
Chapter 3 explained the rationale for designing a study to identify the predominant 
human factors in failures, and determining the quantitative relationships between 
human factors and the maintenance reliability of petroleum industry operations.  
Both the practical value to industrial organisations and the theoretical contribution to 
understanding the role of human factors generally in the workplace were considered. 
Chapters 4-8 then detailed the methods and findings of three studies conducted 
within a petroleum producing company to improve the understanding of these 
relationships.  The research in these three studies was based on the following 
objectives of the project: 
• Select and refine a method for analysing the most-frequent contributors to 
maintenance failures, and use this method to determine the human factors 
that appear most frequently in company-based reports of maintenance-
related failures.  
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• Determine the human factors that contributed most-frequently to 
maintenance-related failures in petroleum industry operations based on 
structured interviews with maintenance personnel. 
• Measure the group-level differences between higher and lower reliability 
work areas in the strength of the human factors that were most frequently 
identified in Study 2 as contributing to maintenance-related failures.  
 
In this chapter, the key findings from these studies are presented.  The strengths and 
limitations of the data collection methods and sample populations used are explored 
in order to suggest improvements in methodology.  Following this, the theoretical 
and practical implications of this research in terms of the reliability of petroleum 
industry operations are examined.  Finally, future directions are considered for 
further human factors studies of maintenance reliability in the petroleum industry. 
 
9.2 Key Findings 
9.2.1 Findings in Studies 1-3 
Figure 18 provides a schematic representation of the conceptual links between the 
human factors found to be important in the findings of Studies 1-3.  In Study 1, 
reports of Asset Damage/Production Loss incidents (N=194) were analysed to 
determine the demographics of maintenance-related failures within the company.  
Violations, Design & Maintenance, Detection, and Decision-making were identified 
as the four most-frequent causes, respectively, attributed to these incidents.  These 
findings accord with a view of failure in industrial systems as either technical in 
nature (Dhillon, 2002), or caused by violations of workplace rules (Lawton, 1998) 
and human errors, often characterised as a loss of situation awareness (Cacciabue, 
2004) or poor decision-making (Hobbs & Williamson, 2002).  Using HFIT (Gordon, 
2001), a mean of 2.3 factors per incident were identified in the incident reports.  A 
more detailed examination of the group-level (Crichton, 2005; Culvenor, 2003) and 
organisation-level (Dekker, 2006) contributors to failure was considered necessary to 
better understand the role of human factors in reliability. 
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Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 (Quantitative)
Study 3       
(Qualitative)









 Communication (#3)  Communication 
Violation (#1)   Need for personnel & support systems 
Detection Error (#3)   Efficiency 
 
Figure 18.  Diagram of conceptual links between the findings from Studies 1-3.  
 
Study 2 provided this greater depth of understanding of the contributors to failures 
through information collected in structured interviews (N=38) with maintenance 
personnel, concerning failures they had personally experienced.  In these 
investigations, again using HFIT, a mean of 9.5 contributing factors per incident was 
identified.  Assumption, Design & Maintenance, and Communication were identified 
as the three most-frequent human factors codes, respectively.  In addition to 
identifying these recurring contributors to failure, the discussions surrounding each 
of the factors in HFIT (k=27) provided detailed supporting information, which was 
used to identify the sub-factors influencing each incident.  For example, these sub-
factors clarified that flaws in Design & Maintenance were mainly related to limited 
access for maintenance, poor labelling of units, problems encountered with 
modifications and non-standard designs, and overdue maintenance.  Similarly, 
Assumption was found to be partly the result of problem-solving behaviours, such as 
making assumptions based on past experience, partly flawed decision-making, and 
partly the result of inadequate task-related information.  The most-frequent 
Communication sub-factors represented a lack of communication, and poor 
  
                                                       Human Factors and Plant Maintenance Reliability 221
communication between companies or team members, or between on-shore and off-
shore personnel. 
  
The identification of sub-factors was useful in the process of selecting measures for 
the survey for Study 3.  Based on the results of Study 2, the measures for Study 3 
consisted of the Vigilance scale from the Melbourne Decision-Making Questionnaire  
(Mann, Burnett, Radford, & Ford, 1997), the Problem-solving scale from the Work 
Design Questionnaire (Morgeson & Humphrey, 2006), and the Source of Information 
and Subject of Information scales from the OCD/2 questionnaire (Wiio, 1978).  In 
addition, the eight most frequent Design & Maintenance sub-factors identified in 
Study 2 were selected for the Study 3 Design & Maintenance scale. 
 
A survey form was sent to maintenance personnel across nine work areas in three 
types of facility, with each work area assigned a reliability level relative to the other 
areas within its facility type.  Analyses of variance and covariance of the survey and 
reliability level data from valid responses (N=172, Response rate = 41.6%) revealed 
that statistically significant group differences between work areas were found to be 
based on reliability level for Design & Maintenance, and Problem-solving, but not 
for the other three variables.  Higher reliability was predictive of higher Design & 
Maintenance scores, while lower reliability was predictive of higher Problem-solving 
scores.  A significant interaction effect was observed between reliability level and 
facility type for the dependent variable Design & Maintenance.  In addition, there 
were significant correlations between Design & Maintenance and Time at Facility, 
and between Job-related feedback and Employer. 
 
Of the survey respondents, 101 (56.7%) supplied written comments in response to an 
open-ended question at the end of the survey form that asked what they considered to 
have hindered or helped their maintenance activities.  Using Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis, 57 sub-themes were identified in the text, which were 
reduced to 12 distinct themes, and ultimately four super-ordinate themes.  Of these 
super-ordinate themes, Communication & access to information, and Need for more 
personnel & better support systems were uniformly represented across lower, middle 
and higher reliability work areas.  Contrasting this, comments concerning Efficiency 
of workplace systems were more frequent in middle and higher reliability work areas, 
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while respondents from lower reliability work areas commented more frequently on 
Management & supervisory impacts.  This super-ordinate theme included the theme 
of Poor decision-making, which was also more frequently mentioned in comments 
from lower reliability work areas than middle or higher reliability work areas. 
 
The following is an examination of the strengths and weaknesses of the methods 
used to obtain these findings in the three studies conducted. 
 
9.3 Strengths and Limitations of the Present Research 
9.3.1 Strengths 
9.3.1.1 Methodology 
This research was one of the first studies to utilise multiple sources of data to 
develop a quantitative analysis of the relationship between human factors and plant 
reliability.  Quantitative and qualitative experimental methods, triangulation of data 
sources, and both engineering and organisational data were used to test a 
methodology for assessing the influence of human factors on reliability.  The 
agreement among findings has demonstrated the advantages of triangulating the data 
from multiple collection methods, as has been used effectively in related research 
areas (Glendon & Litherland, 2001; Oedewald & Reiman, 2003).  Each of the 
methods, namely company incident investigations, HFIT interviews, surveys, and 
content analysis, has contributed additional data concerning the role of human factors 
in maintenance activities.  At the same time, triangulation has been useful when the 
findings of one method were needed to interpret or support the findings derived from 
another method. 
 
In addition, these methods demonstrated the ability to provide significant conclusions 
regarding the role of specific factors in a specific domain, namely petroleum 
operations.  The research demonstrated that rich sources of data are available from 
company incident reports, structured interviews, and the perceptions of maintenance 
personnel, which could be used to investigate empirically human factors theory.  The 
findings demonstrated that there is a need for greater human factors expertise in 
investigating incidents in petroleum operations, as well as a need to distinguish 
between the important factors in day-to-day reliability and those in failures.  The 
research also demonstrated that these methods could be utilised to obtain baseline 
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data on the human factors climate or ‘health’ of an organisation in relation to 
reliability.  Then, by using longitudinal studies, these methods have a potential 
application for determining whether deterioration or improvement is occurring over 
time, and for measuring the effects of interventions by management.  
 
Finally, the research demonstrated the value of eliciting the opinions of the 
maintenance workforce in order to improve knowledge about the condition and 
operation of facilities, as well as to obtain explanatory data to develop and evaluate 
theory.  Maintenance personnel showed a willingness to provide information that 
was useful for research purposes.  They also demonstrated an awareness of existing 
conditions that was sensitive to the operational differences between work areas.  
Although surveys have been commonly used to elicit opinions concerning the 
influence of individual traits and organisational factors on organisational 
performance, this was one of the first studies to rely on the perceptions of 
maintenance personnel as the primary source of quantitative data concerning plant 
design and maintainability.  The statistically significant relationships demonstrated 
among group and organisation variables justified this confidence in the value of their 
perceptions.  
 
9.3.1.2 Demonstrated human factors in reliability 
The current research has demonstrated potentially important understandings 
concerning the significant role of Design & Maintenance in reliability, and more 
importantly, the significant requirements of problem-solving and information 
availability.  These findings might assist decision-makers with respect to specifying 
the design of workplace (e.g., training, supervision, and procedural requirements) in 
the early stages of engineering new facilities, as well as providing a basis for 




The research suffered from a number of limitations relating to the methods used for 
data collection, and the size and composition of the sample populations contributing 
to Studies 2 and 3. 
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9.3.2.1 Method 
The HFIT instrument provided a comprehensive taxonomy, comprising many of the 
workplace factors influencing performance that were described in the human factors 
literature reviewed.  As such, it seemed suitable for determining the most-frequent 
contributors to failure.  Nevertheless, HFIT required modification to improve its 
effectiveness and accuracy for obtaining the required information for Studies 1 and 2.  
Despite these modifications, a number of limitations were apparent with the methods 
used to collect data for Studies 1 and 2.  The limitations in using company incident 
data were anticipated, as discussed in Section 4.4, and the data was recognised as 
being of only limited value.  The following limitations arising in the use of HFIT to 
collect data in Study 2 were more critical to the outcomes of this research. 
• Despite the modifications made to HFIT, there was still a degree of ambiguity 
in the names and sub-factors of several codes, introducing unnecessary 
variability in assigning codes to failures.  This might be resolved by further 
refinement of code names and sub-factor questions, followed by validation 
using more than one rater. 
• Assignment of codes relied on accurate recall of events some time after they 
occurred, with biases developing in the interviewees’ accounts of events.  
Stipulating that only recent events be investigated could provide better recall 
and may also reduce hindsight bias. 
• Use of a single coder was useful in maintaining consistency across the group 
of interviews, but provided no means of eliminating the interviewer’s biases 
in interpreting events and actions.  This was partially addressed by enlisitng a 
second coder for a random selection of cases, and recoding all cases at the 
end of interviewing to reduce drift in coding.  However, coding consistency 
could be improved by using multiple coders for all cases and monitoring the 
inter-rater reliability. 
• McNemar Tests of Change showed no significant differences between closely 
ranked codes, despite the Cochran’s Q Test which indicated that significant 
differences existed within the dataset.  The most serious implication of this is 
that the most-frequent codes, Assumption, Design & Maintenance, and 
Communication, which were accepted as the basis for Study 3, were not 
necessarily more important than the codes following them in ranking.  A less 
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serious implication was that there was insufficient statistical power in Study 
2, and that with a larger sample size, significant differences may be detected.  
 
There were a number of limitations to Study 3, involving both assignment of 
reliability level and collection of data concerning the perceptions of staff.  
• Reliability ranking depended on production deferments, which were 
relatively infrequent events in some work areas with a degree of variability 
from month to month.  More precision in assessing the reliability of facilities 
would increase the confidence in these rankings as well as allowing for 
regression analysis between a scalar reliability variable and survey scores.  
This precision could be achieved through analysis of Mean-Time Between 
Failure data from major pieces of mechanical and electrical equipment (e.g., 
programmable logic controllers, compressors, turbines, and pumps).  This 
type of failure data is currently recorded by the company, but needs to be 
collected more systematically and recorded more accurately to be of value in 
measuring work area reliability. 
• Although comparisons among the same type of facility (gas platforms or 
FPSOs) eliminated some confounds, comparing different work areas in the 
Process Plant was more problematic, as different types of equipment and 
maintenance processes are involved.  Cognitive task analyses could assist in 
ensuring that the tasks being done in different work areas are accounted for in 
any comparisons. 
• Selection of scales appropriate to the factors identified in Study 2 relied on 
the availability of validated measures in the literature.  The most appropriate 
scales were selected, but there were clear inadequacies in several of these in 
terms of testing the constructs of interest.  For example, while testing of the 
prevalence of assumptions in decision-making at the group-level was 
required, the Vigilance scale items referred to individual-level traits.  This 
evoked a relatively uniform and positive response, which did not accord with 
many of the comments made in Study 3 relating to group-level characteristics 
of decision-making.  Similarly, the items in the communication scales often 
referred to organisation-level processes (e.g. information on organisational 
change), when testing of group-level differences was required.  Access to 
validated scales other than those in the public domain may provide a broader 
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selection of instruments for testing the human factors constructs identified in 
Study 2. 
• Factor analysis has revealed some disparities in the loadings of items relative 
to the original scale structures of Design & Maintenance and Organisational 
Communication.  Again, this may require better scale selection to improve 
validity with respect to the constructs being tested, or may require refinement 
of the individual items and consistency testing of these revised scales to 
ensure internal reliability.  
• Despite expectations based on the literature, Organisational Communication 
and Vigilance did not demonstrate a significant relationship to reliability.  
Explanations were offered based on content analysis of the comments made 
by survey respondents.  However, these responses were not rigorously tested, 
and questions remain as to whether Organisational Communication and 
Vigilance scores could be predictive of reliability if measured differently 
(e.g., more sensitive measures, more statistical power, or a different form of 
analysis).  More detailed testing of these dimensions is required to understand 
this lack of significance in the survey results. 
• Some of the conclusions of this research were drawn from content analysis of 
a single open-ended question.  While the responses provided a rich source of 
data, there was clearly a frequent focus on efficiency of maintenance 
processes, when reliability, the construct being tested, is more concerned with 
the effectiveness of these processes.  Questions more clearly focussed on 
effectiveness would provide data more specific to the overall aim of the 
research, namely understanding the relationship between human factors and 
maintenance reliability. 
 
9.3.2.2 Sample size 
Small sample size was a recurring limitation in Studies 2 and 3.  In Study 2 the 
availability of maintenance personnel willing to take time out for an interview and 
the remoteness of facilities limited the number of potential participants available for 
interviews.  Sample size was also limited due to the time required for structured 
interviews, which in turn made achieving sufficient statistical power in the study 
difficult.  The lack of statistical power may have been a reason for the inability to 
find significant differences between closely-ranked codes in Study 2.  Multiple 
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interviewers, also serving as multiple coders, would expedite the collection and 
processing of interview data, possibly revealing a significant difference in the 
frequency of the predominant codes.  
 
In Study 3, the overall population size was considered acceptable (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007), but the number of responses from several facilities provided a sample 
that was too small for the intended analysis.  Thus, the 3x3 factorial design, as 
originally intended with facility type and reliability level as the independent 
variables, was not possible.  Again, statistical power was low for the analyses that 
were conducted, possibly contributing to the non-significant results obtained from 
ANOVAs of several of the variables.  Replicating the research in a larger 
maintenance organisation or by including additional personnel, such as operators, 
may provide a clearer evaluation of the hypotheses being tested. 
 
9.3.2.3 Selection bias 
One of the consequences of small sample sizes was the possible introduction of 
selection biases.  The cohort for the interviews was self-selected on the basis that all 
who offered to be interviewed were accepted for interviews.  This resulted in the 
sample being less representative on some criteria, relative to the entire company 
workforce.  For example, the sample was biased towards maintenance personnel who 
worked in the head office and the Process Plant, who were easier to access than 
personnel who worked off-shore.  With a large enough workforce and more access to 
off-shore facilities, a more representative sample could be obtained.  Similarly, the 
incidents examined were self-selected by the participants.  This sample was also less 
representative on several demographic criteria, relative to the incident population in 
the company database used in Study 1.  For example, severe incidents were found to 
be over-represented in the interviews.  This could be corrected through selection of 
representative incidents and interviewing the people involved.  However, this 
requires targeting individuals, which then leads to concerns about trust and 
confidentiality, which were not encountered when the interviewees were self-
selected.   
 
In Study 3, selection bias mainly resulted from motivational differences in 
completing the survey, and in lodging comments at the end of the survey.  It is 
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possible that the 42% of the maintenance personnel who completed a valid 
questionnaire were more motivated than the other 58%.  The survey results may have 
been biased if, as is likely, less-motivated staff held different opinions relating to the 
variables tested in the survey.  A data collection method that achieves a higher 
response rate, such as a telephone interview sample, may provide an indication of the 
representativeness of the responses obtained.   
 
Finally, as the research was only conducted within one organisation, it is difficult to 
generalise the findings across other organisations and other industries.  Replicating 
the studies in other petroleum operations and other industries would indicate the 
applicability of the findings across different domains. 
 
9.4 Theoretical Implications 
The current research makes an important contribution from a methodological and 
theoretical perspective to understanding the role of human factors in reliability, 
supporting many of the ideas expressed by researchers into organisational 
performance.  Research in the areas of aviation, nuclear power generation, medicine, 
and military operations has supported the notion that high reliability can be 
developed in existing organisations through a human factors approach (Ericksen & 
Dyer, 2005; Vogus & Welbourne, 2003; Klein, Bigley & Roberts, 1995).  The 
current research has contributed an understanding of the theoretical role of human 
factors in a distinctly different domain, namely the petroleum industry.  Through the 
derivation of empirical group-level measures for workplace-based studies, Studies 2 
and 3 have revealed a new theoretical perspective on the way that human factors 
interact with the design of physical facilities to influence the reliability of outcomes.   
 
9.4.1 Assumptions/Problem-solving 
The results of this research revealed that an integrative approach including both 
design and problem-solving measures was beneficial in understanding the 
impediments to performance in socio-technical systems.  While logic dictates that 
these two should be related, as design in itself is a form of problem-solving (Wilpert, 
2007), the challenges of investigating across different knowledge domains, i.e. 
engineering and psychology, coupled with the format differences between technical 
data and socio-metric data, have limited the research in this area.  The current studies 
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have demonstrated the ability to combine technical assessments of equipment 
performance with the human experience of working with this technology, providing 
a more comprehensive basis for organisational decision-making.  In particular, 
problem-solving data demonstrated that equipment and workplace design limitations 
were significantly related to the requirements for problem-solving in the workforce.  
The negative correlation between Design & Maintenance and Problem-solving 
suggested a moderating role for problem-solving on the effect that design and 
maintenance factors have on reliability outcomes.  In comments from maintenance 
personnel, Design & Maintenance considerations were rarely mentioned, while 
comments were frequently received concerning decision-making and problem-
solving.  These latter comments were more frequently received from low reliability 
work areas (Figure 17).  These differences demonstrated a need to provide support 
for organisational decision-making and problem-solving in order to facilitate reliable 
maintenance of inherently flawed technical designs. 
 
In turn, the human factors and organisational psychology literature reviewed in 
Section 2.9 has clearly recognised problem-solving and associated decision-making 
as fundamental group-level processes that influence organisational outcomes.  
Oedewald and Reiman (2002; 2003) in particular characterised these dimensions as 
critical demands of the maintenance core task.  The current research extended these 
theoretical developments by demonstrating a quantitative and significant inverse 
relationship between problem-solving and maintenance outcomes.  This research also 
extended current theory by postulating how problems were being solved, namely 
through use of Recognition-Primed Decision-making, at times with assumption-
making based on experience and heuristics.  Decision-making observed in Study 2 
accorded with Carvalho, dos Santos, and Vidal’s (2005) estimate that 80% of the 
decisions made in the operating environment that they investigated were made 
through a Recognition-Primed Decision-making process.  However, the current 
research suggested that a Recognition-Primed Decision-making mode of problem-
solving defaulted to assumptions when provoked by shortages of time and 
information, and by complexities in the problem space (e.g. equipment, the work 
environment, or work systems).  As a result, the assumptions associated with this 
process were the most frequently occurring contributors to the failures examined in 
Study 2.   
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Although the literature rarely discussed ‘assumption-provoking’ factors per se in 
organisational behaviour, two of the cognitive processes involved, problem-solving 
(Proctor & Van Zandt, 1994) and decision-making (Kerr & Tindale, 2004) were 
often recognised as the stages at which assumptions were made, and these were often 
considered in the human factors literature in relation to organisational reliability.  For 
example, Ericksen and Dyer (2005) discussed ‘diligence’ in locating and identifying 
the source of problems, while other HRO literature (Choo, 2008; Vogus & 
Welbourne, 2003) suggested the need to avoid over-simplifying problems, both of 
which will reduce the tendency to make assumptions.  In the case of decision-
making, methodicalness has been recognised as part of the core maintenance task 
(Oedewald & Reiman, 2002), as has the importance of vigilance in the cognitive 
processing (e.g. acquiring information and assessing alternatives) needed for 
successful decision-making in the workplace (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2008; Lipshitz, 
Klein, Orasanu, & Salas, 2001).  For maintenance personnel, flexibility in adapting 
strategies to correct problems was suggested by Pettersen and Aase (2007), and this 
is another approach that might reduce the dependence on assumptions.  
 
It was anticipated that both of the dimensions of problem-solving and vigilance in 
decision-making would have demonstrated a relationship with group differences in 
reliability level.  However, only the Problem-solving scores were significantly 
predictive of reliability at the group level.  The results of the content analysis of 
Study 3 comments (Figure 17) indicated that respondents in lower reliability work 
areas were more likely to mention decision-making (i.e. as a sub-set of Management 
& supervisory impacts) than those in middle and higher reliability work areas.  
Attitudes to group- and organisational-level decision-making were typified by the 
comment, “Our decision-making process is always too fast [italics added],” 
indicating that decision-making variables would be expected to be predictive of 
group differences.  Zohar and Luria’s (2003b) studies of supervisory impacts on 
workgroup climate indicated the important mediating role of supervisors in 
workgroup climate as perceived by workers.  It appeared from their research and the 
comments of maintenance personnel in the current research that understanding 
vigilance in decision-making in the current context requires examination of decision-
making at the level of work teams, supervisors and management (Kerr & Tindale, 
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2004).  Thus, the level of analysis implied in the wording of the Vigilance scale may 
have been the main factor in the absence of a relationship between vigilance in 
decision-making and reliability level.  The items in the Problem-solving scale 
inquired about characteristics of the maintenance work in the respondent’s group 
(group-level) while, the Vigilance scale was designed to measure the respondent’s 
personality traits (individual level) with respect to decision-making.  The former 
were more likely to detect group differences in job design and workplace climate 
(Bourrier, 1996; Tucker, Edmondson, & Spear, 2002) while the latter may only 
detect differences in commitment (Louche & Lanneau, 2004; Meyer, Becker, & 
Vandenberghe, 2004) and motivation (Cassignol-Bertrand, Baldet, Louche, & Papet, 
2006; Latham & Pinder, 2005).  These differences between the items in Problem-
solving and Vigilance in detecting group-level reliability differences accord with the 
current interest in accurately assessing organisational phenomena at the appropriate 
level (Culvenor, 2003; Torp & Grøgaard, 2009; Zohar, 2008; Zohar & Luria, 2005).  
 
In contrast to Vigilance, Problem-solving demonstrated a significant, but inverse, 
relationship to reliability level.  Thus, as the assessed reliability decreased, the 
apparent need for better problem-solving skills increased.  From the results of Study 
2, insufficient problem-solving skills, in conjunction with poor designs and 
insufficient information, appeared to be accompanied by assumption-making, which 
was the principal contributor to failures.  Thus reliability, problem-solving skills, and 
maintenance failures were at least empirically linked through the two studies.  
Directionality still remained an important question to resolve.  That is, the question 
remained whether a lack of problem-solving skills requiring more frequent 
assumption-making causes lower reliability, or whether facilities that by history or 
design tend to be more unreliable require personnel to develop better problem-
solving skills.  Aside from the unlikelihood that less-skilled maintenance technicians 
and supervisors had been employed in lower reliability facilities, the evidence 
indicated that it is more likely that low reliability facilities require better problem-
solving skills.  Problem-solving scores showed a significant negative correlation with 
Design & Maintenance.  As scores on Design & Maintenance increased, perceptions 
of the need for problem-solving skills decreased, implicating problem-solving as 
moderating the effects of workplace design on reliability outcomes.  This was 
consistent with Bourrier’s (2005) contention that technical design should be 
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accompanied by organisational design.  The provision of skills, and systems for 
resolving problems as they arise, has been demonstrated to have a substantial 
influence on reliability differences among similar manufacturing operations 
(MacDuffie, 1997).   
 
Furthermore, the results of the content analysis of comments demonstrated that 
management and supervisory influences are perceived by maintenance personnel, 
particularly in low-reliability work areas, as having a major impact on their 
workplace.  Whether due to poor maintainability of the original design, or historical 
neglect of maintenance requirements, the ‘creation’ of inherently low-reliability 
facilities through design and management decisions then appeared to generate a need 
for greater problem-solving resources in the workforce.  If maintenance technicians 
in low-reliability work areas then cannot access the problem-solving skills, systems, 
and information required, their alternative is to rely on assumptions to fill in the 
cognitive gaps.  This is analogous to the situation for nurses, as was described in 
studies of US hospitals (Edmondson, 1996; Tucker, Edmondson, & Spear, 2002) in 
which shortages of resources, or internal organisational politics resulting from 
management decisions, tended to drive workers towards relying on assumptions 
rather than rigorous problem-solving.  Edmondson argued that the need for solving 
underlying problems in turn requires greater support from and involvement of 
management.  This conclusion was supported by comments in the theme of 
Management & supervisory impacts, such as the one identifying a “management 
focus on maintenance costs without any understanding of what contributes to these 
costs” (Respondent #70).   
 
The issue of problem-solving requirements also related to the modes of cognitive 
processing applied to resolving equipment faults.  As mentioned, the relative 
frequency of assumptions, as compared to other failure codes, was consistent with a 
tendency of maintainers to adopt Recognition-Primed Decision-making.  Although 
this form of Naturalistic Decision-making is now recognised as a common mode of 
decision-making among experienced workers in operating facilities (Lipshitz, Klein, 
Orasanu, & Salas, 2001), defaulting to Recognition-Primed Decision-making may be 
problematic in facilities in which the experience levels and inherent reliability are 
low.  In Recognition-Primed Decision-making, the first alternative that accords with 
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previous experience and decision-making criteria is adopted as the required solution, 
particularly under time and internal political pressures (Sagan, 1994).  Deficiencies 
in this approach are aggravated by the occurrence of organisational ‘blind spots’ to 
information that does not fit the prevailing frame of reference (Choo, 2008).  Thus, 
where complexity is low, inherent reliability is high, and experience is high, 
Recognition-Primed Decision-making is arguably an efficient mode of problem-
solving (Klein, 1997).  Efficiency as an objective of maintenance personnel was 
clearly demonstrated in the comments they made.  However, where reliability is low 
for a particular facility, complexity is high as in the petroleum industry, and 
experience varied, as Time at Facility (Figure 11) and Time in Industry (Figure 12) 
demonstrated, requisite variety in cognitive abilities, such as problem-solving skills 
(Hollnagel, 2002), may be insufficient to support a Recognition-Primed Decision-
making approach.  The result is likely to be a process of more assumption-making, 
leading to incorrect solutions, and an increased probability of failures.  Under these 
conditions, a more analytical approach to resolving maintenance problems may be 
beneficial.  Schaafstal, Schraagen, and van Berlo (2000) recognised that training of 
maintenance technicians tended to be experience-based as opposed to being based on 
problem-solving skills development.  They argued for more emphasis in training 
programs on learning trouble-shooting strategies rather than on systems knowledge.   
 
Klein (1997) also recognised that the Recognition-Primed Decision-making model 
did not apply to all Naturalistic Decision-making situations, and that a more 
analytical approach, involving identifying and comparing alternatives, could still 
occur in Naturalistic Decision-making.  Experience and heuristics would still play a 
major role in workplace decisions, but a more thorough gathering of information and 
exploration of alternatives would be developed.  This accords with Rasmussen’s 
(1997b) view of Naturalistic Decision-making as operating differently at different 
cognitive levels (i.e., the rule, skill, and knowledge levels) and the need to clearly 
distinguish the level of cognition involved when considering appropriate designs for 
workplace systems and training.  The evidence in this research is consistent with a 
moderating role for Problem-solving, in which any inherently low reliability in 
designs may require a different level of problem-solving skills and information 
availability, in order to both improve day-to-day outcomes and reduce the probability 
of failure. 
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9.4.2 Design & Maintenance 
The consistency of Design & Maintenance across all three studies (Figure 18) 
demonstrated the influence that this factor has on reliability.  It was understood from 
a number of points of reference, including that of company investigators and 
maintenance personnel discussing both past events and current workplace conditions.  
That original designs and the ease of maintaining these designs has influenced both 
failures and day-to-day reliability is well-supported by the literature.  The role of 
engineering design in failures has been acknowledged in past research, but 
explaining its role in day-to-day performance has been less clear.  For example, 
Kinnersley and Roelen (2007) have shown that 51% of the accidents in aviation and 
46% of accidents in NPPs relate to design.  Specifically in the process industries, 
Taylor (2007) attributed 55% of accidents to design.  In Study 2, 49% of the 
incidents related to design issues, which agrees well with both Taylor’s and 
Kinnersley and Roelen’s data.   
 
Despite detailed data on the genesis of accidents, no data were supplied in either of 
the two investigations cited above that indicated the relationship of day-to-day 
reliability to design.  This may be due to, as Wilpert (2007) argued, “complex 
technologies and large-scale technical installations [being] seen to fall into the 
domain of engineers who traditionally tended to focus on component failures” 
(p.295).  Tjiparuro and Thompson (2004) also discussed the determination of 
maintainability based on failure-based techniques, but argue that a more “holistic 
treatment of maintainability requirements” (p. 105) is needed, along with more 
consistent evaluation methods.  Attempts have been made to devise such evaluation 
methods (Mason, 1990; Wani & Gandhi, 1999; International Standards Organization, 
2006a).  However, in addition to focussing mainly on the risk of failures 
(Krishnasamy, Khan, & Haddara, 2005), measures are often more concerned with 
plant productivity (Lofsten, 2000; Bamber, Castka, Sharp, & Motara, 2003) than 
human factors requirements for reliability. 
 
The current research has demonstrated instead that in addition to the role of design in 
failures, a quantifiable and significant relationship exists between design and day-to-
day reliability.  Furthermore, the research demonstrated that group differences in 
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Design & Maintenance could be quantified based on the aggregated perceptions of 
maintenance personnel.  Other research has recognised the importance of 
characterising design and maintainability based on judgements of practitioners at the 
workplace-level (Reiman & Oedewald, 2006a; Reiman, Oedewald, & Rollenhagen, 
2005).  Reiman and his associates have conducted numerous studies of the 
maintenance culture in a hazardous industry (i.e. NPP).  In their studies, interviews 
and surveys were used to characterise qualitatively the climate dimensions of a 
successful maintenance organisation.  Their research revealed that an influence of 
human factors existed, as perceived by maintenance personnel, on the multiple 
dimensions of the maintenance task.  The current findings supported with 
quantitative data, their concept of the critical demands of maintenance, which in this 
research was related to problem-solving, and the instrumental demands, which in this 
research was related to organisational communication. 
 
9.4.3 Communication 
The frequent mention of Communication and the frequent contributing role of 
Information and Procedures in the interviews in Study 2 supported the association 
found in the literature between the quality of organisational communication and 
performance.  In Reiman, Oedewald, and Rollenhagen’s (2005) examination of 
maintenance culture in two NPPs, communication climate was one of the variables 
related to effectiveness in performing the maintenance task.  Their results showed 
communication climate to be significantly correlated with Job satisfaction, Job 
motivation, and Proficiency, though with differing results for the two organisations 
studied.  Despite this, neither of the two Study 3 communication variables, Job-
related feedback or Information about change, demonstrated significant group-level 
differences based on reliability level.  An explanation could again be found in the 
content analysis of the comments.  Organisational communication was the only 
variable from Study 3 that emerged in the qualitative analysis as a distinct super-
ordinate theme.  This super-ordinate theme, Communication & access to information, 
consisted of comments concerning many of the organisational flaws mentioned as 
contributing to Study 2 failures, namely, flawed organisational communication 
processes, inadequate procedures, and lack of information (Tables 19-21).  
Furthermore, the relatively uniform distribution of this super-ordinate theme across 
different reliability levels (Figure 17) appeared to explain the absence of group 
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differences in the Organisational communication variables.  The communication 
climate tended to be characteristic of the entire organisation, whereas reliability was 
measured at the group-level.  This distinction accords with Wiio’s (1978) original 
communication studies with the OCD/2 Audit and its predecessor, the LTT 
Communication Audit, as well as Aberg’s (1986) continuation of Wiio’s research.  In 
these studies, communication was discussed as an organisational characteristic, 
though group-level differences within the organisations studied were also identified.  
Interestingly, in the Study 3 survey, communication was also confirmed to be an 
organisational property in the sense that a significant correlation with Employer was 
observed.  Lower scores for Job-related feedback were significantly associated with 
the target company’s employees relative to contractors.  Although this is not a 
positive result for the company, it does indicate that communication climate is a 
dimension within the organisation’s control, rather than being dependent on the 
characteristics of a specific workgroup, or the individual traits of maintenance 
technicians and their supervisors.  This contention is supported by triangulating 
organisational communication findings across the three studies.  Insufficient 
information, inadequate procedures, and poor feedback mechanisms were often 
mentioned in incidents recorded in the First Priority database, in the interviews, and 
in the comments of respondents to the survey.  In contrast to team-based (group-
level) communication effectiveness, which was often argued in the safety literature 
(Crichton, 2005; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1998) and HRO literature (La Porte, 1996; 
Roberts & Tadmor, 2002) as being important, the functions arising in the current 
research were dimensions of communication climate originating instead at the 
organisational level.  The implication is that communication may play a contributing 
role in failures at the group level, but its role in predicting day-to-day reliability is 
only differentiated at the organisation level, such as in employer-related differences. 
 
9.4.4 Consideration of other human factors  
Company incident reports in Study 1 attributing many failures to Design & 
Maintenance were supported by Studies 2 & 3, but the attribution of failures to 
violations and human error (i.e., Violations, Detection, and Decision-making) was 
not supported by the other two studies.  Despite the literature (Hobbs & Williamson, 
2003; Holmgren, 2005; Reason & Hobbs, 2003) frequently attributing the cause of 
maintenance failures to violations, the data provided often did not differentiate either 
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the violation-provoking factors (Fergenson, 1971; Holmgren, 2005; Torp & 
Grøgaard, 2009) or the underlying motivations, as identified in the theoretical 
discussions of Reason, Parker, and Lawton (1998).  Consequently, interviewees in 
Study 2 were carefully questioned to ensure that violations as a possible contributing 
factor was fully explored.  A common response was that violations of procedures had 
not been a factor, primarily because procedures were not available for the task.  Lack 
of procedures was a contention supported by comments from Study 3, as in the 
example, “The main problem retarding my way forward is two-fold, 1.  lack of up-to-
date procedures…”  (Respondent #22).  This accords with Taylor’s (2007) study of 
design error in chemical plant accidents.  Among the failures he attributed to 
Managerial Errors, ~25% were due to Inadequate Procedures and only ~7% were 
due to Procedures Not Followed.  A similar ratio of inadequate procedures to 
violations was identified in Study 2.  Violation of rules due to poor availability of 
procedures is not limited to industrial contexts.  In relation to their investigation of an 
adverse drug event, Iedema, Jorm, Braithwaite, Travaglia, and Lum (2006) argued, 
“The uptake of formal rules is contingent on the extent to which the rules are woven 
into the existing fabric of activities” (p. 1207).  They found that procedures could 
only partially specify acceptable actions, after which clinicians needed to adapt 
systems to the situation, at times in opposition to formal rules.  Similarly, the 
‘procedures’ that the First Priority reports in Study 1 claimed should have been 
followed, often amounted to an idealised concept of how a particular maintenance 
activity should have proceeded, without regard to what Iedema et al regarded as ‘the 
complexity of everyday situations.’  The First Priority incident reports also suffered 
from the Hindsight Bias discussed by Dekker (2005).  He contended that Hindsight 
Bias is more about modelling what should have occurred in the situation that led to 
an adverse outcome, than it is about explaining what actually occurred.  Similarly, 
the findings of Studies 1 and 2 indicated that although investigators often concluded 
that a procedure should have been followed, such a procedure that fully-specified the 
tasks to be undertaken often did not exist. 
 
Human errors, in the form of Detection and Decision-making (both sub-categories of 
Situation Awareness) were also often reported in First Priority as contributing factors 
without reference to situational context.  This too is typical of incident investigations 
that conclude with a finding of human error rather than taking human error as a 
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starting point for further investigation (Dekker, 2006).  The current research 
demonstrated the complexity of analysing each particular failure; company 
investigations revealed a mean of 2.3 factors per failure, compared to structured, 
human factors-based interviews that revealed a mean of 9.5 factors per failure.  
While the intention of the study was not to count errors, which Dekker (2003b; 2007) 
clearly warned against, the interviews in Study 2 served to reveal the prevalence and 
interactivity of the specific factors underlying reliability in a complex socio-technical 
system. 
 
Finally, other factors that the organisational literature tended to regard as important 
to workgroup performance, such as supervision (O'Dea & Flin, 2001; Wu, Chen, & 
Li, 2008), training (Kirby, Knapper, Evans, Carty, & Gadula, 2003; McKeon, 
Cunningham, & Oswaks, 2009; O'Connor & Flin, 2003; Salas, Burke, Bowers, & 
Wilson, 2001; Salas et al., 2008), and teamwork (Crichton, 2005; Flin, Fletcher, 
McGeorge, Sutherland, & Patey, 2003; Sexton, Thomas, & Helmreich, 2000) were 
not frequent contributors to the failures investigated in Studies 1 and 2.  Requests for 
better supervision and more training were mentioned in Study 3 comments 
aggregated in the super-ordinate theme, Need for more personnel and better 
workgroup support systems.  As with communication, this super-ordinate theme was 
relatively uniformly distributed across reliability levels, indicating it to be an 
organisation-wide desire for better support for work activities, rather than a direct 
contributor to failures or poor reliability.  As such, the workforce appeared to be 
following the course of HRO development as described by Ericksen and Dyer 
(2005), in which personnel recognise the need for greater diligence and responsibility 
for rectifying situations.  Furthermore, the recognition by maintenance personnel of 
the need for training and better access to information, among other ‘reliability-
oriented employee behaviours’ was an expression of a lack of complacency about the 
challenges that they and the organisation face.   
 
9.4.5 Models 
9.4.5.1 Human Malfunction Model 
As discussed in the literature review, a framework is required in the assessment of 
human behaviour in general, and in this particular research, organisational behaviour 
in relation to reliability outcomes.  HFIT (Gordon, Flin, & Mearns, 2005) and the 
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Human Malfunction model (Rasmussen et al., 1981) upon which it was partly based, 
has proved to be a useful framework for: 
• assigning a formal structure to the human factors contributing to incidents 
• quantifying the occurrences of these factors  
• deriving logical explanations for the mechanisms involved.   
While remaining mindful of Dekker’s injunction against ‘counting errors’ and 
‘digitising data’ (Dekker, 2003b) HFIT taxonomy has provided the means for 
obtaining a greater understanding of the mechanisms involved in failures.   
 
The current research has shown that it is beneficial for organisations to proceed 
beyond counting errors and failures to an understanding of the factors supporting 
day-to-day reliability.  Although individual-level traits such as intrinsic motivation, 
commitment, and job satisfaction, were often explored in the literature and are likely 
to contribute to reliability, these rarely arose in the current research.  The code 
Person Factors was rarely mentioned in the interviews and the Vigilance data in 
Study 3 was not significant.  The evidence from Studies 2 and 3 was that group-level 
and organisational-level factors played a greater role in reliability.  These positive 
group and organisational processes served to oppose the Drift Into Failure described 
in the model initially developed by Rasmussen (1997a) and further refined by Cook 
and Rasmussen (2005) and Dekker (2005).   
 
9.4.5.2 Drift Into Failure Model 
As described in Chapter 2, the Drift Into Failure model postulates that in any 
organisation there is a safe operating domain, within which the accepted work 
procedures, team functions, operating limits, and supervisory controls ensure a high 
probability of reliable operation.  Under organisational pressures, such as restricted 
time and financial resources, organisational ‘fine-tuning’ (Starbuck & Milliken, 
1988), and internal political agendas (Sagan, 1994), drift can occur in day-to-day 
processes.  This drift is accompanied by a decrease in the probability of reliable 
operation.  Eventually, sufficient drift brings these processes into the proximity of 
safe operating boundaries, essentially the point at which probabilities of failure are 
higher than the process designers, the organisation’s management, or the industry 
regulators would consider acceptable.  In the current context of a petroleum 
operation, drift in the processes investigated would be predicted to compromise the 
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systems that protect against failures (Urbina, 2010; Øien 2001a; Øien 2001b).  From 
the findings of Studies 2 and 3, at the group level, drift in problem-solving processes 
implies a reduced ability to manage the Design & Maintenance impacts on 
reliability.  In Figure 19, a graphical representation is provided of the theoretical 

























Figure 19.  Theoretical relationship between the processes investigated in Studies 2 
and 3.  
 
9.4.6 Generalisability of the findings 
Application of this research to other organisations is reliant on the generalisability of 
the findings to other domains, including other companies in the petroleum industry 
and other industries, and to theoretical human factors research.  The factors identified 
as the most frequent contributors to failure, i.e. assumptions in decision-making and 
problem-solving, design and maintainability, and organisational communication, 
were all of sufficient prominence in the literature to be logical candidates for 
examination in any industrial operation.  In addition, these factors were apparent in 
failures outside of industrial operations, such as the Barings Bank collapse (Choo, 
2008).  In that failure, poor communication of warning signs and assumptions about 
the robustness of financial system safeguards permitted the total failure of a financial 
network.  This failure demonstrated the critical role of problem-solving and 
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organisational communication as likely contributors to failure in non-industrial 
domains as well.  However, different organisations are likely to experience different 
contributing factors in failures, as the significant Employer-related differences in 
Organisational Communication scores demonstrated.  The current methodology was 
specifically intended to narrow the range of human factors closely examined to just 
the most-frequent contributors to failure.  It was intended that the methods used 
would allow any organisation to determine the predominant human factors in its 
specific context.  The selection of the scales relied on the factors found in the 
preliminary studies, but could be reconfigured based on validated scales for testing 
organisational, group, and individual characteristics.  Reliability ranking of work 
areas was based on accepted engineering principles, and as such could be derived by 
comparing work areas in any organisation for which appropriate data was available.     
 
The variables used in the Study 3 survey might not demonstrate the same statistical 
relationship in another organisation.  Each organisation has specific climate 
characteristics which wholly or in part influence reliability (Bourrier, 1996; Reiman, 
Oedewald, & Rollenhagen, 2005).  It did appear from the literature, however, that 
modern workplaces commonly experience inadequate communication (Alvarez & 
Coiera, 2006; Baltes, Dickson, Sherman, Bauer, & LaGanke, 2002; Greenberg et al., 
2007; Horwitz et al., 2009) and deficient information systems (Hoffman, 2008), and 
that industrial designs create the conditions for many failures (Kinnersley & Roelen, 
2007; Taylor, 2007) which may be remedied through improved problem-solving 
skills (Wilpert, 2007) and recognition of the decision-making processes that naturally 
occur in the workplace (Carvalho, dos Santos, & Vidal, 2005).  Therefore, these 
findings might find immediate application by those industrial organisations 
attempting to improve reliability via a human factors approach, as well as by the 
researchers developing a theoretical understanding of the human-machine and 
human-system interactions which contribute to the evolution of both day-to-day 
reliability and catastrophic failures. 
 
9.5 Practical Implications for Reliability in Maintenance 
9.5.1 Problem-solving 
The implications from this research, that problem-solving may moderate the effect of 
inherently low-reliability technical designs on outcomes, is important to the on-going 
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operation of hazardous facilities.  The empirical findings (Figure 18) indicated that 
the management of complex socio-technical operations would benefit from balancing 
design considerations at the initial engineering stage, against the problem-solving 
and informational requirements of the workforce throughout the service life of the 
plant, if ‘acceptable’ outcomes are to be attained in terms of the risk of failure and 
loss of productivity.  Much of the design and engineering literature, as discussed in 
Section 2.6, has attempted to conceptualise the association between design, 
maintainability, and outcomes as a direct one.  The research quoted in Section 2.7 
concerning design-related accidents typically recognised that there are contributing 
factors to these failures, but did not discuss the factors moderating the effects of 
inherently flawed designs.   
 
From the findings, it appeared that organisations would benefit from identifying and 
supporting the problem-solving climate that has developed within their workgroups.  
If the climate is one that favours experienced maintenance personnel utilising a 
Recognition-Primed Decision-making approach, the organisation will benefit from 
reducing the frequency of assumptions and increasing the accuracy of the 
assumptions that are made.  This can be promoted by developing expertise and 
experience among maintenance technicians through active organisational learning.  
Small failures offer opportunities to learn (Baumard & Starbuck, 2005; Carroll, 
1998), provided that there exists a feedback culture based on de-briefings (Lipshitz, 
2007), organisation-wide Lessons Learned systems (Carnes & Breslau, 2002), or 
relatively easy access to historical information (Cannon & Edmondson, 2005).   
 
Alternatively, if problem complexity is frequently high and experience is relatively 
low, such as with a younger workforce, a new operating facility, or a particularly 
unusual design-related problem, a Recognition-Primed Decision-making approach 
will engender too many faulty assumptions.  A more analytical approach to 
maintenance trouble-shooting is desirable, as Schaafstal et al (2000) have argued.  
They found in their investigations that “problems were mainly solved, if at all, by 
recognition of similarity to a previous problem” (p. 77) and that therefore “it became 
useful to distinguish between system knowledge and general trouble-shooting 
strategy” (p.77).  Their training of maintenance technicians to formulate problem-
solving strategies more analytically was successful, demonstrating that problem-
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solving climate can be changed to a more organisationally-effective approach if 
supported by management, as MacDuffie (1997) found in his studies of auto 
factories.  The findings of Studies 2 and 3 showed that management decisions 
affecting problem-solving climate would benefit from aligning with the demands of 
inherent design reliability and the characteristics of the maintenance workforce, in 
order to support the maintenance task and thereby decrease the probability of failure. 
 
9.5.2 Design & Maintenance 
The consistency of Design & Maintenance across all three studies also demonstrated 
the need for an integrative approach involving past failure history, relative measures 
of human factors, and the perceptions of maintenance personnel, all of which have a 
complimentary role in providing data to support organisational decision-making 
concerning maintenance (Figure 18).  Organisations attempting to fine-tune their 
socio-technical processes in order to achieve greater efficiencies (Starbuck & 
Milliken, 1988) would benefit from obtaining equivalent data from each of these 
sources, as each contributes an additional understanding of the influences of human 
factors on outcomes.  Despite the apparent technical focus of the dimension Design 
& Maintenance, the findings indicated the relationship of Design & Maintenance to 
other human factors, such as Problem-solving, which may moderate outcomes from 
this factor (Figure 19).  Companies could benefit from broadening their design 
considerations to include human factors-based analyses of the factors that influence 
reliability.  As the interview and survey results demonstrated, investigations of 
specific failures provides direction for closer examination of group-level differences 
between lower reliability work areas and better-performing work areas.  
Furthermore, as the comment analysis showed, qualitative data can be used to 
explain and justify the type and extent of interventions required to reduce the 
probability of design-related failures. 
 
The influence of Design & Maintenance on maintenance activities was both 
significantly related to reliability, as well as being implicated in the need for 
acquiring problem-solving skills.  Although all operating facilities may experience 
periods of lower and higher reliability, several of the facilities examined 
demonstrated consistently lower reliability than seemingly equivalent facilities 
(Figure 6).  Tucker, Edmondson, and Spear (2002) argued that inherent reliability is 
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a characteristic of the workplace; that is, poor design of physical and organisational 
workplace systems leads to a condition of inherently poor reliability.  As Tucker et 
al. described, nurses and other front-line workers typically ‘work around’ problems, 
rather than devising second-order solutions to correct the underlying workplace 
designs that are responsible for the problems.   
 
The origins of low inherent reliability may be due to decision-making in the original 
design process (Cullen, 2007), in which financial constraints (Aoudia, Belmokhtar, 
& Zwingelstein, 2008), lack of human factors awareness in design considerations 
(Bea, 1998), or attempts to fine tune systems with advanced engineering (Starbuck & 
Milliken, 1988) result in systems in which human factors work against performance.  
Additionally, low reliability may also be due to historical deterioration of the 
maintenance function caused by management neglect or policy, as was attributed to 
the Piper Alpha (Pate-Cornell, 1993) and Bhopal disasters (Pidgeon & O'Leary, 
2000).  Whether in the original design, or evolving over time, design problems are 
known to be implicated in approximately half of process plant failures (Kinnersley & 
Roelen, 2007; Taylor, 2007).  The current research demonstrated that in addition to 
failures, design-related impediments to maintenance activities have a significant 
influence on day-to-day reliability, and in turn on the problem-solving skills required 
to achieve acceptable performance according to organisational requirements.  As 
such, design decisions have implications for the ability of the plant to be maintained 
throughout its operating life.   
 
The importance of the concept of maintainability has been accepted in engineering 
theory (Tjiparuro & Thompson, 2004) along with consideration of the practical 
requirements of maintainability (International Standards Organization, 2006a; 
Mason, 1990; Wani & Gandhi, 1999).  The means of designing facilities to automate 
control and improve the interfacing of humans to machines has similarly received 
attention (Jamieson & Vicente, 2005).  However, the evidence from the current 
research was that Design & Maintenance was still a major contributor to human 
factors-related failures, and that, when asked, maintenance personnel were often 
aware of the specific Design & Maintenance impediments in their work areas.  At the 
same time, comments concerning Design & Maintenance were virtually absent from 
survey responses, other than noting the lack of spares.  The implication was that 
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although plant design influenced reliability level, and maintenance personnel were 
aware of these influences, maintenance personnel did not consider plant design their 
concern.  Apparently, the design of a plant was taken as a given, and maintenance 
personnel tended to ‘work with what they had’.  This view accorded with Cooke’s 
(2002) description of maintenance technicians in manufacturing as generally having 
no input into plant design and equipment selection, and little involvement at the 
installation and commissioning stages.  Yet, they are still required to ensure that 
equipment functions reliably, and are often called upon to modify the original design.   
 
Despite the focus of maintenance personnel on human factors rather than design in 
their comments, it can be argued from the evidence of Study 1 that incident 
investigators were still not yet able to recognise the human factors associated with 
failures involving Design & Maintenance.  This may not be uncommon among 
incident investigators (Reinach & Viale, 2006) or managers striving to prevent these 
failures (Crichton, 2005; O'Dea & Flin, 2001) due to their lack of human factors 
expertise.  However, until organisations develop this ability to analyse the human 
factors contributing to incidents and better utilise the knowledge of maintenance 
personnel to correct design flaws, advances in reliability outcomes will be limited by 
the problem-solving abilities of maintenance personnel. 
 
9.5.3 Communication  
As mentioned, an important requirement of successful use of both Recognition-
Primed Decision-making and analytical problem-solving relies on easily accessible 
task-related information.  This applies to information from colleagues as well as from 
electronic information systems.  The findings in Study 2, and the qualitative data 
from Study 3 relating to communication (Figure 18), supported the important role of 
organisational communication and access to information in preventing failures and 
providing the resources that maintenance personnel perceive as needed to ensure 
reliability.  Furthermore, the results demonstrated that level considerations are 
critical in assessing organisational communication.  The evidence from Study 3 
(Figure 19) indicated that organisational communication, as the name implies, is an 
organisation-level dimension, and that therefore addressing deficiencies lies within a 
company’s control.  The significant correlation between Job-related feedback and 
Employer (Figure 15) further supported this contention, showing that workers in the 
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same workplace may experience communication climate differently if they are 
employed by different companies.  The implication from the current research is that 
communication and access to information needs to be addressed by the organisation 
as a whole, as solutions do not appear to develop at the group-level.  This conclusion 
particularly pertains to the concerns about impediments to obtaining information 
from electronic sources, supporting Baltes et al’s (2002) evidence that the quality of 
group decision-making decreases with the use of computer-mediated communication.  
Statements from maintenance personnel in both Study 2 interviews and Study 3 
comments frequently expressed dissatisfaction with information mediated by 
electronic information management systems, such as the SAP database.  Thus, 
although the role of communication in supporting problem-solving was not 
demonstrated in group-level processes tested in Study 3, it clearly played a 
supporting role in facilitating processes at the organisation-level, and therefore its 
impact on group-level outcomes still warrants investigation.   
 
9.6 Directions for Future Research 
9.6.1 Method development 
Further refinement of the data collection methods used in the research would be 
beneficial in addressing the methodological limitations discussed previously (Section 
7.4.6 and 9.3.2).  The current research approach could be extended in other 
directions.  This might include a longitudinal study of the effects of interventions 
designed to improve the areas of organisational weakness identified in the research, 
namely problem-solving methods, organisational communication, and the ease of 
access to information.  An intervention study would have a three fold purpose:  
1) A pre-test replication of the survey would provide an indication of the 
stability of the measures over time. 
2)  A post-test survey might demonstrate the relationship of the problem-
solving and organisational communication variables to changing reliability 
levels.  
3) A post-test survey with control groups could be used to determine the 
sensitivity of the measures to the effects of interventions. 
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9.6.2 Additional research directions 
The current research demonstrated the importance of relating group-level variables to 
group-level outcome differences.  However the impact of human factors variables at 
the individual and organisational level on group-level processes was not specifically 
investigated.  From the literature reviewed (Cassignol-Bertrand, Baldet, Louche, & 
Papet, 2006; Martin, 2004; Meyer, Becker, & Vandenberghe, 2004), the individual-
level traits of job satisfaction, commitment, and intrinsic motivation are likely to 
have an influence on performance.  The richness of the data provided in the survey 
comments demonstrated that the respondents had a high level of commitment to 
achieving positive outcomes and a motivation to do their work efficiently.  However, 
this may not apply to the other maintenance staff (N=77) who completed the 
questionnaire without commenting, or the 58% of maintenance personnel who did 
not return a completed questionnaire.  The CULTURE questionnaire, developed by 
Reiman and Oedewald (2004), provides a promising methodology for investigating 
the role of these individual differences in maintenance outcomes.  Controlling for the 
influence of individual traits may provide a more complete explanation of the role of 
problem-solving and vigilance in managing maintenance problems, as well as the 
attitudes to differences encountered in design and maintenance.   
 
Similarly, at the organisation-level, the literature indicates the important role of 
organisational learning in correcting faults in the design of workplaces (Carroll, 
1998; Marsick & Watkins, 2003), as well as in providing a feedback mechanism 
whereby information learned through problem-solving is incorporated into 
organisational understanding and processes (Barkai & Samuel, 2005; Carnes & 
Breslau, 2002).  In Study 1, it was observed that the Lessons Learned section of the 
First Priority form was rarely completed.  At the same time, in Study 2, it was often 
mentioned that learnings from failures would not be fed back into workplace systems 
and that errors were likely to be repeated.  Although organisational learning was not 
tested per se in Study 3, a number of comments supported the findings from Studies 
1 and 2, namely that learnings were often not communicated, and therefore the 
probability of future failures was not reduced.  The extent of organisational learning 
may be an important covariate in both the scores from Problem-Solving and 
Communication.  Measuring and controlling for perceptions of organisational 
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learning as a separate variable may clarify the way in which problem-solving and 
communication influence reliability outcomes.  
 
Finally, the influence of procedural violations on reliability outcomes was frequently 
suggested in the maintenance literature (Hobbs & Williamson, 2003; Holmgren, 
2005; Pyy, 2001).  Although Study 1 found that failures were frequently attributed to 
violations (Figure 3), a similar relationship was not identified in Studies 2 and 3.  
This may be due to the nature of data collection in the latter studies, which was 
primarily based on self-reports.  An alternative (i.e., more ‘objective’) method of 
assessing group-level differences in the prevalence of violations, such as behavioural 
observations (Glendon & Litherland, 2001), may reveal a stronger relationship to 
reliability level than was identified in this research. 
 
9.7 General Conclusions 
Each technical failure reinforces the perceived potential for hazardous operations to 
fail catastrophically and the need for better control of complex technologies, such as 
those in petroleum operations (Urbina, 2010).  Industrial workers in general and 
maintenance personnel in particular are responsible for control of these technologies, 
and for maintaining their reliability.  At the same time, the managers of these 
technologies have agendas which include reliability, but, as Schein (1996) agued in 
his comparison of operator, engineering, and executive cultures, may not focus on 
the needs and opinions of the workers responsible for it.  Consequently, as Starbuck 
and Milliken (1988) contended, organisations are inclined to ‘fine-tune’ advanced 
systems by increasing output and reducing input resources to the point where 
probability of failure drifts to an unacceptable level.  Despite this influence of the 
decisions made by organisations, the people working closest to the technology are 
the first to be blamed for its failure.  Thus, ‘pilot error’, ‘maintenance failure’, and 
‘violation of established procedures’ are among the first labels attached to many 
failures and accidents (Reason & Hobbs, 2003). 
 
Although they have a responsibility for outcomes, maintenance personnel are rarely 
recognised for their awareness of the condition of equipment and weaknesses of the 
systems with which they interact on a routine basis.  In Cooke’s (2002) analysis of 
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the role of maintenance workers in five British firms undergoing change, she 
identified that: 
“Maintenance workers have a more important role to play in technological 
change than is commonly assumed by their managers and by writers on 
maintenance work.  Instead of being passive recipients of, or a source of 
resistance to, technological change, they can, and are willing to, facilitate and 
initiate technological change in their organizations.”  (p.963) 
The findings of the current research support this conclusion, namely that firms would 
benefit from utilising the perceptions and situated insights of maintenance workers.  
Maintenance personnel were found to have the domain knowledge, situation 
awareness, motivation, and interactivity with the technologies that could provide the 
data that organisations require to deal with the reliability flaws that are commonly 
inherent in equipment and plant designs.  Furthermore, by equipping maintenance 
technicians in particular with more effective problem-solving strategies and 
improved access to task-related information, they may be better-equipped to counter 
the effects of any inherent reliability flaws in plant designs.  The feedback involved 
in analysing and correcting both immediate and underlying problems, and facilitating 
organisational communication, represent an important process of second-order 
organisational learning.  Tucker and Edmondson (2003) found that front-line 
workers, such as nurses are able to solve first-order problems, but they need the 
support of management to redesign work systems in order to prevent future 
recurrences.  As plant and systems become more complex and tightly coupled, 
maintenance personnel will need to become better equipped to analyse the problems 
inherent in the equipment they manage, and have a role in improving the overall 
effectiveness of the technology and equipment they control.  The starting point of 
this process is better information and understanding concerning the human factors in 
workplace functions.   
 
The current research has attempted to demonstrate that the perceptions of 
maintenance personnel were the best place to begin acquiring this understanding of 
human factors in the workplace.  Based on interviewees’ descriptions in Study 2, 
petroleum companies will benefit from addressing instances of inadequate design 
and limited equipment maintainability, if they wish to reduce the incidence of 
failures.  At the same time, steps could be taken to become a ‘higher reliability 
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organisation’ by ensuring adequate organisational communication, and greater 
information flow between participants in the maintenance process.  Where reliability 
has been identified as inherently low, petroleum companies would also benefit from 
enhancing the problem-solving skills of maintenance personnel.  More emphasis is 
required on developing broader strategies for solving maintenance problems across a 
wide range of equipment types, rather than allowing organisational pressures to 
impose an exclusively Recognition-Primed Decision-making approach.  Finally, 
instead of focusing on human error and procedural violations, a more thorough 
examination of underlying organisational weaknesses will assist in the organisational 
development needed to counter threats to process safety and continuity of petroleum 
production. 
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Appendix A:  Templates used to Collect Data from Interviewees 
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Appendix B: Approval of the Curtin University Ethics Committee 
 
  
                                                       Human Factors and Plant Maintenance Reliability 284 
Appendix C: Information Sheet to Explain the Purpose of this Research 
 
  Curtin University of Technology 
 School of Psychology 
 Bentley, Western Australia 
 
 
Call for Volunteers 
 
Recognising the Human Factors in Maintenance at [the company] 
 
 
Thanks for your interest in our project.  This information sheet will explain why 
we are doing this project, and how it may help you in your job and help [the 
company] become a better place to work. 
 
Why is this project important?
This project will examine the human and organisation factors in your workplace, 
and their role in creating maintenance reliability.  The information will be used to 
make [company] workplaces more-user friendly and to eliminate the factors that 
cause breakdowns in the workplace.   
 
By volunteering to be part of this study, the important information that you can 
provide will help us to determine what workplace issues make the job of 
maintainers at [the company] more effective.  Many times the goals and 
pressures create the basis for mistakes and frustration.  People working at the 
‘coalface’ experience this and are the best people to feed back examples of 
where this is happening.   
 
Who is conducting this research? 
Specialists in human factors in the School of Psychology at Curtin University of 
Technology have developed this project with the support of [the company] 
Maintenance Strategy group.  The principal researcher, Ari Antonovsky, is an 
engineer with 15 years experience in maintenance reliability in the WA mining 
industry.   
 
  




What will you be doing for this survey? 
We are asking you to participate in a short interview (about 50 minutes).   
The interviews will be at [company headquarters] if you are based in Perth and 
at site if you are based at the Process Plant.  All interviews will involve only 
yourself and a researcher from Curtin University.  No information from you goes 
directly back to [the company]. 
 
Examples of the types of questions you will be asked are: 
• Was a particular part of a task missed out?   
• Did someone assume that equipment and location were correct? 
• Was a procedure not used because it was difficult to obtain? 
 
Who can participate in this study? 
We are looking for anyone in the maintenance, operations or supervisory areas 
who have first-hand knowledge of work that did not ‘go-to-plan’, or later caused 
maintenance ‘headaches’. 
How will your information be used? 
The responses of all the people interviewed will be collected together to 
determine which of the human and workplace issues are most important to 
maintenance reliability at [the company].   
All employees participating in this project will be COMPLETELY ANONYMOUS. 
• No personal information will be asked for in the interview; 
• No [company] staff will be present at the interview; 
• The information that [the company] receives will be grouped together to 
ensure that individuals cannot be identified.  All information will be 
held confidentially by Curtin. 
• Note that you can change your mind at any time and chose not to 
continue.   
What you need to do to assist this project 
• All you need to do is to reply to this note by e-mail.   
• A member of the research team will then contact you to set up a 
meeting.  We will ask when your best availability is.  That’s all there 
is to it. 
• If you have any questions about the project, please contact one of the 
people below. 
 
Ari Antonovsky     Prof Clare Pollock 
ari.antonovsky@postgrad.curtin.edu.au   clare.pollock@curtin.edu.au
041 312 7935      08 9266 7867 
 
This study has been approved by the Curtin University Human Research Ethics Committee (Approval 
Number HR 147/2007. If needed, verification of approval can be obtained either by writing to the Curtin University 
Human Research Ethics Committee, c/- Office of Research and Development, Curtin University of 
Technology, GPO Box U1987, Perth, 6845 or by telephoning 9266 2784 or emailing hrec@curtin.edu.au 
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Appendix E: Scales Used in the Survey in Study 3 
 
Work Design Questionnaire (Morgeson & Humphrey, 2006, p.1338): 
Problem Solving scale: 
1. The job involves solving problems that have no obvious correct answer. 
2. The job requires me to be creative. 
3. The job often involves dealing with problems that I have not met before. 
4. The job requires unique ideas or solutions to problems. 
 
Melbourne Decision-Making Questionnaire (Mann, Burnett, Bradford & Ford, 1997, 
p.12): 
Vigilance scale: 
1. I like to consider all of the alternatives. 
2. I try to find out the disadvantages of all alternatives. 
3. I consider how best to carry out a decision.  
4. When making decisions I like to collect a lot of information. 
5. I try to be clear about my objectives before choosing. 
6. I take a lot of care before choosing. 
 
Organisational Communication Development Audit Questionnaire   (OCD/2) 
(Greenbaum, Clampitt, & Willihnganz, 1988, p.276): 
 
Each question is answered on a five-point scale as follows: 1 is very dissatisfied 
(very little); 2 is dissatisfied (little); 3 is cannot say; 4 is satisfied (much), 5 is very 
satisfied (very much). 
 
A.    Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with communication and the availability of 
information in your organization? 
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B.   How much information about your work and organization do you get now from: 
 
1. Supervisors and management 2. Shop stewards 3. Fellow 
employees 
4. Bulletin boards 5. Newsletters/house 
organ 
6. Staff meetings 




D.   What is the amount of information you receive now about the following job 
items? 
1. Economic situation of 
the organisation 
2. Employment situation 3. My own work 
4. Changes in production 5. Training and courses 6. Employee benefits 
7. Sales 8. Organisational changes  
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Appendix F: Maintenance Workplace Questionnaire – Form Sent to Participants 
    Faculty of Health Sciences 
   Curtin University of Technology 






































Thanks for participating.  If you have any questions about the survey please contact either of the people below.  
   Ari Antonovsky     Prof Clare Pollock 
 ari.antonovsky@postgrad.curtin.edu.au  clare.pollock@curtin.edu.au
   041 312 7935                       08 9266 7867   
This study has been approved by the Curtin University Human Research Ethics Committee (Approval Number HR 147/2007.  If needed, verification of 
approval can be obtained either by writing to the Curtin University Human Research Ethics Committee, c/- Office of Research and Development, Curtin 
University of Technology, GPO Box U1987, Perth, 6845 or by telephoning 9266 2784 or emailing hrec@curtin.edu.au 
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       Curtin Univ. Code____________________ 
Please tick the appropriate box:      (Office Use) 
            
Your Usual Workplace:       GP1       GP2     GP3     Process Plant  
           FP1    FP2   FP3       
 
If you work in the Process Plant: 
Work Area:        PP1       PP2       PP3 
 
           Other: Where?_____________________________ 
 
Workgroup type:       Core Crew      Major Maintenance     Shutdown Crew 
 
         Other: Which?_____________________________  
 
Work Category:              Electrical/Inlec        Mechanical 
 
 
Length of Time at this Facility:        Less than 3 months     3-12 months 
       1-3 years     3-10 years     More than 10 years 
 
 
Total Time in the Resource Industry:    Less than 3 months     3-12 months 
       1-3 years     3-10 years     More than 10 years 
       
      Are you employed by: 
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Section 1:  Design & Maintenance section  
 Thinking of the machines and 




Sometimes Often Always 
1 
Are the structures and designs of plant 
equipment adequate (‘fit for purpose’)? 0 1 2 3 4 
2 
Are the parts, spares, and materials used 
adequate (‘fit for purpose’)? 0 1 2 3 4 
3 
Do you have sufficient access to equipment 
for maintenance? 0 1 2 3 4 
4 
Is equipment ever overdue for maintenance 
or Condition Monitoring? 
0 1 2 3 4 
5 
Do you ever encounter problems with 
modifications? 
0 1 2 3 4 
6 
Do you ever work on non-standard 
equipment  
(e.g., unexpected or confusing designs)? 
0 1 2 3 4 
7 
Does the plant design allow parts to be 
installed easily? 0 1 2 3 4 
8 
Do you find that equipment is accurately 
labelled for maintenance work? 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
Section 2:  Problem-solving section  
 











The job involves solving problems that have 
no obvious correct answer. 
0 1 2 3 4 
10 The job requires me to be creative.   0 1 2 3 4 
11 
The job often involves dealing with 
problems that I have not met before.   
0 1 2 3 4 
12 
The job requires unique ideas or solutions 
to problems.   
0 1 2 3 4 
13 I like to consider all of the alternatives.   0 1 2 3 4 
14 
I try to find out the disadvantages of all 
alternatives.   
0 1 2 3 4 
15 I consider how best to carry out a decision.   0 1 2 3 4 
16 
When making decisions I like to collect a lot 
of information.   
0 1 2 3 4 
17 
I try to be clear about my objectives before 
choosing how to do a job.   
0 1 2 3 4 
18 
I take a lot of care before choosing how to 
do a job.   
0 1 2 3 4 
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Section 3:  Communication Section  
 











Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with 
communication and the availability of 
information in your organization? 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
How much information about your 









20 Your Supervisor 0 1 2 3 4 
21 Fellow employees 0 1 2 3 4 
22 Staff meetings 0 1 2 3 4 
23 Memos, procedures and reports 0 1 2 3 4 
24 Vendors 0 1 2 3 4 
25 
Computer based information systems (SAP, 
Virtual Bookshelf) 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
What is the amount of 
information you receive now 









26 My own work 0 1 2 3 4 
27 Changes in production 0 1 2 3 4 
28 Training and courses 0 1 2 3 4 
29 Organisational changes 0 1 2 3 4 











That is all!  You have successfully completed the survey.   
Thanks for taking the time to participate, and helping to make a better 
workplace.  Please send the filled-in questionnaire to:       
Ari Antonovsky, Mail drop WP 03‐12L. 
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Appendix G – Factor Analysis of the Design & Maintenance scale 
 
Four parameters were calculated using SPSS to assess the suitability of the data for 
Factor Analysis of the Design & Maintenance scale.  Normality of the data was 
initially determined using the Shapiro-Wilk statistic, but all items returned a 
significant value, nominally indicating that the data violated the assumption of 
normality.  However further tests of normality (Allen & Bennett, 2008) indicated the 
shape of histograms were approximately normal.  Furthermore, the skewness and 
kurtosis data (Table 22) for scale items indicated approximately normal distributions, 
i.e., skewness and kurtosis statistics were between -1 and +1. 
 
Table 22.  Item statistics indicating normality of distributions. 
Item No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Skewness .049 -.129 .076 .102 -.123 -.055 -.093 -.682 
Kurtosis -.24 -.144 -.339 .374 .001 -.108 -.345 1.019 
 
Howell (2004) recommends that predictors that are highly correlated should not be 
used in Factor Analysis.  The highest inter-item correlation in this data was r= .408, 
indicating that multi-collinearity was acceptable for Factor Analysis.  The 
assumption of linearity between items was tested by producing scatterplots for a 
sample of items.  An example of a linear relationship between Question 1 and 
Question 8 is provided in Figure 20. 
 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was significant, returning a value of 226 (df= 28, 
p<.001).  This result indicated factorability, though this test is recommended for 
fewer than five cases per variable (Allen & Bennett, 2008).  Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin’s 
Measure of Sampling Adequacy was .781.  Values greater than .6 are considered 
acceptable for Factor Analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  As the skewness and 
kurtosis statistics are all within the range of -1 to +1, the data for the scales was 
considered normally distributed.   
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Figure 20.  Scatterplot showing linear relationship between items in the Design & 
Maintenance scale. 
 
Factor Analysis of the eight items in Design & Maintenance produced the Scree Plot 
of Eigenvalues shown in Figure 21.  Two factors were found to have Eigenvalues 
greater than 1.0.  The loadings for these factors are shown in Table 23.  Cronbach’s 
α resulting from the removal of each item is also listed.  Internal reliability was 
found to decrease from the scale reliability (α=.729) if any item were to be removed.  
Therefore Design & Maintenance was kept as a single variable including all items in 
the original scale. 
 
 
Figure 21.  Eigenvalues for Factor Analysis of Design & Maintenance items. 
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Table 23.  Factor loadings the items in the Design & Maintenance section of the 
survey. 
 Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Cronbach’s α if Item Deleted 
Q1 Adequate Plant Structure .526  .702 
Q2 Adequate Parts, Spares and Materials .478 .378 .684 
Q3 Sufficient Access for Maintenance .423 .393 .687 
Q4 Maintenance or CM Overdue a   .644 .696 
Q5 Problems with Modifications a   .651 .710 
Q6 Problems with Non-standard Equipment a  .396 .709 
Q7 Parts Installed Easily .612  .718 
Q8 Equipment Accurately Labelled .541  .702 
a Reverse-coded 
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Appendix H- Factor Analysis of the Organisational Communication items 
 
For the Organisational Communication items, four parameters were calculated to 
assess the suitability of the data for Factor Analysis.  Normality of the data was 
initially determined using the Shapiro-Wilk statistic, but here too all items returned a 
significant value.  Further tests of normality (Allen & Bennett, 2008) indicated the 
shape of histograms were approximately normal.  The skewness and kurtosis data 
(Table 24) for scale items indicated approximately normal distributions. 
 
Table 24.  Item statistics indicating normality of distributions. 
Item No. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
Skewness -.332 -.562 -.566 -.168 -.631 .205 -.671 -.419 -.049 -.219 .045 -.035
Kurtosis -.752 -.638 .680 -.835 -.207 -.587 -.223 -.306 -1.018 -.742 -.923 -.741
 
The assumption of linearity between items was tested by producing scatterplots for a 
sample of items in the Organisational Communication scale.  An example of a linear 
relationship between Question 26 and Question 27 is provided in Figure 22.  The 
highest inter-item correlation in this data was r= .513, indicating that multi-
collinearity was acceptable for Factor Analysis. 
 
 
Figure 22.  Scatterplot showing linear relationship between items in the 
Organisational Communication scale. 
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Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity returned a value of 530(df= 66, p<.001), which indicated 
factorability.  Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin’s Measure of Sampling Adequacy was .804, also 
indicating factorability.  As the skewness and kurtosis statistics were all within the 
range of -1 to +1, the data for the scales was considered normally distributed.    
 
Factor Analysis of the 12 items in the Organisational Communication section 
produced the Scree Plot of Eigenvalues shown in Figure 23.  Four factors were found 
to have Eigenvalues greater than 1.0.  The loadings for these factors are shown in 
Table 25.  The items loading on Factors 1 and 2 are relatively free of cross-loadings.  
Factor 3 cross-loads on a number of items while Factor four only has one item which 
does not cross load onto another factor.  Therefore two factors were derived from the 
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Table 25.  Factor loadings for the items in the Organisational Communication 
section of the survey. 
Factor  Item 
1 2 3 4 
Q19 Satisfied with Communication and Information .443    
Q20 Information About Work From Supervisor .809    
Q21 Information From Fellow Employees     
Q22 Information About Work From Staff Meetings .502  .424  
Q23 Information From Procedures & Reports .407  .517 .415 
Q24 Information About Work From Vendors   .579  
Q25 Information From Computer Systems    .603 
Q26 Amount of Information About Own Work .633    
Q27 Amount of Information About Production  .613   
Q28 Amount of Information About Training  .475   
Q29 Amount of Information About Organisation  .534   
Q30 Amount of Information About New Procedures  .679   
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Appendix I – Assumption Tests for ANOVAs and ANCOVAs 
To determine the suitability of the collected data for analysis of variance and 
covariance, Shapiro-Wilk Tests for normality and Levene’s Tests for the 
homogeneity of variance were conducted (Table 26 and 27).   
 
Table 26.  Tests for the suitability of analysis of variance for one-way ANOVA. 
Levene’s Test Shapiro-Wilk 
Variable Name F(2,50) p 
Reliability 
Ranking Statistic df p 
Highest .840 11 .031 
Middle .926 21 .112 Design & Maintenance 2.182 .123 
Lowest .961 21 .534 
       
.948 11 .613 
Middle .966 21 .638 Vigilance .048 .954 
Lowest .932 21 .152 
       
Highest .939 11 .513 
Middle .967 21 .662 Job-related feedback 2.010 .145 
Lowest .938 21 .201 
       
Highest .894 11 .158 
Middle .953 21 .380 Problem-solving 1.369 .264 
Lowest .959 21 .503 
       
Highest .926 11 .375 Information about 
change 2.624 .082 Middle .924 21 .104 
Highest 
 
The assumption of homogeneity was only violated for the items relating to 
Information about change.  Allen and Bennett (2008) do not consider this a concern 
when groups are equal in size and are moderately large.  The assumption of 
normality appeared to be violated for several variables, in which the Shapiro-Wilk 
Test returned a significant statistic (p<.05).  They recommend a further test of 
normality by examining the skewness and kurtosis of the distribution.  In all of these 
distributions, the skewness and kurtosis statistics were acceptable i.e., between -1 
and +1. 
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Table 27.  Tests for the suitability of analysis of variance for two-way ANOVA.   
Levene’s Test Shapiro-Wilk Test 
Variable Name F(3,82) p Reliability F(3,43) p 
Lower .971 .333 Design & 
Maintenance 1.604 .195 Higher .960 .137 





 Higher .948 .049 
Lower .951 .066 Job-related 
feedback 1.567 .204 Higher .968 .266 





 Higher .978 .583 
Lower .974 .439 Information about 
change 2.760 .047 Higher .975 .474 
 
For the ANCOVAs, the co-variates must be normally distributed as well.  Shapiro-
Wilk Tests for the co-variates Time at Facility and Employer were significant, 
indicating a violation of the Assumption of Normality.  However, histograms, and 
skewness and kurtosis statistics indicated that the data was approximately normally 
distributed.  A further assumption in the suitability of data for ANCOVA is the 
homogeneity of regression slopes.  The results (Table 28) indicated that the 
assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes was only violated for the interaction 
between Reliability Level and Time at Facility in the one-way analysis of Design & 
Maintenance. 
 
Table 28.  Tests for homogeneity of regression slopes. 
Scale Interaction Term F p 
Reliability * Time at Facility   
One-way data (2,47)   5.104 .010 
Design & Maintenance 
Two-way data (1,79)     .104 .748 
Reliability * Employer   
One-way data (1,45)    1.670 .203 
Job-related feedback 
Two-way data (1,77)     .618 .434 
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Finally, checking for linearity of the items within a scale was required.  Scatterplots 
comparing the DVs with the co-variates were used to assess linearity of data.  A 
scatterplot showing linearity of Design & Maintenance against Time at Facility is 
shown in Figure 24, and a scatterplot of Job-related feedback against Employer is 
shown in Figure 25. 
 




Figure 25.  Scatterplot of Job-related feedback against Employer. 
  
